

News from behind the IRON CURTAIN

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FEATURES

- Romanian Balance Sheet
- Consumer Goods and Internal Trade in Romania
- The New Line on Love
- Hungarian Journalism
- Hungarian Party Resolution



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April 1955 — Vol. 4 — No. 4

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ABOUT THIS PUBLICATION . . .

NEWS FROM BEHIND THE IRON CURTAIN, published monthly by the Free Europe Press of the Free Europe Committee, Inc., is addressed to those with a specific interest in events and developments in Communist-dominated Europe. This publication is sold, by subscription at an annual rate of \$3.00, to representatives of the press and other media, to universities, churches, libraries, and research centers, and to other groups of citizens, as well as to individuals who are interested in a serious, fully-documented account of "Communism-in-action." The Committee believes that accurate information contributes to an understanding of the strengths and weaknesses of Communism, and hence to the ability of the free nations to combat this system.

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The Month in Review



IN Hungary, an important Central Committee resolution clarified the new tone of political life in that country. The resolution reaffirmed the essential correctness of the June, 1953 decisions while simultaneously criticizing serious errors in their implementation. As the New Course itself was a policy of attempting to correct previous imbalances and exaggerations, so the new resolution was a Communist attempt to control the "runaway" aspects of the policies which the Party has castigated as "liberalization." That such correction should come first in Hungary was logical since Hungary had moved farthest and fastest along the "June road." The Hungarian leadership was trying to steer a middle course between two "distortions" of these policies; as Istvan Kovacs, First Secretary of the Budapest CP Committee, stated it: "We must fight on two fronts; we must see to it that while we rout anti-Marxist and rightist concepts, we do not permit left-wing concepts, which might be equally detrimental, to regain their strength."

The resolution went on to insist that permanent development of heavy industry is essential to Marxist-Leninist policy, but carefully declared that no return to forced industrialization was presently planned, and reiterated the statement that "From 1951 on, Socialist industry aimed at a pace of development in excess of our capacity and economic conditions." The "June road" elements of "Socialist legality," "collective leadership," "voluntary adherence" to collective farms, emphasis on private farming, initiative from below and increase of productivity, were all called for. At the same time the tone of the resolution was reflected in the insistence on closer Party control of the PPF and Party primacy in the nation's political life.

Elsewhere in the orbit, budgetary figures and new decrees indicated that 1955 would see further emphasis on agriculture. In Bulgaria, Premier Chervenkov admitted serious farm failures in 1954 because of bad management, incompetence and corruption. The 1955 budget provides for approximately the same total farm expenditure, but a fifty percent increase in agricultural capital investment over 1954.

In Romania, Premier Georghiu-Dej called for an increase in farm production, particularly in the per hectare corn yield which, he stated, is lower today than it was forty years ago. The 1955 investments in agriculture will be increased more than fifty-five percent over 1954. In addition, various forms of State aid are to be given to farmers, private and collectivized alike, and compulsory delivery prices paid for certain technical plants have been raised.

In Poland, a recent budget announcement revealed that agricultural expenditures for 1955 are to be increased twenty-two percent over 1954. Poland also had a number of recent pronouncements on the relative emphasis of heavy and consumer goods industry. The tenor of these was that in 1955 consumer industry will increase at a more rapid rate than heavy industry, but it was cautiously pointed out that such a rate is exceptional and

the result of unusual circumstances. The unusual circumstances presumably refer to previous overemphasis on heavy industry and neglect of consumer goods.

In Czechoslovakia, there was a **price increase to farmers**, collective and private, for compulsory deliveries and above-quota deliveries of certain products. A campaign was also underway to **increase** greatly the **aid given by MTS to private farmers**, indicating that the regime was prepared to make some investment in money and machines on the independent sector of farming.

In Hungary, the only recent and important **agricultural decree** was in the **spirit of the Central Committee resolution** correcting New Course "excesses." It attempts to cut off a thriving black market by restricting farmers' rights to trade in livestock.

Throughout the orbit, statements paralleling the Soviet "general line" on the prime importance of heavy industrial development have been made and, in fact, some moderate increases in heavy industry have been planned. It is significant, however, that even in Hungary the Central Committee resolution calls for only a 5.7 percent increase in the production of "Socialist" industry in the current year as compared to a 7.3 increase in agricultural production. In the main, therefore, the **Satellite regimes** seemed to have **seized upon that portion of the Soviet program which calls for an upsurge in agriculture**, and to agriculture the greatest budgetary increases have been assigned, as well as the greatest political emphasis.

While the Communists continue their concessionary policies toward the independent farmers in order to raise production and yield, they also continue to consolidate, and in some cases to increase, the collective sector by "persuasion." Last year, Czechoslovak and Hungarian collectivization rates continued to decrease, but at a slower tempo than in 1953, while Polish collectives increased somewhat, though a thousand short of the planned goal. Romanian activity in the countryside was chiefly focussed on the peasant associations, yet a 15 percent increase in kolkhozes was announced. While the Communist regimes have for the present abandoned terrorist methods and lessened administrative pressures in the countryside, a "**creeping collectivization**" drive seems to be taking place.

Romanian Balance Sheet

A survey of conditions in Romania since the introduction of the New Course in August 1953. The article shows that Party dissension has increased, and that the regime is having considerable trouble unifying Party ranks and gaining firm control over the Communist youth organization, UTM. It also points up the prevailing chaos in industry, and the regime's inadequate efforts to boost consumer goods production within the scope of its present program. Shortages of goods in villages, and failures in farm production have also presented serious problems for the Communist government, and it appears that in the past year and a half, implementation of the new program has given rise to new and critical difficulties.

THE current crisis within Romania is perhaps best reflected in the fact that it is the only East European Satellite not to have held a New Course Party Congress by the end of last year. Although a Party convention was scheduled for 1954 and required by the Party Statutes, the year passed without a Congress and was characterized by internal difficulties which necessitated its being twice postponed. Originally slated for March 1954, the Congress was first put off until the end of October; then, in mid-October, came the sudden announcement that, because Party organizations needed to devote their full attention to autumn sowing, the Congress would take place at some future date. No definite time was set for the event, however, and as late as February 1955—long after the sowing campaign had ended—the regime remained silent on this important subject. The leadership's inability to organize a Congress as well as the nature of its activities in recent months indicate that post-Stalinist corrective measures, far from bearing fruit, have created serious new economic and political disruptions.

Ever since 1952, with the purge of the Pauker clique, there have been signs of profound disturbances within Romanian Party ranks on all echelons. Following the downfall of Ana Pauker, there was a gradual but thorough reorganization of top government and Party personnel.



LEUL: — Și eu sînt pentru critica de jos!... Cine începe ?...

Desen de NELL COBÂR

Lion: "I am also one who believes in criticism from the lower echelons. Now, who's first?"

Urzica (Bucharest), November 15, 1954

Now, in 1955, the purge appears to be over, but the top leadership has neither whipped the Party into shape nor suppressed the rumblings of discontent within middle Party echelons. The 1954 trials of former top Communists Vasile Luca and Lucretiu Patrascanu, and the present campaign to appease national minorities, provide significant clues to the Party's lack of cohesion.

Patrascanu-Luca Trials

For more than a year now the top Party hierarchy appears to have been fighting a losing battle in its desperate attempt to mold its membership into a dedicated monolithic organization responsive to the demands made upon it by the New Course program. As in the other countries, the new orientation has imposed additional tasks on all the Party echelons: more initiative has been required of Party members, greater flexibility has been demanded of them, and to some extent new methods, new goals and new "ideals" have been prescribed to them from above. These instructions, however, have been far from clear and, in essence, contain two elements—an increase in individual initiative and a preservation of the all-prevailing mechanism of Party discipline—that are irreconcilable. It now appears that, as the new program has unfolded, this basic

contradiction in Party orientation has had a disruptive effect on the membership, so that the top hierarchy has had to devote a great deal of effort trying to define the ideological limits of the New Course to the Party faithful.

The first phase of this process in re-indoctrination was dramatized in the trial of the Patrascanu group in April 1954. Ostensibly this trial of the wartime leader of Romanian Communism and his associates was carried out in accordance with the revived concept of "Socialist legality," a term which in present-day Party parlance denotes a reaction against the arbitrary lawlessness of Stalinist terrorism. To some extent the concept was applicable since Patrascanu had been purged as long ago as 1948 and no legal proceedings had been taken against him in the intervening years that he spent in prison. It is clear however that more than that was involved in the trial of the "nationalist" Patrascanu at that particular time: one of his associates, Silber, tried with him and duly sentenced to life imprisonment, had actually died in prison several years before. The trial therefore was not of a person but of an idea, the idea or, more exactly "Party trend" that Patrascanu stood for among the Party faithful.

Exact labels cannot be attached to any one high up in the Party hierarchy since the top echelons have long been made up of opportunists whose ideological commitments have little in common with the policies they advocate at any particular time. Temperamental, educational and other personality variations do however exist among Communist leaders, and these were often of a decisive nature in the case of native-born and educated leaders who directed Party organizations at a time when, because of the war, control from Moscow was tenuous. Patrascanu was such a man. He was a scholar, a well-known lawyer of "bourgeois" origin and, above all, a "native" Communist who had not been trained in Moscow and who apparently was naive enough to expect the development of Communism in his country along lines best suited to take into account local, national conditions. Patrascanu, in short, embodied many elements of Titoism (though he was purged before the Yugoslav-Cominform break) and he possessed few of the elements that would have qualified him as a Moscow emissary under Stalin.

The concept that was therefore repudiated at his trial was that the New Course had ushered in a new era of national independence, of "bourgeois" tolerance and *laissez faire*. Patrascanu was sentenced to death for having committed treason in that he had been "paralyzing the fight of democratic forces against Fascism." No such "paralysis" would now be tolerated. That this reminder had to be communicated so forcefully to the Party seems to indicate that the New Course "liberalization" had indeed given birth to dangerous "nationalist" tendencies within the Party that had to be checked and destroyed before a Congress could be held.

It is probably no coincidence that the Patrascanu trial took place almost on the very date that the Congress should have been held. Similarly it is probably not accidental that yet another trial, that of former Minister of Finance Vasile Luca, took place in October 1954, the

time set for the postponed convention. The relationship between these legal proceedings and deferment of the Congress becomes even more striking when it is remembered that Luca was the driving force behind the downfall of Patrascanu and that, with Ana Pauker and Teohari Georgescu, he formed part of the Moscow-picked team that ruled the country after Patrascanu's elimination. It can be adduced that Patrascanu's trial did not cement Party unity and that, on the contrary, fear and apathy engendered by the proceedings demoralized large segments within the Party. The Party hierarchy, in other words, having attempted to re-establish discipline, appears instead to have demoralized the membership.

The effects of that demoralization were probably reflected in all spheres of Party activity, particularly the economic sphere as related to the New Course program. Be that as it may, it is interesting to note that Luca was charged with having "undermined the national economy," a sign that economic activity was not going according to expectations. It is also significant that shortly before the trial, in September of 1954, it was announced that the joint Soviet-Romanian stock companies, those instruments of Soviet imperial exploitation, had been dissolved (though Romania continues to make yearly "repayments"). This type of apparent appeasement occurred in the other countries at that time too: the mixed companies were dissolved throughout the orbit and, in Hungary in particular, much stress was laid on "proceeding along the June Road." It is likely that there were Party factions both in Romania and in the other countries that clamored for a return to a more disciplined "Stalinist" program; at that time, however, all indications were that the Party hierarchy was trying to mobilize both the Party membership and the people behind the New Course line. The Luca episode was apparently part of that endeavor.

Wooing of Minorities

The Patrascanu affair did not settle Party disunity, and neither did the Luca affair. Once again there are reverberations, and new deviations that have to be taken care of before the Party can appear in open caucus. The new trouble appears to arise from the fact that Luca had long been known as the champion of minority groups and had played a leading role in the formation of the Hungarian Communist Party in Transylvania. His trial apparently set off a chain reaction among the already discontented minorities, and ever since October, the Party has had to wage an intense campaign to reassure them of their equal rights within the country.

This campaign has included the opening of "cultural homes" for national minorities and propaganda on regime tolerance of the various languages, such as Turkish, Armenian, Greek and chiefly Hungarian, spoken by the minority population. Emphasis also has been placed on the minorities' freedom of worship, and a recent broadcast to this effect was delivered by a member of the Hungarian Magyar Reform Church. Within the period of last De-

Mai sînt unii funcționari necinstiți care, în schimbul unor sume de bani, impun pe chibăuri la sume foarte mici

Desen de A. RIK



Title: There are still dishonest functionaries [tax collectors] who, in return for money, only levy small sums from kulaks.

Caption: "You put more in my pocket, and I'll put less down on paper . . ."

Urzica (Bucharest), November 15, 1954

December 2-7 alone, the following items appeared in the official press: *Scinteia Tineretului* (Bucharest) on December 2, claimed that "the successes attained in building Socialism . . . show that the unity between the Romanian working people and the national minorities constitutes one of the impelling factors of the people's democratic regime. Therefore, the working people must be vigilant, and check any vile machinations of the class foe who, with the help of the venomous weapon of nationalism and chauvinism, strives to undermine their unity and sabotage the building of Socialism." *Rominia Libera* of December 3, wrote:

"The brotherhood and the fighting and working unity between the Romanian people and the national minorities constitute . . . one of the principal resources of our People's Republic. . . . In the supreme organ of our country's state power, the Grand National Assembly, 77 deputies have been elected from among the ranks of the national minorities, and over 13,000 deputies in the regional, district and communal People's Councils. . . . The national policy of our Party has strengthened the confidence of the working people of various nationalities in the people's democratic regime and has led them to participate intensely in public life and in directing State affairs."

Scinteia Tineretului, in a December 7 editorial on educational accomplishments under the present regime, claimed that the successes achieved should not result in complacency and that a sharp struggle must be conducted against

signs of nationalism and chauvinism: "The increase of vigilance, the liquidation of any influence of the class foe, the destruction of any form of chauvinistic prejudice—these are the tasks of great responsibility which must be fulfilled at any time." With regard to the Patrascanu-Luca affair, an especially illuminating editorial on the minorities question appeared at the onset of the campaign in *Scinteia* (Bucharest), October 28, 1954. Under the title, "The Unshakable Brotherhood and Friendship of the Romanian People and the Ethnic Minorities," the newspaper wrote:

"Our Party, by carrying out intensive work for the internationalist education of workers, fought the different manifestations of bourgeois nationalism and, as far back as 1946, publicly unmasked and firmly and implacably crushed the attempts of Patrascanu, American espionage agent, to introduce and spread chauvinism within Party ranks. Through the expose by Comrade Gheorghiu-Dej at the plenary session of the RCP on chauvinist and revisionist tendencies . . . our Party has given the working people powerful arms to crush all kinds of nationalist machinations and to continuously consolidate the brotherhood of the Romanian people and the national minorities. . . . An expression of the RCP's realization of Marxist-Leninist principles as regards minorities was the creation of the Hungarian Autonomous Region. . . ."

This excerpt shows how fast the balance of political intra-Party warfare swings from one scale to the other.

It seems that hardly had the Patrascanu wing been conciliated by the Luca trial than a reaction set in among Party leadership of the minorities, so that once again it is Patrascanu who is under fire. At the same time, however, "national" Communist concepts have lately been loudly proclaimed, so that the total picture that emerges of the Party fight for internal cohesion is one of sustained unsteadiness maintained by emergency, self-defeating measures. Only a week after the *Scinteia* reference to "chauvinism," for instance, Gheorghiu-Dej wrote in the November 6 *For a Lasting Peace, For a People's Democracy!*:

"The trade relations among countries of the Socialist camp are the vivid personification of the principle of proletarian internationalism; all the countries . . . are vitally interested in the maximum development of the production forces of each one of them as the economic power of the entire camp is consolidated by this same development. . . . The comradely coordination of State plans, the socialist division of labor, represent a new and higher degree of brotherly cooperation. . . . *According to this cooperation, each country can see the possibility for developing, in the first place, those branches of its economy for which it possesses the most favorable economic resources. . . .*" (Italics added)

Confusion within the Party has not only prohibited the holding of a Party Congress but also has hampered fulfillment of the new economic program. The Party's inability to gain mass support or exercise firm economic leadership has contributed largely to New Course shortcomings, and has given rise to "formalism," bureaucracy and negligence in the work of ministries and Party committees. An August 31, 1954 *Scinteia* editorial pinpointed major weaknesses when it stated that the draft of the amended Party statutes emphatically points out that it is not enough for Party members merely to agree with Party decisions. They must actively struggle for the implementation of these decisions—i.e., help boost food, livestock and consumer goods production, decrease production costs, improve internal trade and "become determined fighters for the socialist transformation of agriculture." The newspaper complained that many Party members violate Party discipline, fail to combat hostile rumors and manifest an attitude of "passive formalism." *Scinteia* warned that the new statutes provide for expulsion of members who persist in these faults.

Further insight into prevailing weaknesses was provided by Central Committee member Petru Borila who, in the January 7, 1955 issue of *For a Lasting Peace*, declared that "implementation of the entire economic policy of the Party depends on the ability of Party organizations to rally, organize and lead the masses." Borila insisted that Party organizations check on the work of production managers and "combine political education of workers with agitation on the tasks confronting them." Serious shortcomings, he said, were evident not only in Party organizations but in ministerial apparatuses as well, particularly in those sectors concerned with consumer goods production. "It must be pointed out," he said, "that there are still major deficiencies in the Ministry of Light Industry, the Ministry

of the Food Industry and the Ministry of Communal Services and Local Industry. Frequent changes in planned assignments, lack of coordination between production plans and plans for material and technical supplies to enterprises prevent the use of all available reserves."

Youth

The Party's lack of cohesion and inability to mobilize the masses for carrying out the new program has been reflected in numerous criticisms of the Communist Youth Organization (UTM) for formalism, bureaucracy and poor ideological work, as well as in frequent complaints about the apathy, "misdemeanors" and "non-proletarian" attitudes of Romanian youth. The wide publicity given to UTM shortcomings in the first half of 1954 was followed in mid-year by a purge of the UTM leadership and a significant, official change in the organization's status within the country.

At a July 29 National Conference of the UTM in Bucharest, Virgil Trofin, the only member of the UTM's Political Bureau and Secretariat to survive the meeting politically, summed up previously-mentioned deficiencies by claiming that the work of the organization was totally divorced from present political-ideological tasks. At the end of the Conference, the entire Political Bureau and Secretariat, with the exception of Trofin, was purged, and a large part of the UTM Central Committee was replaced. Publication of the new draft statutes of the Party in August revealed further that the regime was not merely relying on new leadership to whip the UTM into shape, but had decided to take over openly direct organizational control.

According to the new statutes, the UTM no longer exists officially as an autonomous mass organization under Party guidance: UTM organizations in towns and villages are no longer responsible to superior UTM organs, but to local Party Committees, and the entire executive body of the UTM—which includes both Communists and non-Communists—comes under the supervision of the Party's Central Committee. This means, in effect, that the UTM has lost all claim to "independence" and "internal democracy."

Despite this change, criticisms of the UTM in the second half of 1954 paralleled those issued earlier in the year, and indicated that conditions had not improved. The UTM was and continues to be accused of failing to suppress chauvinism, cosmopolitanism, mysticism and hooliganism among youth, and of neglecting the education of young people in a "true Marxist spirit." The organization has also proved to be inadequate on the economic front: it has not encouraged "Socialist competitions," eliminated large-scale absenteeism, or won over young people as front-line workers in agriculture and industry. In a July 7, 1954, summary of these weaknesses, *Scinteia* lashed out at the UTM Central Committee: "The principle of collective leadership was violated by the UTM CC; criticism and especially criticism from below have been stifled. Bureaucracy and formalism have taken root in the work of the UTM CC. Real work with men has been replaced in great part

by paper work, the promotion and education of cadres has been neglected, and the fulfillment of decisions has not been satisfactorily organized and controlled."

After the purge of the UTM leadership, denunciations of formalism and bureaucracy continued. *Scinteia Tineretului* of September 7, for example, claimed that "many UTM organizations in industry are guilty of formalism and superficiality. . . . This can be the only explanation of why at the Grivitza Rosie Complex . . . there are in reality only seven brigades when there are claimed to be 35 UTM brigades. At the December 21 enterprise, there are claimed to be 38 brigades and in reality there are none. . . . UTM organizations are not sufficiently concerned with strengthening work discipline of young people in production and with liquidating unexcused absences from work. Many UTM organizations failed to take into account the fact that Communist education is class education. . . . For this reason, they have failed to permanently mobilize UTM members and the broad masses of youth, so as to unmask the class enemy and resist his ideology. . . . Where UTM organizations have loosened their political and ideological influence, kulak elements and other enemies have encouraged youth to indulge in hooliganism, to become truant idlers and to adopt unfair attitudes towards their working comrades."

On October 26, 1954, the same newspaper lashed out at UTM organizations' censorship of letters sent to the press, and their "stifling of criticism from below": "The smothering of criticism is a profound anti-Party act, a manifestation of a low political level and a lack of socialist conscience." On November 12, *Scinteia Tineretului* stated that "formalism and superficiality still exist in the political work for drawing young people into socialist and patriotic contests. There is still a great lack of discipline in production. . . . The activity of UTM members and young men in villages continues to be poor. . . . UTM meetings have not yet become true schools for the Communist education of youth. Many UTM gatherings continue to develop . . . in a bureaucratic manner." And on January 8, 1955, *Scinteia Tineretului* insisted that UTM organizations pay special attention to the "patriotic and international educational of youth . . . and severely combat any enemy attempts to spread nationalism and cosmopolitanism. . . . UTM organizations must not forget that to neglect that the education . . . of young people in the spirit of proletarian internationalism means to open the door to chauvinism."

Difficulties within the UTM must be attributed largely to lack of monolithic rule within the Party which has resulted in looser control and permitted more room for manifestations of discontent; the fact that the Party has now officially acknowledged its control of the UTM probably will not result in any significant improvement in the organization's work until the Party is able to act in a cohesive, effective manner.

Industry

The conditions noted above are indicative of the confusion now existing in Romanian industry and are due



Caption: "Get out, comrade! Courtesy Week ended yesterday!"
Urzica (Bucharest), January 26, 1954

partly to the fact that New Course investments to increase consumer goods production have been inadequate to achieve regime goals. The shortage of machinery, building materials and spare parts, as well as the exhaustion of both manpower and machinery, resulting from the pre-New Course program, have hindered fulfillment of the post-Stalin plan; further, neither managers nor workers are encouraged by the fact that a higher living standard depends chiefly on lowering production costs and raising productivity, and they have demanded either more money or more manpower to carry out the new program. Objections to the new policy's limitations were evident at the end of 1953. *Probleme Economice* in November of that year warned: "We must fight against tendencies shown by some Party and State cadres which, instead of fighting for increased production and labor productivity and better exploitation of internal reserves, demand that the State make investments in every new enterprise." In January 1954, the same periodical voiced other complaints: "Instead of fighting for fulfillment of work norms or implementing measures which would insure their fulfillment, the leadership of various industrial plants has adopted a more comfortable attitude: they ask for more manpower."

Since the regime was apparently unable to allocate either more men or more money to consumer goods production, partly because of its commitments to the Soviet Union, it relied on a system of production incentives to boost industrial output. The November 1953 wage law established progressive premiums and work norms which were devised to stimulate workers and managers to over-fulfill plan targets. The law stated, for example, that "the

new list of functions must be established in such a way as to encourage the interest of engineers and technicians in higher labor productivity and production. . . . The total amount of income for [technical-administrative] personnel must be conditioned by fulfilling and surpassing quantitative and qualitative indexes of the State plan." The new system introduced instability into wage categories and attempted to set up a thorough piecework system so that tighter control over individual output was possible and competition among workers increased. That the law has not worked out according to regime expectations was indirectly admitted by Radio Bucharest on January 13, 1955:

"A great many enterprises neglect the problem of quality as well as that of production costs: one of the reasons why the task of cost reduction . . . could not be carried out in many enterprises is that *they did not remember that the increase of overall production must be higher than the increase of wage funds, and the increase of productivity higher than the increase of the average salary.* In the Stalintown 'Temelia' factory, for example, where the plan for the third quarter was fulfilled, the planned salary fund was surpassed by 21 percent.

"Such violations of financial and salary discipline must be eliminated. Only powerful increases of production and labor productivity, which will result in a proportional wage increase, correspond to the interests of . . . the national economy. . . . [Despite existing resources] . . . in 1954, the development of consumer goods production was lower than expected: such production at the factory Isolatorul, for example, was less than one percent of overall production." (Italics added)

The new wage policy also had disastrous effects on the quality of consumer products. Since most managers tried to augment their incomes by increasing the volume of production, speed became their primary concern. This resulted in slipshod work and high production costs. Speed-up methods in the textile industry, where the new wage and norm system was first introduced, provoked a flood of complaints from cheated citizens. Thus, *Probleme Economice* of January 1954 lashed out at weaving factories for cutting down on the time allocated to various technical processes, claiming that materials were badly dyed, lacked resistance and shrank when used by customers. *Scinteia* of November 24, 1954, also discussed the problem of quality, and issued bitter complaints about the sandals of the Bucharest Cooperative Comet, the meat products of the Campulung Enterprise and the jam made by the Gura Humorului Enterprise May Day. "This indifference of responsible agencies towards the quality of production," *Scinteia* said, "must be eliminated without delay."

Furthermore, while the Communists have harped on increased consumer goods production, heavy industry evidently still receives financial and material priority. Therefore many factories producing heavy industrial equipment have resisted allocating men and materials to consumer goods departments, considering this work an additional burden and an unprofitable sideline. It should be pointed out, too, that much of the raw material for light industry is composed of remnants and scraps and that successful production depends on strict economy. That reluctance

to produce consumer goods is widespread was admitted by *Scinteia* (Bucharest), November 24, 1954, which blamed the present unsatisfactory situation on bureaucracy and managerial apathy. Even the building of new plants has been hindered by this attitude: "It is necessary," the newspaper said, "to combat the superficiality shown by some executive committees for timely execution of technical conditions. The Bacau District People's Council had planned the building of a fruit and vegetable factory, but now, after one year, its plan is still a plan."

Even more revealing was a November 19, 1954, Radio Bucharest commentary complaining that "many enterprise managers assume that they can produce consumer goods in improvised consumer goods departments, equipped haphazardly and with workers who are less qualified." The broadcast stated also that workers in the consumer goods department of the railway depot "February 16" kept sending poor quality spare parts to commercial agencies but when asked to improve production, they replied: "If you don't like these products, we'll stop sending them!" In view of this attitude, it is clear that the regime's New Course program for increasing light industrial output has run into grave difficulties essentially because neither the country's productive facilities, nor the Party-directed producers, are consumer-oriented.

These industrial difficulties have had a damaging effect on the regime's campaign to cut production costs. *Scinteia*, November 27, 1954, claimed that failures were caused chiefly by uneconomical use of raw materials. "The textile factory Drapelul Rosu in Sibiu was obliged to increase production costs by two percent as a result of exceeding specified consumption norms. In other places, raw material is wasted either as remnant scraps or because of poor quality production. Thus at the Buftea canning factory, canning scraps amounted to 4.2 percent instead of 1.5 percent in July." The newspaper also blamed high production costs on administrative shortcomings—that is, poor planning and violation of production contracts: "The clothing factory Tudor Vladimirescu in Targul-Jiu exceeded the amount for general expenses because of numerous fines and high rates of interest. There are a number of enterprises that have to pay fines for violating contracts. Ministries and General Directorates must oppose . . . such inadmissible practices."

The general lack of efficiency and coordination in Romanian industry was summed up by Radio Bucharest in a January 8, 1955 broadcast deploring the inadequate supply system, the poor use of machinery and, in particular, the haphazard rhythm of production:

" . . . There are still many enterprise leaders who seek to justify non-fulfillment of the plan on the score of deficiencies in the field of supplies. Difficulties exist, no doubt, but it is nevertheless true that, . . . in many cases, difficulties are due to shortcomings in the enterprises themselves with regard to utilization of resources provided by the State. *The organization of rhythmic production was and still is the main problem of every enterprise. The erroneous practice . . . of postponing at least fifty percent of the planning work until the last ten days of the month results in haphazard utilization of equipment, unnecessary wear and*

tear on machines, an increase of rejects, a need for overtime, and so forth. In the next two years, our industrial enterprises must produce, in addition to basic production, an ever-greater quantity of better and cheaper consumer goods. . . . It is not permissible that some enterprises with great possibilities . . . turn out only two or three varieties of consumer goods." (Italics added)

Complaints about poor trade union work and lack of discipline are almost as frequent as complaints about unsatisfactory production, indicating that the New Course reorganization of industry has been accompanied by a weakening of effective control. *Munca* of May 13, 1954, issued a typical complaint when it claimed that Party and trade union organizations underestimate the significance of "cultural work" in important worker centers: "The lack of political content in this work is manifested by the fact that it is not geared to present tasks—discovery of internal resources, increased labor productivity and reduction of production costs." On August 14, 1954, *Munca* complained that trade unions had failed to ensure fulfillment of collective contracts, and on December 14, 1954, *Scinteia* urged trade union agencies to eliminate "formalism" and superficiality in work and "Socialist competitions," and to direct workers to more productive methods and rational utilization of raw materials: "Because of lack of social labor discipline the Brick Factory Ceramica carried out the plan in the first months of the year by only 88.3 percent, and the November plan by only 89.2 percent. . . . The immense possibilities of socialist production depend on the zeal and disciplined work of all Romanian working people: by this work, the worker's State will have all that is necessary for consolidation of the country's defense power and for successful achievements in the improvement of the people's living standard."

Throughout the New Course the Communists have adopted a more conciliatory attitude towards workers, relying on "persuasion" to achieve plan goals. In cases where difficulties have persisted to an alarming degree they have cracked down not on workers but on the union leadership. Thus in August of last year a large part of the middle union leadership of the lumber industry was expelled as well as four leading members of the Presidium of the Union's Central Committee. Despite these measures, conditions remain unsatisfactory, and it appears that within the scope of its present conciliatory program the regime is unable to enforce labor discipline or to make trade unions and Party organizations effective instruments of economic control.

Agriculture

Industrial failures have complicated regime difficulties in the countryside and New Course concessions to the peasantry have not resulted in any substantial rise in food production. In recent weeks, for example, the Party press has issued many complaints about slow deliveries of farm machinery which, combined with inefficiency on tractor stations, has seriously hampered agricultural work. Although it was announced that mechanization was to be a chief means of raising New Course farm output, the plan

for 1954 left much to be desired. In an April 21, 1954, *Scinteia* editorial Minister of Finance Petrescu announced that 1,625 tractors would be delivered during the year—a figure which represents 46 percent fewer tractors than in 1952. On the basis of 1954 plan results it appears that 2,400 tractors were delivered, which is higher than the number planned but still below requirements. Further, the regime claimed that in 1953 about 45-50 percent of the available tractors could not be used for sowing due to lack of repairs and spare parts. In 1954, special precautions were taken to have all tractors repaired before sowing started, but it was discovered that of the 220 existing tractor stations, 123 did not have repair shops.

A discussion of present deficiencies in mechanization appeared in *Scinteia*, September 24, 1954, which bitterly rebuked various ministries for delaying production and deliveries of important farm equipment:

"The Macazul Factory in Ploesti, for example, did not realize more than 70 percent of its plan, although it had



Legend explains that the bookkeeper of a State Farm included 5,000 lei under fictitious names and then pocketed the money. Though the sovkhos management was informed of the fraud, no measures were taken against the embezzler.

Caption: Manager—"What's this? You put down fictitious names! It's scandalous!"

Bookkeeper—"How can you say that it's a scandal since you knew all about it?"

Manager—"It's a scandal because others know about it too. . . ."

Urzica (Bucharest), November 30, 1954

to produce only one item: mechanical rakes. The factory at Ceahlăul . . . to date failed to deliver sowing machines for maize planned for the third quarter. Although a great many farm machines were to be produced this year, the Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry has not yet sent the needed data to the Iprom Planning Board. Even projected items were not manufactured, because agricultural and forestry agencies show superficiality and irresponsibility, repeatedly asking for modification of drafts."

On October 24, 1954, *Scinteia* complained that farm machines were not used in a productive way, and that, as a result of poor organization, half the tractors in the Constantza region were wasted and that only 50 percent of the possible working tempo was achieved. "In the Adam Clisi MTS, 32 tractors are idle and no measures have been taken to remedy conditions." On December 8, 1954, *Scinteia* returned to the subject, claiming that increased farm production requires radical improvement in the work of tractor stations and a higher level of mechanization. The newspaper deplored the inadequate distribution of parts and the neglect of repairs, and insisted that tractors be cleaned, inventoried and sheltered properly. On January 20, 1955, *Scinteia* issued similar rebukes, revealing that its previous warnings had had little effect:

"Some heads of State farms and MTS's have not paid attention to care of machinery and quality of repair work, to labor organization, to improving the skill of mechanics or to strengthening their sense of responsibility. That is why some MTS have neither realized their yearly or periodic plans. In fact, they have hindered the timely fulfillment of farm work. . . . To achieve 1955 plans for one million tons of wheat and maize, it is imperative that all farm implements be well repaired and returned to service without delay. . . . There are some MTS where not a single tractor or farm machine has been repaired. Others are lagging far behind. Disorder prevails, and many spare parts and materials which could be saved are wasted and thrown out. . . . The Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry still has not done everything to insure spare parts. Further, the Ministry of Metallurgy and Machine Construction continues to delay distribution of materials. Thus, because of lack of spare parts, machinery already repaired cannot be commissioned."*

Collectivization

Propaganda on the importance of Party work in the countryside and Party shortcomings in directing sowing, harvesting, deliveries and the "socialist transformation of agriculture," have provided further insight into regime troubles and goals. Although the Communists have slowed down collectivization in the New Course, they have emphasized it as a permanent target and, for the time being, have directed their efforts towards the simpler forms of peasant associations. At the end of 1953, the number of kolkhozes in the country was 1,998. In August 1954, the total was listed as 2,048—an increase of 50—and by the end

of the year this figure was raised by 250.* On the other hand, there has been a more significant increase in the number of simple peasant associations. At the end of 1953, there were 2,087 such associations, and in mid-1954, 2,384. On December 18, 1954, Radio Bucharest announced that as a result of Party activity and "on the basis of the peasants' free consent," over 2,700 agricultural associations had been established. The Radio Bucharest commentator stated, however, that there were still numerous deficiencies in Party work. Regional and district Party committees not only take little interest in promoting new agricultural associations but neglect consolidating established ones:

"At Barlad there is no political activity for enlightenment of peasants. Moreover, those who expressed the wish to form agricultural associations were not organizationally supported. How can State and Party organs of this region explain the fact that a group of peasants from about 100 villages who wished to form agricultural associations failed to get support in order to fulfill their desires?"

The Radio Bucharest commentator issued the further warning that agitators must make a sharp distinction between collectives and agricultural associations, instead of "mixing them in the same pot." In view of this emphasis, it is clear that many Party activists, either out of uncertainty or conviction, are pushing full collectivization, and fail to see any difference or value in the lower cooperative form. This attitude has hindered the Party's campaign to conciliate the peasantry and has aroused the suspicion of farmers, who fear the restrictions of simple associations almost as much as those of kolkhozes: "It is a mistake to mix agricultural and collective farms in the same pot. As is known, there is an important difference [between them]. Confusion between these two can only harm the political work for the formation of new agricultural associations and provide grist for the mill of enemies of the socialist transformation of agriculture who are hostile to the formation of agricultural associations precisely because this form of cooperation is highly accessible to peasants."

The regime's land reclamation program is an important factor in New Course plans to boost farm output. Although no figures are available on the Party's overall goals in 1954 and 1955, the statistics which do exist indicate that this policy has not been carried out satisfactorily. In his March 4, 1949, speech to the Central Committee of the Romanian Workers' Party, Gheorghiu-Dej stated that Romania had 9,751,000 hectares of arable land. Five years later, in his August 23, 1954 speech, Gheorghiu-Dej claimed that 23 percent of the arable land surface, 1,780,000 hectares, were "Socialized." This means that between 1949 and 1954, the nation's arable land surface decreased about 1,300,000 hectares. In view of this significant decrease in the cultivated land surface, and the constant propaganda issued on the importance of extending the area under cultivation, the February 1, 1955, announcement

* In light of the above, it is interesting to note that Radio Bucharest recently announced that 1,800 tractors were exported in the first half of 1954.

* On February 1, 1955, the regime announced the total of 5,000 for both kolkhozes and simple associations. No official breakdown was given.



Legend reads: Tractor No. 65556 of the Nanov MTS was out of order for months because of negligence in the procurement of new tires. While it was immobilized many of its parts disappeared, so that when the new tires do arrive, it will no longer be in operating condition.

Urzica (Bucharest), November 30, 1954

that 120,000 hectares were reclaimed in 1954 was not impressive.

Village Trade

Perhaps the most revealing sign that the New Course has not achieved the desired results either in industry or agriculture is the current campaign to improve the internal trade network. One of the regime's chief aims in the New Course was to increase the supply of consumer goods in villages in order to give farmers incentive to boost production. Part of this program entailed selling industrial consumer goods at low State prices to those farmers signing contracts with the State. Despite propaganda on the benefits of long-term agreements, the supply situation in rural areas remains unsatisfactory: industry has failed to turn out the required quantity of goods, and farmers have held back deliveries and violated production contracts.

A clue to present deficiencies was recently provided by Chairman of the Central Union of Consumer Cooperatives Constantin Mateescu, who discussed the lack of building materials and basic goods in the countryside. Writing in *Rominia Libera* (Bucharest), October 8, 1954, Mateescu said that consumer cooperatives were not supplied with goods in heavy demand, such as salt, tobacco and matches, and that lime, bricks, tiles and other essential construction materials were scarce. Mateescu also complained that the system of contracts to improve purchasing had not been developed satisfactorily and that many cooperatives were guilty of bureaucracy and frauds: "The work aimed at buying and strengthening contracting for agricultural produce and at improving the supply of the working people in towns with food produce and of socialist industry with raw materials," he said, "must be carried out parallel to action aimed at improving the service of the rural population. The leadership of cooperatives and the apparatus of purchasers must point out to the working peasants that by increasing their sales through the cooperatives, they will receive even larger quantities of goods."

On October 19, *Scinteia* also discussed the problem of

trade, claiming that the State had failed to send sufficient amounts of scarce industrial goods to rural areas to cover the plan for purchases of agricultural products. Items such as iron sheetings, nails, galvanized sheets, soft lumber, cement, heavy cloth and rolling mill products had not been delivered and "dishonest practices in some parts of the country had discredited State barter trade." *Scinteia* returned to the subject again on October 23, complaining that in regions such as Bucharest, Craiova, Oradea, Timisoara, and others, "numerous cooperative units had not grasped the importance which the fulfillment of the contracting plan has for the development of the consumer industry":

"The leadership of such cooperatives did not ensure the supply of the working peasantry with necessary goods, often goods of daily necessity, such as kerosene, matches, oil lamps. . . . There is nothing astonishing that under such conditions the results obtained by such cooperatives are far below the economic potential of such regions, particularly in obtaining cereals, vegetables and milk. Also in the regions of Huneadoara, Bacau and Arad . . . contracting for the supply of animals is lagging far behind. The gaps existing in the requisitioning of agricultural products through cooperatives is caused to a large extent by the fact that industrial goods reserved for this trade have not been ensured in time and in the quantities and varieties required. . . . Some enterprises belonging to the Ministry of Metallurgy and Machine Construction . . . as well as enterprises belonging to the Ministry of Building Materials fail to respect the time of delivery or send goods of unfit to use."

Other complaints were registered by *Scinteia Tineretului* (Bucharest) of October 29, 1954, which stated that peasants do not hand over the animals for which they have contracted and that when they do, the number is much smaller than required and the quality deficient. *Munca* of October 26, 1954, also discussed the problem of village trade, and revealed that cooperatives had a hard time reclaiming the financial advances made to peasants who failed to deliver the goods contracted for. In the Bistrita

and Ludus regions alone, *Munca* said, cooperatives must reclaim 200,000 *lei*. The newspaper concluded that the above deficiencies are due chiefly to shortcomings in the commercial sector which "did not succeed in ensuring a just and rapid circulation of goods for rural consumption."

The shortage of consumer goods within the country as a whole was strikingly illustrated in *Scinteia* (Bucharest), September 2, 1954, which published a series of complaints from citizens about scarcities of badly-needed products. A woman technician complained that for several months she had tried unsuccessfully to buy a needle and that she had had similar trouble when attempting to find white thread. Two employees at the Universal State Shop deplored the lack of basic kitchen utensils, and an employee of the Bucharest restaurant wrote that when she had washed her overalls the buttons had turned to paste. Two other industrial workers claimed that after they had finally received the local People's Council's approval of their purchasing asphalt to cover the holes in their roof, they couldn't find any in the stores: "The rainy season is approaching. We cannot remain with our house uncovered. The ceiling will collapse. The house will deteriorate and it will no longer be possible to use it. Great damages are being inflicted on the State and the working people, all for a few feet of asphalt pasteboard which we cannot find."

In the same issue of *Scinteia* a certain Ilie Tanase complained that after buying a large quantity of tomatoes to make preserves, she was unable to buy a sieve and, as a result, the tomatoes had rotted. Another letter complained that there were no papers and corks available for sealing preserves. In view of the above revelations, it is obvious that the shortage of consumer goods has had a damaging effect on the economy as a whole, as well as on public morale.

Foreign Trade

The scarcity of consumer supplies and the apparent inflexibility of the nation's New Course capital investment program are closely connected "with Romania's foreign trade commitments. According to official Communist data for 1952, 85 percent of Romanian exports went to the Communist bloc and, of this figure, 58 percent went to the Soviet Union alone. USSR exports to Romania, as listed by *Agerpress*, April 1, 1954, include cotton, coke, iron ore, ferrous and non-ferrous metals, fertilizers, industrial equipment and "specialists." In return, Romania exports to the Soviet Union oil, cement, chemical products, oil drilling equipment, fishing vessels, barges, steam boilers and "other manufactured goods for consumer purposes of which the Soviet Union has specific need." More information on Russia's consumer goods imports from Romania was provided by *Pravda* (Moscow), February 4, 1954, which claimed that Romanian-Soviet trade relations had confirmed the fact that the "brotherly friendship" of the two countries was growing stronger. The newspaper revealed that Romania exports to the USSR "petroleum products, lumber materials, furniture, shoes and other goods for popular consumption." These other goods are known

to include canned meat, fish and grains. Further, the March 31, 1954, trade agreement signed between the two countries stipulated that "there will be a continuous expansion of reciprocal goods deliveries over and above the deliveries stipulated for 1954 by the long-term trade agreement and the volume of exchange trade effected during 1953." It thus appears that Romania's obligations to the USSR have increased, which is significant in view of the fact that such trade seems to be in terms advantageous to the Soviet Union.

Although in September 1954, both Moscow and Bucharest announced the dissolution of 12 of the 14 joint Soviet-Romanian stock companies (known as *Sovroms*) and declared that henceforth they would be in Romanian hands, this measure did not actually take the Romanian economy out of Soviet control. According to the terms of the agreement, Romania must make long-term payments to the USSR for the Soviet share in the companies. It is likely that a large part of these payments will be made in the form of consumer goods and heavy industrial exports; therefore, aside from trade treaties with Romania, the USSR retains a tight hold on Romanian production through its role as creditor and former partner in the *Sovroms*.

It should be mentioned also that in the first nine months of 1954 Romania signed thirteen economic agreements with countries outside the Soviet bloc. Of these, ten provide for lumber exports, nine for oil, six for tractors, four for glass and window panes, and three for cement. These obligations have been undertaken despite the fact that there is a shortage of tractors and building materials within the country, and that the 1955 plan calls for a sharp upswing in housing and farm mechanization.

De-Rationing

The low living standard within the country itself is partly illustrated by the high cost of food and consumer goods. Although the regime presented the end of rationing, announced on December 25, as a benefit made possible



Sign Reads: House Furnishings Exhibit.

Salesman: "Just a minute, comrade! Don't handle that — you might break it and you'd have to pay for it."

Urzica (Bucharest), September 20, 1954

by New Course production successes, it was no unmixed blessing for the people. Although the prices of some goods were reduced about ten percent below the non-rationed price levels (corn meal—10 percent; rubber and canvas footwear—15-23 percent; kapron stockings—37 percent; medicines—10 percent; electrotechnical goods—10 percent; toys—10 percent; kerosene—13 percent; and agricultural machinery and spare parts—16 percent) the prices of many basic food items were raised above the rationed level and increased substantially. As the following chart shows, such commodities as black bread, beef, sugar, soap and macaroni, are now considerably more expensive than hitherto:*

	Old Rationed Price (in lei)	New Unrationed Price (in lei)	% of Increase
Black bread, 1 kg.	0.70	2.00	188
Beef, second grade, 1 kg.	3.40	8.00	135
Edible sunflower oil			
1 liter	3.00	11.00	266
Sugar, 1 kg.	2.80	9.00	221
Macaroni, 1 kg.	2.00	6.40	220
Laundry soap, 1 kg.	7.28	8.00	10**
Men's suit, cheapest....	227.50	393.75	73
Lady's dress, cheapest...	97.50	163.65	69
Men's shirt, cheapest....	24.30	40.94	64
Men's shoes, cheapest...	82.85	150.67	81

Although monthly cash allowances are to be given to all wage earners, pensioned employees and dependents holding ration cards, to compensate for the general price rise, these benefit chiefly the highest category of paid workers—that is skilled workers in heavy industry. The average

* Rationed prices appeared in the Communist press of January 27-30, 1952. The new, unrationed prices were published in the press of December 27, 1954.

** The ten percent increase in laundry soap is calculated on the basis of the new price, after calculating the price cut stipulated by the new decree.

office worker, for instance, is to receive 51 lei per month as a cash allowance. Of this, 45 lei are to be spent on the difference in food prices, and the remaining six lei on purchases of clothing and footwear. Since a pair of men's shoes costs as much as 70 lei more than previously, and the cheapest men's suit 170-180 lei more, it is clear that office workers and the population in general, will be unable to make any extensive purchases under the new system.

The lack of unity within the Romanian Communist Party is reflected in the disorganization of industry, the reluctance to convert to consumer goods production, and the failure of various ministries to supply basic industrial articles to the countryside. The economic and political confusion prevailing within Romania seem to be caused chiefly by the regime's inability to solve its problems within the scope of its present program. Recent Soviet announcements have indicated a stepped-up emphasis on heavy industrial production, and the Satellite press has echoed these sentiments, but although Romania has confirmed Moscow's line, so far it has taken no actual steps to reverse the New Course. According to the January 1955 issue of *Lupta de Clasa*, organ of the Romanian Workers (Communist) Party, the present toleration and encouragement of independent farmers is necessary in order to increase agricultural production, but the regime's ultimate goal is to liquidate private farms and to make sure that the "law of priority for capital goods will inevitably work out in the long run." In the current period, however, Romania is preoccupied with raising the low farm yield and increasing consumer supplies. The main difficulty seems to be the need to keep heavy industrial output on a high level as well. Lacking the financial resources to develop simultaneously agriculture, consumer goods production and capital goods output, the regime has taken half-measures in the New Course which have created new problems, and which so far have remained unsolved.

Scylla and Charybdis

It happened in the Hungarian town of Sztalinvaros. A construction foreman refused to have the scaffolding on a building removed, saying that it would be dangerous to do so until the concrete had dried. The Communist Party Committee had the foreman arrested for "holding up the production schedule." His successor carried out the Party orders, and two days later the concrete ceiling collapsed. He was arrested and convicted of "sabotage." By chance the two men met in the Balatonfenyves labor camp and discussed the problem of whether it was better to disregard instructions and act on one's own conviction, or to disregard conscience and follow the Party orders. They were unable to reach a conclusion.

Consumer Goods and Internal Trade in Romania

This is the last of a series of articles on internal trade and consumer goods in the Satellite countries.

ROMANIA'S economy is still primarily agricultural, despite the fact that in the last 25 years or so extractive and manufacturing industries have been playing an ever more important role. In 1930, according to *Industrialization and Foreign Trade* (Geneva), 1945, as many as 78 percent of the people were dependent on agricultural employment and only seven percent were dependent on manufacturing and handicrafts. In the next two decades little change took place in this ratio, as was shown in a 1948 census which disclosed that at that time 76.6 percent of the population was still to be found in the rural sector. (By 1953 this rural percentage fell to 65.2 under the impact of the Communist drive for industrialization.) Industry, however, did expand considerably between World Wars, and by 1938 the general industrial production index had risen from 100 in 1927 to 155.3* For manufacturing alone, the index rose to 161.2 in 1937 and stood at 156.4 the following year.

In this period Romania's industrialization did not follow the usual pattern for underdeveloped countries, in that industry grew as a separate entity, disassociated from agriculture. Thus, light and agricultural processing industries were neglected, and by 1937 capital goods industries were almost as large as consumer goods industries—normally a characteristic of a relatively advanced economy.

This lack of integration arose partly because the large amounts of foreign investments that entered the country went into exploitation of natural resources or into export industries, and partly because, though the State participated in a variety of undertakings, it became especially

* *Anuarul Statistic al Romaniei 1939-1940*, Bucharest, 1940.



Title: The artisan cooperative "Struggle for Peace" produces a type of lock that fails to work after a short while and then can no longer be opened.

Caption: "This is terrible! I must have left my keys at the office—what am I supposed to do now . . .?"

"Well, at least you can still hope to find your keys, but I got mine and yet I can't get into my apartment."

Urzica (Bucharest), September 20, 1954

interested in the development of heavy industry for armament during the thirties. The result was what one economist termed an "abrupt transition from backwardness into modernity" which lacked the middle ground of intermediate industrial activities.

In terms of value, the two leading industries of prewar Romania were textiles and food processing. According to *Communicari Statistice*, No. 8 (Bucharest), May 15, 1945, in 1939 food industry ranked first, accounting for 23 percent of all industrial production by value.* That year the textile industry accounted for 21.8 percent. The following two years the textile industry ranked first, but in 1942 the food industry once again forged ahead with 29.1 percent of total production by value. As far as personnel was concerned, the textile and metallurgy industries were the most important, and food was in third place. The personnel breakdown for 1939, for example, was: textile industry, 23 percent; metallurgy, 20.7 percent; food industry, 14.6 percent. In the period 1939-42, the total number of persons employed in industry decreased by approximately 18.3 percent—the food industry lost 35.3 percent of its personnel, the textile industry 25.5 percent. Metallurgy on the other hand acquired 5.4 percent more people. Undoubtedly these shifts occurred because of the severe shortages of raw materials in light industry and war production.

As far as foreign trade was concerned, Romania was highly dependent on her exports of petroleum and petroleum products. According to *International Trade Statistics* (Geneva), 1939, approximately 42.7 percent of the

* These figures do not include that part of Transylvania ceded to Hungary in September 1940 and returned in 1945.

country's exports by value fell within this category in 1938. Agricultural products that year amounted to 37.8 percent.

Comparison between prewar and postwar Romanian production is impossible. First, numerous territorial changes took place.* Second, methods for recording production units differ for the two periods. For textiles, for example, production was recorded in prewar and early postwar years according to weight; from 1948 on, on the other hand, linear—that is, surface length—measurements were used.

Immediate Postwar Period

Romania's recovery from the war was the slowest of any East European country now under Soviet domination. The country was confronted by gigantic problems which included the removal by the Soviets of substantial quantities of industrial equipment, petroleum, and agricultural products; the payment of high occupation costs; the effort to meet the \$300 million reparations debt (at 1938 prices). Though reparations were reduced in 1945, and though the balance still owed in 1948 was then reduced by 50 percent, the US economic delegate to the Paris Peace Conference, Willard Thorp, estimated that the total value of Soviet extractions (in cash, food and services) for the years 1944-48 amounted to some \$1,785,000,000. This situation was further aggravated by the creation of the so-called "joint" Soviet-Romanian companies (See NBIC September 1954, pp. 16-22) which in effect gave the USSR control of the majority of the country's key industries.

Two successive droughts, 1945-46, further added to the country's economic difficulties, and so did the severe transportation tie-up and the disastrous inflation which arose as a result of wartime disruptions. In 1945, overall production of basic commodities was only 43 percent of the level reached in 1938.** The following year only a slight increase to 50 percent took place and by September 1947, the level attained was still 20 percent lower than in 1938. Industry in 1945 worked at 50 percent of capacity.*** On May 28, 1947, former Premier Tatarescu, then head of a Liberal Party faction, presented the government with a memorandum stating that general industrial production in 1946 was only 48 percent of the 1938 output level and smaller than in the previous year. In 1947, industry somewhat recovered, and by September of that year the industrial index (1938=100) stood at 76.5.**

* In August, 1940, Bessarabia and Northern Bucovina—some 50,000 sq. km.—were occupied by the Russians. In 1941 these areas were regained, only to be lost again to the Soviets in 1944. In September 1940, Southern Dobruja—6,900 sq. km.—was ceded to Bulgaria, and Northern Transylvania—43,700 sq. km.—to Hungary. The Transylvanian territory was regained in 1945. Further, from 1941 to 1944, Romania administered the portion of the Ukraine lying between the Dniester and the Bug. This area, Transnistria, proved to be mostly a liability to Romania, though advantage was gained from the 1942-43 harvest.

** *Romanian News* (Washington), December 1947, official organ of the RPR Legation.

*** Report of the Administrative Council of the Romanian National Bank to the General Assembly (Feb. 17, 1946), as appeared in *Bulletin d'Information et de Documentation* (Bucharest), January-March 1946.

The cotton textile industry suffered from acute disruptions in these years, mainly because it had been highly dependent upon imports of raw cotton and cotton yarn in the prewar period and the switch to internal self-sufficiency necessarily had to be slow. Thus, before the war there existed a considerable disproportion between spinning and weaving capacities—according to *Rumania Basic Handbook* (London), November 1943, there were only 250,000 spindles for 16,000 power looms in the prewar cotton textile industry. In 1937 Romania imported as much as 26,900 tons of cotton yarn for weaving and 16,700 tons of raw cotton for spinning. Not only was spinning relatively neglected in favor of weaving, but production of raw cotton itself was extremely low. Between 1934-38, the average annual internal production of raw cotton amounted to only 400 tons.*

This situation grew worse when, in 1940, internal production was further curtailed through the cessation of some 8,000 hectares of cotton land to Bulgaria, at the very time when foreign imports decreased as a result of wartime restrictions. Measures were therefore taken during the war to increase the area sown to cotton and by 1945-46, the amount produced internally exceeded 4,700 tons, more than ten times the prewar average.

It has been the policy of the present regime to continue to encourage the expansion of cotton growing in Romania, so as to eliminate the bottleneck caused by the lack of imports. In 1948, according to the February 1948 *Probleme Economice*, the industry had 290,000 spindles with a capacity of 28,000 tons of yarn annually. The same publication, however, shows that in 1947 only 11,743 tons of cotton yarn were produced. In other words, the cotton spinning facilities were then operating at only slightly more than 40 percent of capacity. The weaving part of the industry, since it was out of proportion with the spinning facilities, suffered an even greater setback. Only 3,288 tons of cotton textiles were produced in 1947, indicating that only approximately 15 percent of the 1938 production level of 21,120 tons had been reached.

Since internal production of raw cotton provided a relatively minute portion of the cotton needed for processing, Romania became largely dependent upon imports from the USSR. According to *Probleme Economice*, 25,000 tons of raw cotton were to be imported in 1948, and in that year, 33,000 tons of yarn were to be produced for internal consumption. In order to achieve this substantial increase, it was foreseen that not only would the spinning industry be used to capacity, but also that 80,000 additional spindles would be required. It is unlikely, however, that the USSR's part of the bargain was fulfilled. In the whole of 1947, imports from the Soviet Union were only somewhat more than 7,500 tons, according to the same report. It is also likely that a substantial amount of the cotton thus received from the Soviet Union was not used internally but sent back to the USSR after being processed, thus further aggravating textile shortages

* *International Yearbook of Agricultural Statistics 1941-42 to 1945-46*, Volume I, (Rome), 1947.

within the country. To remedy this situation, the regime projected a tremendous increase in cotton growing in the following years. According to *Romanian News* of April 8, 1951, production was to reach 230,000 tons by the end of 1955.

The wool textile industry also suffered a drastic setback during the war years. *Probleme Economice* shows that in 1943 approximately 6,600 tons of raw wool was collected. The following year collection was down to 3,700 tons, decreasing further to 780 tons in 1945 and 350 tons in 1946. This catastrophic drop was no doubt largely due to the loss of agricultural territory, droughts, the Soviet occupation, and the use of livestock in payment of reparations to the USSR. Yet, despite this lack of raw materials, by 1947 the industry was relatively better off than the cotton textile industry, for 2,898 tons of wool textiles were produced that year, or about 50 percent of the 1938 level. The crisis however was reflected in the quality of the fabrics produced; according to *Probleme Economice*, their composition was 30 percent virgin wool, 20 percent raw cotton, and 50 percent reprocessed fibers.

The flax and hemp spinning industry, which in 1947 had 15,000 spindles, operated that year at only 20 percent of capacity, according to the same publication. Here again, difficulties were traceable to shortages of raw materials. Whereas the country had produced some 1,500 tons of hemp and flax before the war, in 1947, because of the drought, production was down to only 700 tons. *Probleme Economice* stated that 8,000 tons of raw materials were to be allotted the industry in 1948—most of which obviously would have to have been imported.

Finally, the silk and synthetic fiber industry, according to the same report, produced only 812 tons of silk and synthetic yarns to supply the mills, even though the industry's weaving capacity was approximately 1,500 tons.

One-Year Plans

Nationalization of industry and economic "consolidation" caused further disruptions in the Romanian economy in 1948. Coordinated planning was not introduced in the immediate postwar period (in contrast to other Satellites), probably because the country suffered a slower recovery from the effects and after-effects of the war, and economic development was hampered by Soviet exploitations.

Romania launched her first plan in 1949. It differed from those introduced in the other captive nations in that it was scheduled to run for only one year. The following year, a second one-year plan was introduced. The 1949 plan, according to the then General Secretary of the Party, Gheorghiu-Dej, was to "prepare the necessary conditions for the building of Socialism in Romania." He stressed the fact that the plan was designed to "strengthen and develop heavy industry, particularly metallurgy, steel and iron production, since these are essential for the economic development of the country."* As for the next plan, Gheorghiu-Dej commented that it "prepared the ground for the Five Year Plan (1951-55)." In both instances, figures reveal that the major effort was devoted to the building up of industry, particularly heavy industry. Thus, in 1949 the plan called for a 40 percent increase in industrial production; the next year the increase was to be 37 percent. Of the total investments of 100 billion *lei* in the first plan, no less than 36.8 percent went to heavy industry and only 10.4 percent to light industry. This ratio was further accentuated the following year when, of the 145 billion *lei* in overall investment, 44.8 percent was earmarked for heavy industry and only 5.4 percent for light industry.

* *Planned Development of the Romanian People's Republic* (Bucharest), 1950.

Percentage Increases in Consumer Goods Production¹

	Plan 1949	Actual 1949	Plan 1950	Actual 1950	Plan 1951	Actual 1951	Actual 1952	Actual 1953	Plan 1954	Actual 1954	Plan 1955
cotton textiles	17.0	25.7	40.0	40.2	20.4	17.7	15.7	—	9.6	6.9	18.0
woolen textiles	11.0	48.0	21.0	26.6	14.9	22.6	—	6.0	3.8	3.7	—
silk textiles	74.0	67.8	3.4	—	—	9.9	—	—	—	10.6	30.0
(including synthetic)											
cotton knitwear	83.0	{126.6}	63.0	59.8	—	16.7	13.5	4.0	—	{3.2}	10.0
woolen knitwear		{311.7}								{—}	
footwear	58.0 ²	164.8	27.0 ²	24.8	21.7	19.3	3.2 ²	—	7.2	— ³	32.0 ²
edible oil	00.0	51.7	70.5	29.7	—	5.4	14.3	11.0	15.9	35.1	—
alimentary pastes	330.0	413.4	52.0	—	—	26.4	19.2	23.0	—	5.7	—
("pasta" products)											
sugar	17.0	12.9	23.9	—	64.7	26.9 ⁴	—	12.0	50.5	—	64.0
soap	—	55.6	—	36.2	—	—	41.4	7.0	—	10.8	—

¹ Sources: *Romanian News*—January 21, 1951; February 18, 1951; February 24, 1952; Radio Bucharest—February 1, 1952; April 21, 1954; July 17, 1954; January 7, 1955; *Monitorul Oficial* (Bucharest)—January 1, 1949; December 30, 1949; *The Plan of the RPR for 1949* (Bucharest), 1949; *Probleme Economice*, No. 3, 1952; *Scinteia*, January 26, 1955; February 1, 1955.

² Figures for leather footwear. The 1949 production increase envisaged for rubber footwear was 110 percent, while increase envisaged for 1955 is 28 per cent.

³ Reported increase for rubber footwear was 14.4 percent.

⁴ Figure for sugar and sugar products. 1951 Plan for sugar products calls for 14 percent increase.

Both the 1949 and 1950 plans envisaged a substantial rise in consumer goods production. It must be noted, however, that the projected increases were based on the relatively low production levels of 1948. Moreover, the 1950 plan specifically stated that the increase was to be achieved primarily "by fuller utilization of existing capacities." The major effort therefore was directed at improving the work of existing facilities rather than in the development of new ones. The 1950 plan, for instance, made reference to "extending the cooperative movement of artisans, and aiding small artisans who by their work contribute to the increase in production."

According to the 1949 plan results, the envisaged levels were reached for most of the principal consumer goods with the exception of sugar, silk and synthetic textiles. The overall increase of 40 percent in industrial production was reportedly overfulfilled. The following year, on the other hand, the production of consumer goods was far from satisfactory. With the exception of silk and woolen textiles, every major consumer goods product fell below the projected goal, and in some sectors results were apparently so poor that no figures were released. Yet, despite this failure, overall industrial production was allegedly 37 percent higher than in the previous year, thus indicating that major production increases had taken place—in heavy industry.

Expansion of Industrial Facilities

The relatively few new facilities for consumer goods incorporated in the two plans were as follows:

Textile Industry

The 1949 plan called for 98 percent of the total investment allocation earmarked for cotton textile production to be devoted to the expansion of cotton spinning mills. The intention was apparently to reduce the disparity between spinning and weaving capacities and to enable the country to become self-sufficient in the production of cotton textiles. The only major new installation prescribed for this industrial sub-sector was a new spinning mill at Iassy.

On April 8, 1951, *Romanian News* confirmed that a new spinning mill called "Noua Filatura" had indeed been established in that locality as part of the "Tesatura" combine. The 1950 plan envisaged the establishment of two more cotton spinning mills (one of them to be part of the "Moldova" combine). The latter plant, was to contain 21,000 spindles, the other 20,000. Both mills were built, though the regime did not say when operations actually started.

As for wool textiles, the only new plant called for was a center for washing and combing wool, scheduled under the 1950 plan. The plant, originally supposed to start operating in 1950, actually went into operation four years later.

The 1949 plan called for "an increase in the production of cello-fiber and preparations for the construction of a new factory . . . to be completed in 1949." Until recently, nothing further was heard about this projected installation. Presumably, as was the case with many other projected installations destined for light industrial production, plans were indefinitely tabled and only revived under the New Course program.

In the hemp and flax sub-sector, the 1949 plan contained directives for the establishment of new flax and hemp retting plants in the Satu-Mare, Hunedoara, Ialomita, Dolj and Bacau regions. The construction of a new flax spinning mill with 5,000 spindles, scheduled to start operations in 1951, was also planned. The 1950 plan contained instructions for the setting up of two new spinning plants within this sub-sector, one for flax and another for hemp. The first one was presumably carried over from the 1949 plan. Here again, little was heard of these proposed installations until the advent of the New Course.

Food Industry

The 1949 plan envisaged the following new installations: a butter factory at Careii Mari; an installation for the fermentation and storage of cheese in the Braila region; a powdered milk plant; three milk pasturization units, and an edible oil factory in Livezi (Oltenia). The 1950 plan

Development of Industrial Production¹

	Total Production			Producer Goods				Consumer Goods			
	Index	Value	% of Increase over Prior Year	Index	Value ²	% of Increase over Prior Year	% of Total	Index	Value ²	% of Increase over Prior Year	% of Total
1950	100.0	403.4	—	100.0	217.9	—	54.0	100.0	185.5	—	46.0
1951 Plan	123.2	497.0	23.2	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
1951	128.7	519.2	28.7	129.6	282.4	29.6	54.4	127.7	236.8	27.7	45.6
1952 Plan	159.6	643.8	24.5	175.0	381.3	35.0	59.2	141.5	262.5	10.9	40.8
1952	158.3	638.6	23.0	168.2	366.6	29.8	57.4	146.6	272.0	14.9	42.6
1953 Plan	196.3	791.9	24.0	215.3	469.2	28.0	59.2	174.0	322.7	18.6	40.8
1953	181.1	730.6	14.4	199.1	432.0	17.8	59.1	161.0	298.6	9.8	40.9
1954	192.9	778.8	6.6	206.0	448.8	3.9	57.6	177.9	330.0	10.5	42.4
1955 Five Year Plan	244.0	984.3	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—

¹ Sources: *Romanian News*—January 21, 1951; January 27, 1952; February 3, 1952; August 24, 1952; January 28, 1953; Radio Bucharest—January 26, 1953; February 12, 1954; Febru-

ary 1, 1955; *Voprosy Ekonomiki* (Moscow), July, 1954.

² Value in billions of lei at December 31, 1948 prices.

called for: a new edible oil plant (possibly the same as above), a fruit juice plant, and three tomato paste plants; it was also stated that the pasturization unit in Cluj was to be completed. It is not known whether the projects planned for these years were completed as scheduled. The proposed fruit juice plant, however, only neared completion toward the end of 1954, while the powdered milk plant was not reported near completion until October 1954.

The Five Year Plan

In January 1951, Romania inaugurated her first long-term plan. As in the other Soviet bloc countries, it was modeled after the plans of the USSR, both in substance and in format. The objectives of the Plan were to "create in the country a powerful economic base" and to turn Romania "into an industrial country."* As in the 1949 and 1950 plans, the main emphasis was put on heavy industry. This was particularly apparent in the investment program. Of a total investment outlay of 1,330 billion *lei* (at December 1950 prices), 53.4 percent was to be devoted to industry. This sum was sub-divided as follows: 42.1 percent for producer goods industries, 9.3 percent for consumer goods industries, and 2 percent for industrial construction. Despite the 9.3 percent allocation to consumer goods over the five year period, the percentage for 1951, the first year of the Plan, amounted to only 7.4 percent of the total while that for producer goods amounted to 48.6.**

The Plan envisaged the following production increases in consumer industries for 1956 (1950=100): textile industry, 245; leather and rubber footwear industry, 235; glass and ceramic industry, 204; food industry, 319; cellulose and paper industry, 188; local industry, 288; craftsmen cooperatives, 336. (For goals of specific commodities see table, page 21.)

58.6 billion *lei*, or 47.4 percent of the total investment allocation for consumer goods industries, was earmarked for the textile industry. The Plan called for the construction of the following new installations within this sector:

Cotton Textiles. Five gins and eleven mills were to be constructed. The Plan called for 285,000 additional spindles. It also provided for the addition of 27,000 spindles for the spinning of processed threads.

Flax and Hemp Textiles. Twelve flax processing plants, 19 hemp processing plants, two textile plants for the spinning of thin threads, two integrated plants for lightweight textiles, and one for heavyweight textiles were planned. The number of spindles was to be increased by 17,000.

Wool Textiles. Two integrated plants (spinning and weaving mills) were to be set up, and a third was to be started. The Plan also called for the construction of a washing and combing station (probably a carryover from the 1950 Plan).

Silk and Synthetic Textiles. A large combine for the production of cellulose-fiber artificial threads was to be

constructed. Further, a weaving plant for artificial silk (rayon) was planned. The Plan also provided for the establishment of another plant for the processing of synthetic fibers of great resistance, a hose factory, and a plant for the production of knitting needles.

As far as the leather and rubber footwear industry was concerned, the Plan provided for 9.7 billion *lei* in investments, or 7.8 percent of the overall investment allocation for consumer goods industry. In this industry, the Plan envisaged the establishment of an integrated shoe factory, having an annual production capacity of 2.4 million pairs.

In the glassware and ceramics industry, the Plan provided for the establishment of the following new installations: a completely mechanized glass factory, a factory for the production of household porcelain, and a factory for the manufacture of ceramics.

Eleven billion *lei* were to be invested in the cellulose and paper industry. It is not known what portion of this sum fell within the consumer goods industry sector. Among the new facilities called for in this industry were: a cellulose paper bag combine with a capacity of 60,000 tons of paper and 60,000,000 paper bags; two new cardboard plants, and construction of a cellulose paper combine designed to use rushes as a raw material.

The second largest investment allocation earmarked for consumer goods was devoted to the food industry. The Plan called for 32.3 billion *lei*, or 26.1 percent of total consumer goods investment to be devoted to this sector. This amount was subdivided as follows: 7.2 billion *lei* for the sugar industry; 1.9 billion for edible oils; 1.9 billion for the meat industry; 2.9 billion for fresh fish; 2.9 billion for milk products; and 1.4 billion for canned fruits and vegetables.

The following plants were to be established within this sector: two sugar refineries, a freezer slaughter house, a plant for canned meat and meat products, 15 milk pasturization stations, a powdered milk plant (no doubt a carryover from the 1949 Plan), and various units for the production of butter and cheese, as well as two amidin and glucose plants. The Plan also called for the creation of new flour mills and fodder industries in those regions of the country where there was a lack of them. Under the meat industry sub-sector, the addition of freezer storage units to the more important slaughter houses was envisaged. It was also foreseen that 2.7 billion *lei* would be invested in the expansion of refrigeration facilities, and the construction of over 22,500 square meters of refrigerated storage units was contemplated.

Early Plan Years

As mentioned, the level of investment allocations for consumer goods industries in 1951—the first year of the Plan—were below the percentage envisaged for the five-year period. Despite this relative neglect, however, consumer goods production that year apparently increased by 27.7 percent, as compared to an increase of 29.6 percent for producer goods production. This relatively large upsurge in consumer goods output (if indeed it did materialize), must to a large extent be attributed to the after-

* *Romanian News*, January 14, 1951.

** *Romanian News*, January 21, 1951.

effects of the two previous one-year plans. Subsequently, the real trend of the Five Year Plan was shown in comparative figures for the following year: in 1952 producer goods were scheduled to increase 35 percent, from which it can be computed that the increase planned for consumer goods had fallen to an unprecedented low of 10.9 percent.

Both in 1951 and in the following year, major consumer goods targets were not reached, though in the first year of the Five Year Plan results were far better than subsequently. The 1951 Plan report, vague as it is, appears to indicate that production of cotton textiles, footwear, and sugar were all below originally-planned targets. In 1952, no plan goals were published. The plan report, however, indicated that production had been below the expected level for woolen textiles, silk textiles and sugar. On August 26, 1953, Radio Bucharest stated that: "... in 1952 ... although targets of the food industry were fulfilled and overfulfilled, the Ministry of Food Industry did not achieve its plan in some of the most important products, such as sugar, vegetable oil, and canned vegetables." The exceptionally small increases recorded in the leather footwear and cotton textile industries were most probably well below envisaged goals. This was substantiated in recent New Course plan revisions, which scaled down the 1954-55 Five Year Plan targets for these items.

Plan Acceleration

Although consumer goods production failed to attain major targets in 1951, industrial production as a whole substantially exceeded planned goals. Toward the end of 1952 it became apparent that the regime intended to stress producer goods production even further, thus reaching the overall industrial production level envisaged for 1955 by the end of 1954. On October 23, 1952, for instance, Radio Bucharest discussed an editorial in *Rominia Libera* entitled "Let Us Fulfill the 1952 Plan in 11 Months." This editorial declared that "the results given in the communique of the Central Statistical Board show that every condition is present ... for fulfillment ahead of schedule of the second-year plan of the Five Year Plan."

It was not until the following month, however, that the overall aims of the regime finally emerged. These were clarified by the Chairman of the State Planning Commission, Miron Constantinescu, in a November 7 speech (*Romanian News*, November 23, 1952). He said that "the essential characteristic of the 1953 plan will be the fact that it will appreciably exceed the level set for 1953 in the Five-Year Plan, approaching the level provided ... for 1954." Preliminary studies for the 1953 plan, said Constantinescu, "provide for the raising of total industrial production in the Socialist sector to a level 24 percent higher than the goals set by the Five-Year Plan for 1952 and 23 percent above the preliminary achievements this year, thus approaching the production [level] provided in the Five-Year Plan for 1954."

Despite the fact that the 1952 results for consumer goods were below the projected Five-Year Plan level, the move to fulfill the Plan in four years gained momentum during the

first quarter of 1953. A January 3, 1953 Radio Bucharest broadcast called for raising industrial production 24 percent and producer goods production 28 percent over the previous year. It is interesting to note that the percent of increase envisaged for producer goods was again above that for overall production, indicating that the percent of increase for consumer goods was below that of overall production. "The main prerequisite for the fulfillment of the plan" said the broadcast, "is the broad extension of Socialist competition and the expansion of the Stakhanovite movement." It stated that "Socialist competition must be adopted by the broad masses of labor." In other words, increased production was to be brought about through increased effort on the part of the worker. This was also indicated in a March 4, 1953 *Romanian News* article entitled "Drive For Completion of Five-Year Plan In 4 Years Gains Momentum." The article stated that "at the beginning of January, the workers of the Semanatoarea agricultural equipment plant adopted a new work schedule, designed to ensure the completion of the provisions of the Five-Year Plan in four years." It declared that "the drive for completion of the Five-Year Plan in four years has become a mass movement." (*italics added.*)

The March 4 *Romanian News* article revealed that the targets of the State plan for 1953 were so set that if they were met, the attainment of the five-year goals would have been possible in 1954. This in turn meant that total industrial production would have had to increase by 24.3 percent in 1954 in order to reach the 244 index (1950=100) originally set for the end of the Five-Year Plan in 1955. By the middle of 1953, however, a variety of factors were operating that made the Plan speed-up an unrealistic venture that had to be abandoned. As in the other Satellites, the whole economy was on the verge of a breakdown, and popular discontent threatened to erupt in violent opposition to the regime. The crisis had been caused by the one-sided stress on producer goods industries at the expense of the people's standard of living, the fantastically high working norms, the abysmally low prices paid for compulsory deliveries, the relatively low purchasing power of the *lei*, and the wholesale reign of terror that accompanied this frantic program of forced industrialization. Plans had to be revised to forestall economic collapse.

The New Course program was inaugurated on August 22, 1953 by Gheorghiu-Dej in a speech commemorating the 9th anniversary of the country's "liberation." He conceded that "the slogan of achieving the Five-Year Plan in four years was reached without sufficient study and [did] not correspond to the real prospects of Romania's national economy." He pointed out that a disproportion had arisen between the accumulation fund (which includes capital investments, State reserves, and the funds allotted to "Socialist" enterprises) and the consumption fund—destined for "the satisfaction of the material and cultural needs of the working people." Dej admitted that this disproportion had resulted in an "unsatisfactory increase of the living standard of the working people when compared to the general development of the national economy."

Even more specifically, the Communist official pointed

out that investments in heavy industry and construction work had been too large, while funds earmarked for agriculture and consumer goods had been "insufficient." To rectify this situation, Gheorghiu-Dej announced that in the period 1953-55, 1.8 billion *lei* would be invested in the food industry and 1.2 billion in the footwear and textile industries. Together, these sums amounted to 60 billion old *lei* (the exchange rate was 20 old *lei* to a new one). It must be noted, however, that this three-year investment amounted to about the original sum allocated to this sector for this period. Since, however, in the first two years allocations were substantially below planned targets, the overall five-year investment will most probably still fall short of the goal envisaged under the Five-Year Plan.

The New Course

This restricted nature of the "expansion" of consumer goods industries is also reflected in an analysis of production targets now set for the end of the Five-Year Plan. Except for rubber footwear, these new targets are considerably below those originally planned. There are no figures available on revisions in consumer goods planning under the accelerated program, but it is clear that in favoring heavy industry the regime drastically reduced the effort devoted to an increase in consumer goods. The New Course program, therefore, is largely an attempt to return to the more balanced production plan originally contemplated.

The first six months of the new program did not bring about the hoped for upsurge in consumer goods production. Thus, although the 1953 plan prescribed an 18.6 percent increase, only a 9.8 percent increase was actually achieved that year. The 1953 report (Radio Bucharest, February 11, 1954) admitted nonfulfillment in the following categories: cotton textiles, leather footwear, silk textiles, sugar, fish, and wood for fuel. Woolen textiles increased by only six percent, knitwear by four percent.

Projected production increases for the following year were relatively modest. Cotton textiles, for example, were scheduled to increase only 9.6 percent over the 1953 level, even though production that year had been below the 1952 level. Wool textiles were to increase by only 3.8 percent, footwear by seven percent. *Scinteia* of February 1, 1955 reported that not even these moderate goals were attained. Cotton textiles increased by only 6.9 percent, thus registering an increase of only 3.2 percent above the 1952 level. Wool and silk textiles production was slightly below planned targets; no results were given for leather footwear, sugar and fish, though the report did say that the plan had not been fulfilled in these sectors, indicating that production had probably been lower than in the previous year.

On January 8, 1955, Minister of Light Industry Sencovici discussed over Radio Bucharest the regime's program for light industry for the current year. The official said that production was to increase "more than 10 percent over 1954," not taking into account the food industry. On January 7, 1955, *For A Lasting Peace, For A People's Democracy!* (Bucharest), announced that consumer



Title: Some State stores still hoard goods to sell them to private tradesmen.

Caption: "Do you have any salami?"
"We did, but it's all sold out."

Urzica (Bucharest), October 15, 1954

goods production—including food products—would increase by 12.6 percent in 1955. Since no data is as yet available on contemplated overall industrial production, it is impossible to evaluate the significance of this figure. It is clear however that, if the 244 industrial index for 1955 (1950=100) is to be achieved, a much greater effort will be required this year of the producer goods sector. An interesting aspect of Sencovici's program for 1955 is the added stress being put on the production of synthetic textiles, which will be some three million square meters above the goals set in the revised plan. Cotton textile production, on the other hand, is scheduled to reach a level of only 240.6 million square meters, or 10 million less than anticipated. The switch was probably effected because of shortages of raw cotton.

Expansion of Industrial Facilities

Relatively few new facilities for the production of consumer goods were constructed during the first two and a half years of the Plan. A number of plants such as the "Moldova" cotton spinning mill started under the 1949 and 1950 plans were completed in this first period of the Five-Year Plan, but the total effort was relatively insignificant.

On August 13, 1952, Radio Bucharest announced that eight bread plants, an edible oil plant, four canneries, three tobacco curing enterprises, and an alcohol factory had been set up in the food industry. The February 1954 *Probleme Economice* revealed that two additional canneries had been built, in 1950, under the one-year plans that preceded all-out forced industrialization.

The only new plants specifically called for in the consumer goods sector in 1953 (according to Radio Bucharest, January 3, 1953), were a sugar refinery and a cannery. This was at the height of the accelerated Plan schedule. After the Gheorghiu-Dej speech, however, a vigorous effort was made to catch up with Plan requirements. The majority of plants mentioned in the following breakdown by sectors were built in this second period.

Dairy Industry

Dairies were established at Roman, Oradea, Jassy, Simeria and Dej. The Roman and Simeria dairies were

reported to have capacities of 800 kilos of butter per eight hour shift and 800 kilos of butter per day respectively. It was also reported that another dairy under construction at Satu-Mare would be completed at the end of 1954. On January 7, 1954, Radio Bucharest announced that a powdered milk plant (almost certainly the one called for in the 1949 plan) was under construction at Remetra in the Magyar Autonomous Region. Later it was announced (October 27, 1954), that operations were soon to start. In addition, on October 22, 1954, *Agerpress* reported that the lactose factory called for under the Five-Year Plan was under construction.

Bread Industry

As far as can be determined, bakeries were established in some 15 different localities up to the end of 1953. Most of these bakeries were situated in industrial centers, including one in Stalin City with a daily capacity of 60 tons. In 1954, bakeries were built in Braila, Botosani, Nasaud, Targu-Mures, Resita, Baia Mare and the "Red Steel" factory.

The February 1954 *Probleme Economice* announced that two new biscuit plants had been established in 1951. On August 17, 1954, Radio Bucharest revealed that a biscuit plant had been established at Mureseni in Transylvania.

Food Processing Facilities

New canneries were reported to have been completed at Tecuci, Focsani and Isalnita in the Craiova region. On August 5, 1954, *Scinteia Tineretului* (Bucharest) announced that yet another cannery was soon to start operations in Arad. A recent article also claimed that a fruit juice plant—originally called for under the 1950 plan—was being constructed at Rimnicu Vilcea in the Pitesti region. Other reports disclosed the establishment or construction of two fish and two meat processing plants.

Cotton Textile Industry

On September 1, 1954, *Scinteia* announced that a new spinning mill had been added to the Arad cotton textile combine. Details about this "Teba" mill were given in a July 6, 1954 Radio Bucharest broadcast: the scheduled annual capacity was to be 1,600 tons of cotton yarn, and it

Production of Selected Commodities¹

Commodity	Unit	1948	1949	1950	1951	1952	1953	Plan 1954	1954	Original Plan 1955	Revised Plan 1955
Cotton Textiles	[million m ²]	80.0	100.5	145.0	170.7	197.5	190.7	210.0	203.9	266.5	250.0
Woolen Textiles	[million m ²]	11.0	16.3	20.6	25.3	27.3	28.9	30.0	30.0	39.4	32.5
Silk & Synthetic Textiles	[million m ²]	6.8	11.4	12.7	13.8	—	15.3	17.0	16.9	41.8	19.0
Leather Footwear	[million pairs]	2.6	—	6.0	7.2	7.4	—	—	—	20.7	10.0 ²
Rubber Footwear	[million pairs]	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	2.7	4.0

¹ Sources: *Bulletin Oficial* #117 (Bucharest), December 16, 1950; *Probleme Economice*, No. 1, 1954; Radio Bucharest, April 21, 1954; *Roumanie un des Chantiers de la Vie Nouvelle* by Joseph Ducroux (Paris), 1951; *Economic Survey of Europe* in

1953 (Geneva), 1954; *Die Wirtschaft Rumaniens von 1945 bis 1952* by G. I. Conrad (Berlin), 1953.

² Includes three million pairs of children's shoes.

would contain 13,000 spindles. If this information is exact, the present spindle inventory of the cotton textile industry stands at approximately 365,000. This represents an addition of some 75,000 spindles since 1948, when it was declared that the industry was in need of an immediate increase of 80,000 spindles.

The only other major new concern established in this branch of the industry was a cotton ginning mill at Ciulnita which went into operation in August 1954, according to *Probleme Economice* of September of that year. This plant is supposedly almost completely mechanized and accounts for approximately 30 percent of the production capacity of the country. The article in *Probleme Economice* disclosed that in "the coming years" three additional spinning mills involving some 100,000 spindles are to be established.

Wool Textile Industry

The most important new facility established in this sector, and the only one that was put into operation since the inception of the New Course, is the "Encsel Mauriciu" carding sets factory at Targu-Mures. In October 1951, *Romanian News* announced the establishment of two new mills, but since no further details were given it is highly probable that these were expanded existing plants rather than completely new ones. In the summer of 1953 *Probleme Economice* reported that a wool spinning mill, "Textile Grivita," had been built in Bucharest.

Flax and Hemp Textile Industry

On August 18, 1954, Radio Bucharest claimed that six flax and retting plants had been established throughout the country. These are located at Dornesti, Garta, Cornul-Luncii, Joseni, Ghindari and Ludus. In coordination with the Joseni and Ghindari concerns, two spinning mills are currently under construction, according to *Probleme Economice* of September, 1954. Both these plants had originally been envisaged in the 1949 and 1950 plans.

Synthetic Textile Industry

In the autumn of 1954 it was announced that three new synthetic fiber plants with a combined capacity of 4,500 tons annually were going to be built. If and when they are finished, the industry's capacity will have been increased by 300 percent. Accordingly to the February 1954 *Probleme Economice* a synthetic fiber plant for Romania is under construction in the USSR, and it seems therefore that a substantial expansion of the industry is now being planned. On June 24, 1954, for instance, Radio Bucharest declared that "it is possible to create a synthetic fiber industry, particularly of nylons, kapron fibers and plastic items, with priority given materials that would replace leather."

Leather and Rubber Industry

The most important new installation added to this sector was the "Argesul" tannin extract factory. Situated at Gavana in the Pitesti region, the factory started operations

Production Indices of Industrial Consumer Goods* (1950 = 100, except where noted)

Commodity	1951	1952	1953
electrical fixtures	140	220	270
radio sets	103	65	62
wired radio sets	—	100	415
electric light bulbs	85	137	125
electrical appliances	130	120	150
flashlights	124	99	109
flashlight batteries	356	542	438
cast-iron kitchenware	100	136	220

on September 25, 1952. According to regime claims, it is the largest establishment of its kind in the whole of Southeast Europe and will satisfy all internal needs for leather tanning extracts, besides fulfilling contracts for exports.

Other plants recently mentioned were a leather footwear factory which is scheduled to be completed this year, and a rubber footwear plant on which construction was supposed to have started toward the end of last year. The February 1954 *Probleme Economice* also mentioned that a plant for the production of synthetic leather soles for shoes was being constructed for Romania in the USSR.

Other Consumer Goods Facilities

Installations already completed include the following: a ceramics plant at Gorund in the Hungarian Autonomous region, the furniture factories "Simo Gheza" and "Liberataea," and a paper mill at Prundul Bargaului. Currently under construction are: a porcelain factory at Sighisoara, a cutlery factory in Bucharest, and a mineral wool plant at Ploesti. Products from this last-named factory will be used for insulation instead of glass wool.

Supply Deficiencies

As in the other Satellite states, the quantitative increase in Romanian consumer goods production in many instances has no relation to the immediate needs of the majority of the people. What consumers desire at a particular time in any given locality is often not to be found on the market. Furthermore, such goods as are available are more often than not of shoddy quality with little or no variation in size, color, style or pattern. As part of the new program, the regime has attempted to remedy this situation, but so far all indications are that both the effort devoted to this task and the results obtained are unsatisfactory—even by regime standards.

The problem was outlined shortly after the inception of the New Course by I. Gorea, Planning Director of the Ministry of Food Industry. Radio Bucharest of August 26, 1953 broadcast a statement in which he said that:

"We can no longer allow certain directors of enterprises to disregard the fact that workers demand, and have the right to demand, not only production of items in given quantities, but also that these products be of different varieties, of good quality and suited to the growing de-

* Source: *Probleme Economice*, January 1, 1954.



Title: Salt for Sale.

Caption: "Haven't got any paper . . ."



Title: Butter for Sale.

Caption: "Allow me to wrap up the merchandise nicely . . ."

Urzica (Bucharest), July 10, 1954.

mands of the workers. Indifference toward quality means indifference toward the consumers, toward the working population. . . ."

By the end of 1953, the situation had not improved. The yearly Plan report stated that "the Ministry of Food Industry, the Ministry of Light Industry, local industry, artisan cooperative industry, the Ministry of Metallurgical Industry and Machine Building, the Ministry of Lumber, the Paper and Cellulose Industry and others were slow in the organization of consumer goods producing departments and did not pay sufficient attention to increasing variety and quality." In short, every government department concerned with the production of consumer goods had failed to improve performance according to regime directives.

As shown in the preceding article, "The Romanian Balance Sheet," these shortcomings in the production of consumer goods adversely affected the whole New Course program. Peasant and worker productivity, scheduled to increase partly as a result of a more plentiful and better quality supply of such goods, failed to rise as planned.

The situation did not improve in the first months of last year. On April 25, *Scinteia* turned to a topic that has lately been raised in all the Satellite states, the resistance shown by big enterprises to the conversion of part of their production facilities to the output of consumer goods. The editorial touched the core of the problem when it stated that some enterprises "do not produce those good that are most needed, but only those that can be made most easily." As a result of these two tendencies—to avoid producing consumer goods, and then to produce only those which can be turned out as fast as possible with the least amount of bother—many articles are over-produced, many items are

of extremely shoddy quality, and many products are almost totally unavailable.

As months went by, little improvement was shown. Quantitatively, consumer goods production did score some successes but, as Minister of Light Industry Sencovici stated on July 17 in a *România Libera* article, "with regard to quality and assortment . . . a satisfactory level has not yet been reached." The Communist official gave many illustrations: the "Red Partisan" factory in Stalin produced faulty fabrics; the "Bela Brainer" knitwear plant in Bucharest produced poor flannel products; the cotton textile enterprises in the capital put poorly printed fabrics on the market; the "December 30" textile plant in Arad turned out poor synthetic fabrics and soiled and carelessly-produced summer fabrics; the "Stefan Gheorghiu" plant, also in the capital, put out footwear of substandard quality, as did the Bucharest plant "Nicolae Balcescu." Sencovici said, for instance, that the last-named plant produced shoe soles of uneven thickness and shoes with improperly sealed seams. Three months later on October 17, Radio Bucharest returned to the same topic, mentioning some of the establishments already scored by the Minister and bitterly complaining that "managements . . . of industrial enterprises pay attention almost exclusively to the quantitative implementation of production plans and neglect the political work and technical and organizational measures referring to the quality and presentation of goods."

On September 24, *Scinteia* frankly admitted that the situation was getting worse: "It must be clear to all enterprise leaders, to all Party and trade union organizations, that poor quality goods harm not only the respective enterprises but also the entire national economy. . . . Fabrics, garments, shoes, as well as metal consumer goods of inade-



Title: There has been a shortage of buttons in notions stores.
Caption: "Why do you mark the buttons so far apart? —
"I know what I'm doing. . . . By the time you find the buttons to sew on, the child will have grown somewhat. . . ."

Urzica (Bucharest), September 20, 1954

quate quality, lie idle in the warehouses, thus freezing large amounts of money, at the very time when there is a growing demand for these goods in the shops."

The same September *Scinteia* article also indicated that difficulties had been experienced not only in the larger State plants, but also in those of smaller size belonging to local industry:

"Wishing to make their lives as comfortable as possible, leaders of local enterprises are content to fulfill plans only in terms of value, neglecting the proper assortment of goods and . . . goods which do not amount to much in value. . . . It is true that such items do not contribute to an easy fulfillment of the Plan, but they are nonetheless vital to the daily needs of peasants and workers."

The whole consumer goods situation is further aggravated by the lack of coordination between industry and commerce. On December 15 of last year, *Scinteia* lashed out at managers who consider the observance of contracts to be a mere "bureaucratic formality." The article cited the instance of a shoe factory which, according to its contract, was supposed to deliver to the Bucharest agency of the Ministry of Light Industry 30 percent of its shoe quota in sizes 32 and 33 and instead delivered only 10 percent in these sizes and tried to make up for it by sending 60 percent in sizes 38 and 39.

Almost all regime references to deficiencies in the production of consumer goods deal with two underlying factors: 1. a centralized economy of the type imposed upon Romania by the Communist regime is very badly adapted

to fulfilling the requirements of popular consumption; 2. the consumer goods industry, like other sectors of the economy, suffers from shortcomings that are intrinsic in Communist organization. The first point has already been discussed, in that it has been shown that production units are mainly interested in satisfying controlling units of higher echelons, and not the consumers. *Probleme Economice* has repeatedly scored "illegitimate" short-cuts resorted to in many plants. It mentioned, for instance, that in the cotton textile industry "in many cases the technological processes of pre-bleaching, singeing and mercerizing has been eliminated, resulting in poor quality finished products." In February 1954 this publication revealed that a plant in the textile industry had reduced the ungluing operation of textile fabrics from 18-24 hours to 3-4 hours, thus producing a poorly dyed fabric and greatly reducing its resistance. Many other such cases could be cited. In no instance, however, do these complaints explain that both management and workers have a vested interest in adopting such methods: it enables them to fulfill their plans and saves them from being penalized for failure.

The other aspect of the problem—the inefficiency of all productive sectors—was succinctly stated in *Probleme Economice* of January 1954. The publication said that the metal industry was turning out poor-quality consumer goods because: 1. there was insufficient technological preparation; 2. insufficient responsibility was given to some quality controllers; 3. there was insufficient organization in production; 4. there was poor maintenance of tools and machinery; 5. raw materials of poor quality were being used. In other words, despite all the effort devoted to the organization of industry, its structure, organization, manpower, initiative and productivity, were all poor.

Internal Trade

As in other Satellite states, the overall supervision and regulation of internal trade is the responsibility of the Ministry of Internal Trade which determines the type and quantity of products to be sold by each sector of the trade network. The retail trade plan includes the following: 1. the volume of goods to be sold in the country as a whole and the volume to be allotted to the various regions; 2. the volume of goods to be sold by every retail chain in every region; 3. the volume of goods to be made available according to three main categories—food products, industrial products, and products in public eating places. Special information is also included on cooperatives with respect to their projected food turnover, public eating places in urban areas, and their planned turnover of industrial products in rural areas.

Three main categories of stores are found in the retail trade network: State stores, cooperatives, and private stores. As far as State stores are concerned, a number of reorganizations have taken place, the latest one presumably as a result of the abolition of rationing. Until recently, this sector included four different kinds of stores: 1. the *alimentare* which specialized in the sale of both rationed and unrationed food items; 2. the *magazine rationalizate* which

sold only rationed items; 3. the *magazine militare* which served only soldiers and militiamen, and 4. special stores for Soviet personnel stationed in Romania. Not all State stores are directly operated by the Ministry of Internal Trade, for a substantial number of them come under the local councils working in coordination with a number of Ministries. The Bucharest Central People's Council, for example, directs all trade within the city through a special commercial section subordinated to the Council.

Distribution of goods through the cooperatives is carried out by two main organizations, the Central Union of Cooperatives for Supply and Distribution (*Centrocoop*), and the Central Union of Artisan Cooperatives (*Uccom*). *Centrocoop* came into existence under the by-laws approved by the Congress of Cooperatives in March, 1949. It was then that the cooperative movement lost its last vestige of independence and was placed directly under the government's thumb. *Uccom* is mainly a producing organization containing 4,000 units with a total membership of 30,000 artisans; its products are distributed through a network of some 1,000 shops. These shops are administered regionally by the 11 *Uccom* regional organizations.

The relative importance of *Uccom* in total production of consumer goods can be gauged from figures released in the November 1953 issue of *Probleme Economice*. At that time, *Uccom* produced 30 percent of the country's ready-made clothing, 9 percent of its leather footwear, 34 percent of its furniture, and 5 percent of its food products. The article also stated that the organization devoted 25 percent of its activities to the production of metal manufacturers such as needles, toys, kitchen utensils, stoves, etc. *Uccom's* production effort, considerable as it is, could be tremendously expanded were it not for the fact that it enjoys a very low priority rating in the allocation of raw materials.

Regime figures released from time to time on additions to the *Centrocoop* network do not tally with overall statistics. Although the annual plan reports usually list the addition of several thousand new State and cooperative stores

each year, the total number of units within the cooperative network is no greater today than it was in 1951. Presumably the so-called "additions" are therefore really transfers of units from one locality to another.

Operating mainly in rural areas, *Centrocoop's* major function in cities consists in running public eating places. Yet, despite this overriding preponderance of work among peasants, the number of units in the rural sector has decreased by more than 2,000 since 1951, even though the total number for the whole country has remained fairly constant. Moreover, though membership in that period increased by some 538,000, rural membership dropped by 138,000. These shifts are partly a reflection of the process of urbanization, but they are also indicative of the shortage of consumer goods in these years and of the calculated regime indifference to peasant welfare before the New Course.

Since October 1, 1950, private trading can be carried only under license. About 22 percent of the retail trade turnover still falls within the private sector, and though this is more than in the other Satellite states, it is confined mostly to agricultural and artisan products sold in large cooperative markets. Since the summer of 1953, there had been only a relatively insignificant relaxation in restrictions on private trade. Two State companies, involving fruit and vegetables and some restaurants, after having been brought to the verge of bankruptcy, offered to sell their concerns to private owners.

Role of Socialized Trade

Socialized trade is meant not only to supply consumers with the necessary consumer goods, but also, in the words of Radio Bucharest of February 2, 1954, to provide the regime with "a potent lever." This lever consists in "the People's State using Socialist trade as a means of restraining speculators and capitalist elements." Most private enterprises were "consolidated" in the State network by 1950.

Growth of Socialized Retail Trade Turnover¹

	% Goods Turnover "Socialized Sector"	Total Socialized Sector		% of Increase over Prior Year	State Stores		% of Socialized Trade Turnover	Cooperative Stores		% of Socialized Trade Turnover
		Index	Value ²		Index	Value ²		Index	Value ²	
1950	—	100.0	230.5 ³	—	100.0	146.7	63.6	100.0	83.8	36.4
1951 Plan	—	133.2	307.0	33.2	—	—	—	—	—	—
1951	76.0	128.6	296.4	28.6	121.9	178.8	60.3	140.3	117.6	39.7
1952	—	132.3 ⁴	304.9	2.9	118.3	173.6	56.9	156.7	131.3	43.1
1953	77.7	165.7	382.0 ⁵	25.3	169.0	247.9	64.9	160.0	134.1	35.1
1954 Plan	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	190.3	159.5	—
1954	—	190.9	440.0 ⁵	15.2	—	—	—	—	—	—
1955 Plan	80.0	217.0	500.0 ⁶	—	—	—	—	—	—	—

¹ Sources: *Romanian News*—May 27, 1951; June 22, 1952; Radio Bucharest—February 11, 1954; *Probleme Economice*, No. 9, 1954; *Scinteia*, August 23, 1954; December 28, 1954; *Lupta de Clasa* (Bucharest), May 1954.

² Values in billions of (pre-currency reform) 1952 lei at December 31, 1949 prices.

³ 1950 plan (*Planned Development of the Romanian Peoples*

Republic) called for turnover of 210 billion lei.

⁴ This is corrected index. Regime gave it as 132.0.

⁵ These values converted to 1952 lei at the rate of one new lei to 20 old.

⁶ The December 28, 1954 *Scinteia* reported that the 1955 envisaged turnover of Socialized retail trade is now 26 billion (new lei equivalent to 520 billion (old) lei).

Small tradesmen were either taxed out of business or forced to discontinue operations because of a lack of merchandise to sell. Many of these former tradesmen were therefore obliged to join the cooperative trade network which needed their experience and was designed to check their "capitalist" practices. On January 21, 1954, *Scinteia* recalled that Lenin had made the following pronouncement on the topic: "Cooperatives represent an economic form in which private commercial interest can be combined with check and control by the State, because they provide the possibility of subordinating private interest to the general interest."

New Function

Recently the State and cooperative trade networks have been assigned a new function, that of determining consumer tastes. It is now up to the retail trade units to ascertain the type, quantity, design, color, variety, etc., of merchandise wanted by the consumers they service. In addition to this market research function, the trade network must now influence manufacturing units to produce according to plan the consumer goods in demand. Finally, trade organs must see to it that defective products are withheld from the market. All these duties should have been carried out in the past, but they were not and the regime did next to nothing to improve the situation. Lately, however, sharp directives have been issued, including the following in *Probleme Economice* of September 1954:

"One of the evident defects of the cooperative sector is that *Centrocoup* and its commercial departments are bureaucratic and do not systematically study the demands for various types of goods. The unsystematic study of the population's demands and ignorance of the actual situation in the field . . . has contributed in many instances

Progress

"The quality of products made by many food enterprises is still unsatisfactory, and does not correspond to the demands and tastes of consumers. To the shame of the collectives of the 'Avram Iancu' and 'Baia Mare' bread plants, these enterprises are still producing poor quality bread, which is also sour, has too much acidity, contains a high degree of moisture and does not look appetizing."

Scinteia, August 26, 1953.

"The new 'Baia Mare' bread plant has begun its test production. Like all bread plants recently constructed, this new unit of the food industry has modern equipment at its disposal."

"Citizens who consume bread made by the collective of the 'Avram Iancu' plant maintain, and quite correctly, that the bread produced by this plant is of inferior quality. Sometimes it contains too much acid, sometimes it is not well baked, and at other times it is burned. The consumers' opinion is confirmed by the test record in the plant's laboratory. In the register one finds this same notation, nearly every day, on the test results: 'Bread does not correspond to the required quality.'"

Scinteia, January 11, 1955.

to a faulty distribution of goods and to a faulty supply of consumer goods, especially those in daily demand by the large masses of the people. . . . In provisioning cooperatives with goods, it is necessary that equal attention be given to various types of goods. We must fight against the tendency of some cooperatives to take only those goods that can be sold quickly. . . ."

Expansion of Facilities of Socialized Trade¹

	Cooperative Trade				New Units Added			
	Number of Coops	Member- ship	Total Units	Rural Units	Coops		State Stores	Total Socialized Sector
					Total	Rural Units		
1948	6,352	—	7,633	6,565	—	—	—	—
1949	5,632	4,700,000	11,409	9,888	—	—	—	—
1950	4,110	5,000,000	19,788	—	5,530	4,255	1,251	6,781
1951 Plan	—	—	—	—	1,100	800	759	1,859
1951	4,154	5,541,838	21,966 ²	16,002	—	—	—	—
1952	4,146	6,000,000 ³	21,000	—	—	—	—	3,179 ⁴
1953	—	6,018,455	—	—	—	—	—	4,700 ⁵
1954 Plan	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	2,086
1954 June	3,500	6,080,000 ⁶	22,000	14,000	1,200 ⁷	—	—	2,500 ⁷
1955 Plan	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	12,500 ⁸

¹ Sources: *Universul* (Bucharest), August 7, 1951; *Scinteia*, August 2, 1954; *Romanian News*—August 13, 1950; March 4, 1951; May 27, 1951; *Law for the Development of the RPR National Economy (1951-1955)*; Radio Bucharest—January 23, 1953; May 8, 1953; July 13, 1954; August 17, 1954; February 1, 1955; *Munca*, August 5, 1954; *Probleme Economice*, March 1950.

² Includes: 17,422 shops, 3,166 in urban areas and 14,256 in rural areas; 4,313 restaurants and public canteens, 2,549 were in urban areas and 1,746 in rural areas; 231 book shops. The Co-

operative Union was also reported to have in operation 7,960 production units and 1,090 service units.

³ 4.5 million reported in rural areas.

⁴ Includes 1,148 public canteens.

⁵ Includes 410 public canteens.

⁶ 4,362,000 reported in rural areas.

⁷ Figures approximate, and are for end of year. Includes 900 public canteens.

⁸ This is number of units projected for five year period (1951-55); 3,700 planned for rural areas.

On October 17, 1954, Radio Bucharest declared:

"Commercial organs can contribute a great deal to the improvement in the quality of goods. They are duty-bound to accept only goods of high quality and must refuse to put on sale defective goods. The harmful system according to which some selling units, eager only to fulfill their plan, close their eyes when they accept faulty merchandise, must be firmly fought. The commercial bodies have the obligation to try and find out the tastes and demands of the working people, to organize talks between consumers and enterprises, etc."

Other recent complaints have mentioned such shortcomings as lack of cleanliness in shops, inefficient service, indifference toward customers, arbitrary opening and closing of shops, and the infiltration of "dishonest elements" throughout the trade system.

Patterns and Conclusions

Very few new consumer goods installations were established between 1951 and mid-1953, the inception of the New Course. Those that were established during this two and a half year period were principally carry-over projects from the 1949 and 1950 plan, as were also a number of the plants established from mid-1953 on. The severe curtail-

ment of consumer industry expansion was the result of the heavy industrial acceleration of the Five Year Plan program for producer goods. Obviously this meant that investments in consumer goods industry were considerably reduced.

With the New Course, investments in consumer goods production were restored to the levels of the original Five Year Plan. Two and a half years of reduced investments, however, made it impossible even to attain the production goals for consumer goods of the original Five Year Plan. The 1955 levels will probably be not only substantially below those, but even below the more modest goals envisaged under the revised program.

In internal trade, it appears that there are fewer retail establishments today than there were four years ago. The number of cooperative stores is about the same, although there are fewer in the rural areas and somewhat more in the cities, but the number of independent retail outlets has been greatly reduced.

It is significant that even the New Course attempt to adjust the economic imbalance only went so far as to restore the original Five Year Plan goals, and was then unable to reach even a revised and lower version of those goals, so that what was impossible in the recent past seems equally impossible for the immediate future.

Suggestion Box Pays off in Hungary

One of the standard means of encouraging workers in Communist countries, in place of adequate wages, is to pay out bonuses for suggestions to improve production. *Szabad Nep* (Budapest), October 8, 1954, charged that Hungarian "innovators" are turning the system into a huge racket whereby almost any suggestion made will apparently win a bonus. The newspaper listed a number of awards recently made:

"There is the world-shaking innovation called, 'An Infallible Cure for Hay Fever': 'Persons suffering from hay fever should breathe through their mouths and not through their noses. . . .' K.J., under the title 'Improvement of work in Health Institutes,' made the suggestion, 'Turn off the water taps if no water is needed' and received 300 *forints*. The chief of the department of public enlightenment of the Ministry of Health discovered one day that there was no health propaganda in the crossword puzzles of the newspapers. He suggested that the following clues, for example, could be inserted: 'What is the most important thing before meals?' Answer: 'Wash your hands.' 'What is the first thing to do in the morning?' Answer: 'Brush your teeth.' For this innovation he received 1,000 *forints*. An innovation suggested by an elderly gentleman to the Ministry of Health was called "Turkish Bath in the Bed." Although the idea seemed hopeless, the department spent 24,000 *forints* making a model and the old gentleman received a 900-*forint* award. The model never worked."


The New Line On Love

"... **T**HERE is another interesting kind of story, this time about love. 'He' is a leader in production, handsome, good, honest, moderate in his habits, and frequently, the receiver of awards (for productivity). 'She' is pretty, graceful, ambitious, but a laggard at work. He sees her, she notices him, they fall in love, she precipitates a discussion (or, perhaps, he does) and they decide to get married at once. They go to the State Store for House Furnishings and admire the windows. They talk a good deal about production. The third day, another 'he' who is also in love with her informs the first 'he' that she is a laggard at work and that consequently, her labor brigade has just lost its good standing in the Socialist competition at their factory. Immediately he—the first one—writes her a letter of one word only: farewell! She, fired by the great love she feels, undergoes a deep and rapid change, becomes a production leader, even a Stakhanovite (the faster the transformation the better, so that 'he' may not have to suffer too long). Then she leaves for a technical school and from there, she writes him a letter. He, filled with happiness, waits for her. They meet after her graduation, they kiss, she tells him: let me show you the innovation I have developed. He will help her to perfect it. They are happy, happy. Three times happy. As for the other 'he'—the reprehensible Iago—don't let's talk about him in order not to spoil the reader's cheerful mood."

The quotation above might, at first glance, seem to be a Western satire on the plot of a typical Communist "love story." In fact, it appeared in *Viata Romineasca* (Bucharest), the newspaper of the Communist Writers' Union in Romania, in March 1954. Its satire is a manifestation of the regime change in attitudes toward love and the relations between men and women which, taking various guises, has been established in all the countries of the Soviet bloc. These attitudes can be traced in editorials, in song, in fashion, in poetry and in the daily life in general.

In pre-New Course days, love and romance were always

The Old Course



Caption: You must approach a machine as you would a woman: with your heart.

Szpilki (Warsaw), July 11, 1954

tied to the individual's role as a functioning part of the State economic machine. Recognizing the power of love as a catalyst, the Communists tried to induce the two sexes to evaluate each other's desirability not on the basis of looks or personal appeal, but according to his or her work productivity. A recent example of this view—and the view is by no means entirely obsolescent—is a popular Polish song called "What Makes a Woman Attractive?", published in *Nowe Polsko*, organ of the Polish-Czechoslovak

Friendship Society, in October 1954. A condensed translation of the lyrics follows:

"Why is she so attractive that every boy looks at her
When she walks in the evening through the streets of Warsaw?

Her work is what makes her so beautiful;
Every boy would like to marry a girl like her.
This morning she mixed cement at the building site;
Tonight she attracts the interest of every boy."

And a Bulgarian poem by Kliment Zachev in *Literaturn Front* (Sofia), September 12, 1954, continues this dubious tradition:

"Listen now, we are going to elope,
But first I want you to become
A shockworker tractorist
And, thus, to overshadow Comrade Christo.
Vela should not brag so much
When she comes to the club,
Let everybody in the village envy me
That I am in love with a shockworker."

In the next verse, a girl confides to her best friend:

"You know that I love him,
But he told me: 'You are not for me,
[Because] in the village unit you are last . . .'"

Here, as in other fields, Communist work monomania has been tempered by a forced realization that there are other human motivations and values. Not only are the

The New Course



Caption: "Henry, do it carefully, don't disturb them."

Szpilki (Warsaw), September 26, 1954

New Course Communists aggressively waving the banner of love, but they are laughing self-consciously at the ludicrous situations which arose from the old, "unrealistic" policy. For example, *Mlada Fronta* (Prague), July 25, 1954, carried a sketch called "Telephone Date":

"Hallo? I'm calling the Multiplex plant. May I talk to Comrade Lukasova? . . . Is that you, Vera? This is Jirka . . . Yes, I am calling you, darling, to make a date. How about tonight at 10? . . . What? A meeting? . . . This is silly, I have a night shift, I have to be at my plant at 10.30. How about 7 in the morning? . . . What did you say? You have to be at your plant at 7? . . . All right, all right . . . Then tomorrow, O.K.? When? . . . Let's say in the morning. I am free then . . . Blast it, you work! What? In the afternoon? . . . What do you say? At 6 the Shop Committee, Cultural Committee at 7? . . . At 7 I start work myself. O.K. Then the day after tomorrow . . . No, wait, I can't (takes out a notebook). Wait, I have to look at my diary. No, I can't the day after tomorrow, I have a brigade meeting and then a conference on production improvement . . . Well, well, what shall we do? Next week? You know how much I want to see you again, Vera . . . I've got it! Next Sunday! The what? The plant outing? Well, just put me on the list, I will go with you! . . . What? But this is impossible! No room in the bus. No guests admitted! But I'm not a guest, dammit, I'm your husband!"

The New Course seems to recognize the family and marriage much more in their own right, apart from work. Although work and Party activities remain important, the regime attitude is that now they should not be permitted to interfere with family life as much as they used to. *Mlada Fronta*, March 7, 1954, published a letter to illustrate this point:


"In our plant there are 4 meetings a week per person. Every young employee, however, has 6 meetings, every young employee in the chorus 8 meetings, and every young female employee in the chorus still 2 more. I am an employee, I am young and I sing. Therefore my quota is 8 meetings per week. . . . My love has two more meetings to attend than I. She bore up well enough until one day we decided that instead of meeting in the park during lunchtime, we would meet at the Magistrate's to get married.

"I resolved to launch an attack on the mass-organization officials in our plant to persuade them that the purchase of household necessities is a political task. Alas! None of them would admit that buying oven-pipes is a political task and one of them even considered that laying in a supply of dry goods is a bourgeois practice with cosmopolitan roots. . . . Spring buds began appearing on the trees and birds took their little ones for the first outing, but Helen and I kept on meeting between Committee and plenary sessions. And even that was for only a second since she was usually rushing somewhere with some records and I was hanging the wall newspaper—and my head too—. . . . We decided to practice absenteeism. Instead of going to Committee meeting we went shopping for hardware, instead of activism we bought curtains, and instead of Plenary Session we bought brushes.

"This misbehavior came to a sudden end and we were called on the carpet before the Youth League Committee. Someone in the Committee said we should take an ex-

ample from the Soviet youth, which lives in a collective. Here my love jumped up and said it was nonsense, the Soviet youth could not live this way because 10 million children were born there last year. . . .

"We are foolish," said old Comrade Klimak finally. "To found a family, to create a nice home, these are just as important as some wall newspaper or recreation meeting. If I were a Committee member, I would suggest that instead of criticizing, the members help these two young people with moving furniture, cleaning up their apartment, etc. This would help the couple and the whole collective."



Title: Just Picture It!

Caption: The sign on the second and empty twin bed reads "I am at a meeting."

Ludas Matyi (Budapest), April 29, 1954

Signalizing the new revival of romance is the official return of the wedding as a ceremony rather than a transaction in a government office. In Hungary, the regime recently converted a former nobleman's mansion into a House of Marriages. The ceremony itself is a uniquely Communist rite: it is, of course, completely secular, and the couples are married in batches, true to the principle of collectivity. *Nok Lapja*, December 10, 1953, gave an account of the first wedding held in the House of Marriages:

"The hall is illuminated by the brilliant radiance of many electric lights. The grey marble walls and the pink marble columns shine in the light, and the gold decorations reflect the rays; the roses in the Persian rugs seem almost real in the fairy-tale splendor. Even the tri-color band worn by the registrar is more ornate than it used to be: the coat-of-arms of the Hungarian People's Republic is embroidered on it in silk and gold. . . . The parents and wedding guests eagerly watch from the carved chairs placed along the walls and in the back of the hall. The registrar rises to speak. His serene look embraces the young couples. . . . He addresses them with the words:

"The sparkle in your eyes, your happy smiles tell me that you are looking into the future with utmost confidence. You have every reason to be confident! In our country newlyweds may expect a happy future. They need not be apprehensive—as in the past—of unemployment, privation, oppression, persecution. . . . Your children will be born in freedom and they will grow up in freedom and peace. . . . and I believe that they will live to see the liberation of all the peoples of the world! Go and build your home,

build your free nation! I wish you happiness and peace in your married life: may love, loyalty and faith in each other be with you until the end of your lives."

The ceremony continues:

"The sound of music issues softly from concealed microphones. . . . The newly-wed couples sign their names to the lifelong contracts; the music swells. The strains of *Lohengrin's* wedding march fill the hall. Arm-in-arm the young couples slowly step down from the dais and start off on the common road. . . .

"What a joy that this place has been created, and that now we can outwardly express the content of our present-day life: our effort to achieve beauty and happiness! . . . These marble walls, the soft silky rugs, and the brilliant chandeliers will make the moments of their wedding an unforgettable memory for hundreds and hundreds of young couples. Many hundreds and hundreds of grandmothers and grandfathers will tell their grandchildren: 'When we stepped into that brilliant hall at 67 Lenin Avenue. . . .'"

Distinct from their "rationalist-materialist" view of society, is the Communist effort to persuade people to marry for love. Old customs like the dowry system, being based on private property and particularly the private ownership of land, are extremely distasteful to their "moral sense"—and their economic policies. A letter in *Scinteia Tineretului* (Bucharest), January 6, 1954, cited the case of a young girl who "persuaded her father, a member of the local kolkhoz, to withdraw from the kolkhoz because it was necessary to have some land for a dowry." Commented the writer: "With the kind of husband who expects a dowry in return for his love, [this girl] will not be happy in her marriage."

The letter further criticized young people who expect a dowry when they get married: "They say that the bride is not welcome in her bridegroom's house, that her husband doesn't love her, if she doesn't have a dowry, especially some land—not much, but some. Our young lads who work on the kolkhoz know all about this, but they have more sensible ideas concerning these matters. They say: 'Well, land or no land, dowry or no dowry, all that doesn't mean a thing. She may be born with a silver spoon and I would not be interested if I were not in love with my future wife!' And they are right."

A story published in *Narodna Mladej* (Sofia), October 20, 1953, contained the same moral:

"... [Maria] was impressed by Paskalev. He was an educated man. He was attentive and gallant. She confessed to her friends that she loved him. He was her first love. . . .

"The days and weeks went by. One evening, after he had talked to her at length about music, Paskalev asked her in the tone of a prosaic salesman:

"Do you have a dowry?"

"No, I don't," said the girl.

"You must have! It is impossible, a girl not having a dowry. It's not right. . . . I would never marry a girl without a dowry."

"Something vague, like fear and distrust, settled in the girl's heart. . . .

"In the meantime, Maria's friends were telling her: 'He will leave you. You will not be the first he has left. . . .'"

A Study of Incompatibility

On July 24, 1954, *Mlada Fronta* (Prague) published a letter from a reader who said: "I cannot agree with the viewpoint of the girls from Hostalkova which essentially is this: one either marries and lives for husband and children, or one works in the Czechoslovak Youth League and foregoes marriage. It would follow from this that the girls regard marriage and [Party] activity as mutually exclusive. They should realize that we do not live on an island isolated from the outer world, but in a society to which we have certain obligations and duties. . . . Work in the Youth League must not separate us in a marriage but draw us closer. . . ."

The compatibility of marriage with outside work for women is immutable Communist dogma. But the Communists could not ignore the fact that, in the still imperfect "Socialist society," there is often conflict on this issue. An extract from Boris Polotai's novel *Ifju Hazasok* was published in *Nok Lapja* (Budapest) on July 3, 1952 (exactly a year before the launching of the New Course.) This story, of a girl's desire to succeed in her job outside the home and her husband's "bourgeois" refusal to cooperate, shows how this problem was depicted in accordance with the Communist aim—to draw women into industry—in pre-New Course times.

While working on the Sztalinvaros construction project, Kati and Joska fall in love and marry. However, Joska does not appreciate Kati's interest in labor competition and Party work, and their differences lead to a break between them:

"I'm going," said Kati, and dragged her wicker basket out from the corner of the room, flung her clothes into it and then knelt on it because she could not close it. Now he will start pleading with me but he can't stop me—she thought, with a lump in her throat; she fumbled with the basket for longer than necessary to give Joska time. Has he lost his power of speech? She shot a sly glance at him. Isn't he mumbling to himself? Don't his movements betray that he wants to grab her with both hands to hold her back, if he dared. . . .

"We don't suit one another," she said quietly.

"That's what I say."

Kati went pale. "You don't understand; I want to make progress and you keep me back! That you perform good work doesn't help matters, that's not everything!" Her eyes filled with tears. . . . "Do you know what you are?" she asked standing in the doorway. "Well, you should. You are a tyrant! A real tyrant, and that is why you drew me away from production!"

"Don't give me a seminar lesson," he said as he fumbled in his pocket for a cigarette.

"You dragged me away from production to have me at your disposal all the time, to stand at attention for you all day long."

Joska angrily crumbled the cigarette in his fingers until the tobacco dropped out.

"Do you know what you are?" asked Kati again as she turned the doorknob. "A bourgeois relic."

Joska moved. "What was that you said?" He took a step forward and he looked so threatening that Kati tore the door open and rushed down the steps with the wicker basket under her arm.

After their separation Joska learned how proud his colleagues were of their wives who overfulfilled the norms. So he decided to take Kati back.

"I will go and get her," he decided. He had gone as far as Gorbe Street when a thought struck him: Kati will feel triumphant, she will expect him to plead with her. Or . . . she might not want even to hear of him. He would not beg her. Perhaps he should just say: "It is hard to live without you," or, "I guess it is O.K. for you to work." But he was unable to say either.

He took along a coffee pot and the porcelain dog. "You may have the radio, too, or whatever you like," he murmured.

"Why do you want to hurt me?" Kati asked in a piqued voice.

"I hurt you? Wasn't it you who said that I was a bourgeois relic? If you had said simply that I was a scoundrel, maybe I would have come to see that I do possess bourgeois vestiges. . . . But this way?"

How much trouble I will have with him, thought Kati and took his arm.

"Dust is collecting on our new furniture," said Joska, and anxiously watched her face. Why doesn't she say she'll come back? he wondered.

"I miss you," he said shortly.

"You miss me?" Kati gave a jubilant shriek. "But—we have a brigade meeting this evening. I asked, you see, to be admitted to a brigade which has not been fulfilling its norm. I want to get them to overfulfill in the future. However, after the meeting. . . ." She turned her haggard but radiant face toward him. "You must understand that my work is as important as yours."

I shall still have much trouble with her, thought Joska with mounting joy and handed the coffee pot to Mrs. Moldva who was standing nearby, so that he could embrace Kati."

A vignette of domestic life in Hungary, from *Ludas Matyi*, May 12, 1954, satirizes the husband who expects his wife to be his servant in "Socialist society":

"Peter Csugari danced around barefoot in the middle of the room. 'Erzsike!' he shouted. 'Get me a pair of socks!'"

"Erzsike came in from the kitchen where she was making Peter's breakfast and gave him a pair of socks. Then she went back to the kitchen to finish making breakfast.

"'Erzsike!' Peter howled again. 'I've lost a button.'"

"Erzsike sewed on the button and started toward the kitchen again. She had hardly taken two steps when an indignant voice shrilled across the room. . . .

"'Again no handkerchiefs!'"

"'Take one out of the bureau,' Erzsike advised.

"'How should I know where you keep the handkerchiefs,' Peter retorted, his indignation rising. 'I never can get anything from you!'"

"Erzsike opened the drawer and took out a handkerchief, slipped into Peter's pocket and started back toward the kitchen.

"But Peter roared like a wounded animal. 'My suspenders have gone to pieces. . . .'"

"'Just a minute,' said Erzsike and immediately started to mend them."

"'Women are funny, or at least some women,' said Peter philosophically. 'They wait till the last minute to fix things. . . . What's with my breakfast?' he said suddenly. 'It's seven-thirty, and no breakfast. I'll be late. . . .'"

"'It's too hot,' Peter complained, 'and bitter.'"

"'Stir it,' said Erzsike."

"'Why didn't you stir it?' Peter demanded. 'Can't you even do that much for me?'"

"Erzsike stirred Peter's tea and hastily put on her coat."

"'Aren't you going to have any breakfast?' inquired Peter."

"'I have no more time, dear,' Erzsike called back from the door. 'I can't be late, you know, a department head must set a good example!'"

Life with Wife and the Party

In the same vein is this letter published in the Romanian woman's (mass organization) magazine *Femeia* (Bucharest), Sept.-Oct. 1954:

"I am taking advantage of the fact that my wife is



Title: Hail March 8, International Woman's Day.

Caption: "How is it, Comrade, that your wife didn't come to our celebration?"

"How could she? I left her home to cook dinner for me."

Urzica (Bucharest), March 25, 1954

not at home in order to write you a few lines so that others may profit from what I have to say. She (my wife) is attending a meeting of the *Alimentara* [grocery cooperative] because they have to appoint a new administrator of supplies, since the last one was dismissed for hoarding large quantities of sugar lumps under the counter. My wife was the one who put an end to his practices, having caught him in the act, and if others hadn't been there, she would have shaken all the sugar out of his pockets herself. . . .

"As I have already said, my wife is now at the meeting, for she is the President of our Street Committee, and she went to give some advice to the new administrator regarding sugar lumps, confectioners' sugar, etc. I must admit, since she has been president, she has done a lot of good things; she has an iron hand! But I must start at the beginning. About a year ago, I came home one evening and couldn't find my wife anywhere. On the table there was a note. It read something like this: 'My incomparable Nicholas, I have gone to a meeting of the citizens of our district. The roast is on the table, I kiss you affectionately, your Maria. P.S. the soup is in the kitchen.'"

"When I finished reading the note, I really began to boil (that saved me from heating the roast.) Well, said I, we will have to discuss this, because this cannot be allowed. Why is she meddling into affairs which concern men? Meetings, citizens, councils!

"Just as I was finishing my dinner, I came my wife. 'Good evening, Nicholas,' she said. Me, I didn't answer. She left the room and returned fifteen minutes later. Then she said, 'Nicholas, are there two of us, or aren't there?' Of course, said I. 'Then why do you speak only to yourself?' 'How can I help it?' was my angry reply. 'Because instead of looking after your wifely duties, you are busy with meetings, with councils. These things are for men. Your business is looking after the pots and pans. It has always been that way. Did your mother, God rest her, go to citizens' meetings? The only meetings she ever had were with your father. All the neighbors can bear witness to that.' 'Nicholas,' said my wife, 'you are taking the wrong stand on this.' 'It's none of your business on what I stand,' I retorted. Later on she explained to me what she had wanted to tell me, and I thus learned that she had been appointed President of our Street Committee. For the street has to be paved, electricity installed in the houses, a park built. 'But,' I said, 'if you're going to be busy with all this, who's going to take care of the house?' 'Oh, don't worry,' she replied, 'I'll do the cooking. I'll take care of both [duties].'

"During dinner I told her again that the matters she is involved in are not the concern of women. She started to interrupt. 'Look here,' I said, 'when I'm speaking, be silent.' And then I was silent because she had more things to tell me. After dinner I told her: 'In this house, I am the boss. This must be as clear as light to you.' 'Yes, we will have light,' she replied, 'for I have spoken with our deputy, and by next week we will have electric light.' I was delighted when I heard this; and we, unlike many others, have a house which is accessible to the light of day. Sure enough, within a month, the street was paved and we had electric light. On that occasion a celebration was held. First a few citizens made speeches. When I heard them praising my wife so highly, my chest swelled to such an extent that I had to unbutton my coat. Some-

one next to me said:

"You have a wife who does you honor, friend."
 "You are right, but what groundwork I had to do!"
 "How so?"

"Well, you know, women will always be women. She was always saying that the woman's place was in the kitchen, with the pots and pans, and that all this business is for men. She had taken the wrong stand. And this very morning my wife said: 'Today is that *Alimentara* meeting but I am not going, as I have to do the marketing.' That burned me up and I said to her face: 'Do you want to make a fool out of me? Today I'll do the marketing, it's my day off anyway. You go about your business.' And so I am writing this letter so that others may profit from my experience. . . ."

But under the New Course, there is a subtle shift in emphasis. Now the Communists make fun of the woman who, even in the interests of her job, denies her femininity—as in this sketch, "Regard Me As a Man!" from *Ludas Matyi*, December 12, 1954.

I.

"When Jenó Peceli took his new job, the first thing he did was to go around and introduce himself to his colleagues. He worked in the same room as Magda Csóvanyos, and so she was the first with whom he got acquainted.

"I'm Peceli," he said shaking hands.

"Csóvanyos," said the girl.

"I hope we will do good work together," he said, feeling that he should say something.

"I hope so too," nodded the girl. "I would like to make something clear right at the start. . . . I must tell you that you must not see the woman in me. We are colleagues. Period. Regard me as a man. . . . Some people are unable to understand that here there are no men and women, there are only colleagues. . . ."

II.

"They worked together in the greatest harmony till five in the afternoon.

"I'm glad it is you who are working in the same room as I," said Magda.

"Why?"

"Because another man would now have asked me whether he couldn't see me home. I see that we understand each other. Are you coming?"

"I am," said Peceli, putting on his coat.

"Which way are you going?"

"Toward Baross Street," he replied.

"Fine. Let's go together."

III.

"What I respect in you," said Magda to Peceli a week later in the cafeteria, "is that you treat me like a man and don't see the woman in me like the others."

"Yes," said Peceli, squeezing her hand under the table.

"They talked for hours about business affairs, man to man. There was just one suggestion Peceli made that did not sound altogether businesslike: 'We could go to the movies tomorrow.'

"Magda pretended not to hear; she merely nodded absently.



Caption: "Don't try to get out of it, Comrade. You have dishonored the name of our organization. I myself saw Comrade Pietrzyk secretly squeezing your hand. . . .!"

Szpilki (Warsaw), June 13, 1954

IV.

"When three months later they left the registry office, Peceli said dazedly: 'The whole thing is like a dream. . . . It is a miracle. . . . What is it you like about me?'"

"That you are not like other men. You never looked at the woman in me, you saw only the colleague," said Magda, clinging to him lovingly.

V.

"A year later, Jenó Peceli and Mrs. Jenó Peceli, nee Magda Csóvanyos, were bending over a crib.

"How amazing," sighed Magda.

"What is amazing, dear?"

"Life," mused Magda. "This sweet little baby would never have been born if you had seen a woman and not a colleague in me."

Communist Couture

Under the New Course, it is a woman's duty to remember that she is a woman. She should not allow her marriage to grow stale in the grind of everyday life. She should care for herself and is even encouraged to take an interest in clothes. This is clearly indicated in the line taken by *Nők Lapja* (Budapest), the leading woman's magazine in Hungary. More than any other section, its fashion section has shown changes since the inauguration of the New Course.

The 1951, 1952 and early 1953 fashions shown in this magazine were a perfect reflection of the drab utilitarian cast of pre-New Course life. Styles were simple, stressed the purely functional aspect of clothes, and showed little variety. Before 1954, there were no pleated skirts, no full skirts, no low necklines, no sleeveless blouses, no "cocktail" or evening dresses, no housecoats or lingerie. The magazine never showed pictures of costume jewelry or accessories such as handbags and umbrellas. The absence of house clothes was most conspicuous. It was, of course, due to the assumption that the women should all be at work.

Now French and American influence has again crept into design—so much so that Party authorities have recently again attacked "Western infiltration" in fashion. Since the start of the New Course, there has been an influx

Proposals Of Marriage

How three specimen types of "Socialist society" would propose marriage was satirized in the Romanian magazine *Urzica*, October 30, 1954:

First, the "servile" type:

Dear Aneta,

I kiss your hands and wish you long life and happiness. I waited for you yesterday in the park for over three hours but you did not come. I'm sorry I couldn't wait longer, but I saw the boss carrying a heavy suitcase and I felt that I could not let him do that, so I offered to carry it for him myself. Please, dear Aneta, excuse me for not being able to meet you yesterday. Perhaps you are angry with me. In that case, I am sure you must be right, even though I do not know why you would be angry.

Dear Aneta, let me confess something to you. I am very much in love with you. What I should like to tell you now is a very serious matter and I hardly know how to begin. Let me take my courage in both hands and ask you, if you should have some time to spare, to go to the registrar with me. If you marry me, I will serve you with all my devotion and faithfulness. You will not have to do one thing. I shall cook, sweep, clean, and I'll also go to market, since I do the marketing for my boss anyway. I must tell you, though, my dear, that in my house I will give the orders. Of course, only if they meet with your approval. Should you dislike my decisions, I will of course follow your wishes. But, please, marry me.

Dear Aneta, I am anxiously waiting for your reply. Please, answer whenever it is convenient for you to do so.

Yours fondly,

My name is Mitica, but you may call me what you will.

And the "laggard":

My love,

I am eager to answer the letter you wrote three years ago. I saw you once during this time, but I couldn't speak to you because you were walking on the downtown side of the street and I was on the other side. You must excuse me now if I interrupt this letter. I am a bit sleepy and can hardly keep my eyes open. I shall continue it tomorrow.

... Luckily I slept rather well. I have been thinking about you even since the day I met you, and today I can therefore say positively that I think I must be in love with you. Thus I would like to know whether you want to be my wife. If you say yes, I will speed the preparations for the wedding so that we could get married as soon as 1956. I must conclude this letter now because the clock shows it is almost ten o'clock and I mustn't be late.

Yours,

Costica

P.S. I've just found out that you got married two years ago. Why the hurry, my dear? Why didn't you wait for my letter? You know, a letter cannot be written just like that. Don't you see how many words it has?

And "the Bureaucrat":

To Whom It May Concern (to my sweetheart Lenutza)

Confidential Memorandum

I, the undersigned, hereby advise you that beginning on

Amor kalandja



Title: Cupid's Difficulties.

Caption: "No! This is a reject!"

Ludas Matyi (Budapest), March 25, 1954

the 25th of August of the current year, I felt the first symptoms of love for you. Consequently, on that day and at that time, I listed you in the files of my heart. In accordance with the powerful feeling which possesses me, and in all sincerity, I would like to inform you that I have been particularly impressed with your beautiful blue eyes. Should you accept the above-mentioned points, I would then request you to make an appointment with me, to take place according to the rules and regulations established for these matters. Will you, please, communicate your decision to me so that I can prepare in time a notebook in which to register our meetings. I shall not be free today, therefore come tomorrow ["come tomorrow" is an expression much used by bureaucrats in the Romanian People's Republic.]

Later, I shall fill out the necessary forms and my application asking you to marry me. As the sole beneficiary of your hand, please let me have the result of my sentimental representation as soon as possible. You are requested to affix to your answer the signatures of all the members of your family together with two photographs, full face and profile, and to have it stamped by the administrative officer of the district People's Council and countersigned by the president of the State Housing Department Office in your district.

Should your feelings be opposed to mine, let me know immediately so that I can strike your name from the files of my heart and after three days report this particular entry closed.

This letter has been typed in original and two copies, one being attached to the files and the other sent to your parents for their stamp of approval.

In anticipation of your favorable reply, I have the honor of kissing you, in original only,

Vasile Alcibiade Popescu

In Love

of suits with colored linings, cardigan jackets, blouses with wide sleeves, feminine bows and ties, sailor collars, cut-out necklines, full skirts. Even in the variety of clothes for different occasions a marked change can be noticed. Clothes for the beach, for sports, even for shipboard parties can again be found in the pages of *Nok Lapja*. The former tendency to impose a sort of uniform on women has been stemmed.

Preoccupation with fashion is still decried, and the following of extreme fashions is spoofed—much as it is often in the West—in this sketch from *Szpilki* (Warsaw), August 1, 1954:

"Ten Years of Fashion"

"1945, May: On her feet she had those shoes, usually worn by people who have one leg which is shorter than the other. But now these shoes are called *koturns* and it looks as if both her legs are shorter. I particularly liked her suit (the same as is worn by all our ladies): her skirt looked as if it had been made for her younger sister, and her jacket, as if it had been made for a boxer. Instead of stockings she wore socks, up to her knees, like a senior Scout. On her head she had some kind of a hairy thing which, not being a wig, must have been a hat.

"1945, June: I recognized Alice from a distance. She blossomed all over—a flowered silk dress, like a botanical collection; two narcissus flowers stuck up over her head. She moved like a wave—curls, dress, bosom. She looked like a flower bed gone wild.

"1946, January: Alice, of course, wore yellow stockings, which are one of several ways to draw the attention of others to one's bad legs. Her canary-yellow scarf and a fox-tail on her head forcibly reminded everybody that Alice was used to keeping up with the changes in fashions.

"1948, May: I recognized Alice by her purely fashionable silhouette. Her skirt went down to her ankles, her feet were like painted hoofs, her hair went down her back in long irregular rows.

"1950, August: These shoes, made of a heap of straw tied around the foot with a colored string, this 'elegant' dress with the inscription "I Love You" on the back and "My Darling" in front, this youthful hairstyle a la garçon—yes, it could not have been anyone but Alice.

"1953, April: I met Alice again. On her feet she had shoes reminiscent of children's playshoes (flat-footed children, at that) and on her head—a stocking shaped into the sort of hat worn by the hangman in the Middle Ages. . . .

"1954: There was Alice again. She had that supremely fashionable hairstyle called "Mad Cat" or "The Uglier, the Nicer," a hairstyle easy to care for: it is enough to keep your hair short and unevenly cut and leave it uncombed from morning till night. On her feet she wore the usual coffins, such as used to be worn by women put away for eternal rest, but which are now worn by women going dancing."

In Song and Story

The Ideological Waltz

"There are songs which are gladly sung
Of love and nightingales and May.
But these songs are *bourgeois*
And serve no useful purpose.
We want something else, we want a song
Which contains a *postulate*, a *command*, a *thought*,
One which resolves our basic problems:
And so today we give you this song.

"Refrain:

Such a new
Such a pretty
Ideological
Ditty
It fearlessly sings
Of our everyday things;
Of hammer and spade,
Of [Nowa] Huta, new-made,
Productivity drives
And Kolesow's knives,
And tells, for the future, the limitless scope
Of the cloth-workers' dreams and the bricklayers' hope.

"You know it and you feel it when the result of your work
Is what it should be:
This song, you see, has activated you.
This song has brought you into the daylight of present problems.

No criticism or reproach can be levelled at our song,
And no examining body can say anything bad about it.
In fact, every expert and critic will accord it full praise
Because it is built up on reality.

"No one can blame me
If I fall into a reverie
Dreaming of myself as a *Stakhanovite*,
Come dance with me, damsel, and have no fears,
You may be moody or even sentimental
And if you wish, you may offer me your lips,
Because this evening is such a personal one for us
Come and listen to how it goes. . . .

Refrain:

This is new
And so pretty
This ideological
Ditty.
It handles with pleasure
Our toil and our leisure . . .
And those are the words and the tune that goes with 'em
"In our dear little waltz in three-quarters rhythm."

According to a Polish refugee, this song, a parody of Communist slogans and clichés, is widely and overtly popular in Poland. Ridicule of the old ideological line is also seen in the official press, as in this verse by Leopold Staff printed in *Szpilki* (Warsaw), January 10, 1954:

"You forbid me to write
About nightingales, moonlight and roses,
Saying: these are trivial things
Unworthy of poetry.
Doubt rises in me:

If, years ago,
Two people had not walked in moonlight,
Listening to nightingales sing,
(And the roses bloomed
On that evening),
Would you be here now?"



Title: In many of our writers' novels a kiss and any other amorous demonstration between heroes and heroines is strictly forbidden.

Caption: "Watch out, the authors can see us . . ."

Urzica (Bucharest), October 15, 1954

"Since Kissing Is Again Permitted . . ."

It was only two years ago that the Hungarian Minister of Culture, Jozsef Revai, laid down the policy for literature with the statement: "Love cannot take the place of the class struggle!" (*Tarsadalmi Szemle* [Budapest], September 1952).

On September 30, 1954, an article in *Nok Lapja* (Budapest) observed: "Since kissing is again permitted in literature. . . ." The words are from a dialogue between two friends. One of them had received a card from his girl

which closed with the phrase, "I kiss you a million times!" The friend tries to prove to the addressee that the fulfillment of this assertion would take the young lady a full two months, if there were no interruptions. The recipient of the affection seemed convinced, but to the question of how he would answer, he said, "Ten million kisses I send. . . ."

Such stories are not rare in Hungarian newspapers and magazines today. The reaction of the people against the drab life and wooden literature influenced the regime, even in the first months of the New Course, to allow more romance in life and literature. "It is not good to see young schoolboys and apprentices in the streetcars reading tattered old 'dime novels,' and the girls reading books by Courtis-Mahler, Harsanyi and Renec Erdos [an erotic novelist]," wrote *Irodalmi Ujsag* (Budapest), on August 1, 1954. ". . . in this phenomenon there is a lesson! The popularity of ragged adventure books and musty old romantic novels demonstrates a justifiable need on the part of readers, especially the young ones, for an interesting story, adventure, and last but not least, love and romance in a book."

Szabad Nep (Budapest, March 15, 1954, laid down the new line concisely: "In our literature, we must break with the viewpoint which considers only production and public life worthy of portrayal. . . . Private life—family, love, friendship—should take its rightful place [in the new life], and thus also in literature which portrays the new life. This will restore the real proportion between public and private life, as it [actually exists] in the thoughts and feelings of the masses."

Viata Romineasca (Bucharest), March 1954, under the title "A Short Primer for Makers of Literature", caricatured the hero-stereotype of Communist literature:

"The positive heroes must all be exactly alike, for the human ideal is one and indivisible. Penetrating eyes, flashing with lightning (or, according to each author's taste, sparks, flames, glowing lights, etc.), husky, robust, with Herculean chest and muscles, he radiates strength and optimism. He doesn't drink, and he may even give up smoking; he repels the allurements of the beautiful sex, chaste up to the day of his marriage (he will marry a chaste woman, and all their children will also be chaste). . . . He will never wear a necktie or a crease in his trousers. . . ."

A freer hand is allowed the writers—but only up to a point. Love is "liberated", not "free." Frank representation of love relationships is not permitted in Communist literature and anything bordering on the erotic is still forbidden. This puritanism results in a kind of old-fashioned sentimentality in current romantic literature. One aspect of this is the return to nostalgia; formerly, the Communists rejected any backward glancing in their literature, except for Party reminiscences. A characteristic new poem in this vein appeared in *Nok Lapja* (Budapest), September 10, 1953. For the poet, Gyula Sipos, the views and vistas of Budapest evoke memories, not of the Revolution of 1919 or the "triumphal entry" of the Red Army in 1945, but of his own love affairs:

"You remind me of love,
Budapest, with all your streets and squares;
My heart leaps out youthfully
When I see Gellert Hill.

"In the Grove, on the banks of the Danube,
At street corners in the Ferencvaros,
I hear the patter of steps from bygone daybreaks,
Their rhythm rings in my ears.

"Fierce fall winds may blow,
Icy tempests may roar,
Budapest! Your streets and your houses
Smile at me, recalling bygone springs.

"White arms of maidens wave to me,
Thus do you preserve my loves of the past,
You preserve my love of today,
And its bud: my love of tomorrow."

The reappearance of the love lyric, the poem whose sole theme is love, without ideological underpinnings, is a New Course phenomenon. Indeed, political themes have dwindled to such an extent that a die-hard among the new Communist poets complained in *Uj Hang* (Budapest), May 1954: "We have no poems on political themes. . . . If you look at a periodical of two years ago, the majority of the poems were political ones. And today? One has to search with a lamp for a poet who expresses feelings stemming from politics!"

The New Course — primarily a change in political and economic policy — has brought with it a change in the Party line on love. Like the political and economic measures, it is a middle course policy, which seeks slightly more flexible attitudes toward those human constants about which the Communists could do little anyway: love, family ties, the



Caption: A reader of our publication writes, "Early this spring I submitted a request for innovation to the bench department of the district council and the blueprint is enclosed herewith. Months have passed and I cannot understand why nothing has happened and the old-fashioned benches remain in the park. When will the time come when I can exchange a kiss with my fiancée without being subjected to the inquisitive glances of passersby?"

Ludas Matyi (Budapest), July 8, 1954

desire for a little poetry in daily living and humanity in personal relationships. Although the old goals of boosting production and creating a powerful industrial machine are not abandoned, the new line does take human foibles and feelings more realistically into account, and in so doing is intended as a sort of valve to release some of the pressure of rising popular discontent with life under Communist absolutism.

Beauty Outclassed

Good looks have been a hindrance to achieving success in the movies in Hungary, according to *Magyar Nemzet* (Budapest), August 8, 1954:

"In recent years, when movie directors needed pretty young actresses they had great difficulty in getting them, because of the impossible cadre policy for training actors and actresses.

"Are there no good-looking men and women in our country? On the contrary! But for years the belief has prevailed among the 'guardians' [Party officials] of our theater and movies that personal beauty is 'class-alien'! There also seems to be a belief that no worker, peasant, or 'positive intellectual' could possibly be attractive to look at!"

Hungarian Journalism

A brief survey of Hungarian journalism and publication in the past few years, documenting their difficulties and contradictions with their own quotations.

ON FEBRUARY 1, 1955, Hungarian Press Day was celebrated and dedicated to "the heroes . . . who served the people's cause and spread the truth of the Party." The press of the Communist countries is the most carefully controlled and censored press in the world, but even it reveals from time to time the difficulties of Communism in action, the conflicts of interest in the Party and government, and frequently, if only by implication, the resistance of the people.

With the beginning of the New Course in June 1953, several interesting and revealing changes took place in Hungarian press propaganda and an examination of those changes indicate that even in a totalitarian country Communist control is not quite total. This does not mean, of course, that press organs have freedom: it does mean, however, that the Party line can be and frequently is distorted, circumvented and even opposed by enterprising, or stupid, journalists and editors.

The major Hungarian Party organ, *Szabad Nep*, (*Free People*) has a circulation of 800,000, although it is likely that many who take the "voluntary" subscriptions do not read the paper. *Szabad Nep* is the new Communist-style newspaper and retains none of the old type Hungarian format or style. The so-called boulevard material, colorful reports, murder and assault stories, sketches and personal accounts, all so characteristic of Hungarian journalism, are completely unknown to *Szabad Nep*. Their place has been taken by politics and propaganda, dealing mainly with Party problems, the history of Communism, its "great" men, its theoretical and practical teachings, the Plan reports and fulfillments, and the foreign policy of the Soviet bloc. Editorials no longer have a special page, but can be seen in every article. Political analyses, complicated economic and statistical reports, scientific and agrotechnical studies can be found in *Szabad Nep* along with articles translated directly from Moscow's *Pravda* or the Cominform journal *For a Lasting Peace, For a People's Democracy!* With the exception of a few well-written editorials and well-planned political and economic analyses by the new journalistic generation, the style is clumsy and dry.



Caption: The horse from which you cannot fall off either way.
Ludas Matyi (Budapest), November 18, 1954

The major task of this central Party organ is to propagate Party policy, which in itself makes the paper dull. Its tone is didactic, the articles impersonal renditions of the *agitprop* department of the Party, and the innumerable articles deal with Plans, Party instructions, sowing and reaping campaigns, "Socialist competitions," and other matters reflecting the dreary daily life of the people.

Prior to the New Course, the central Party paper used an "instructive-educative" tone toward the 20 bi-weekly and daily papers published in Hungary under the control of the county Party organizations. But with the beginning of the New Course, *Szabad Nep* often attacked these papers sharply because of their "liberal" tone. For example, on February 1, 1954, *Szabad Nep* wrote: "There are papers which in recent months have sunk into a moral bog in their efforts to reach wider circulation. A flagrant example is *Nepujsag* [*The People's Journal*] of Pest County." On December 13, 1954, *Szabad Nep* lambasted the *Komaromi Dolgozok Lapjarol* (*The Journal of the Workers of Komarom*):

"Authors of articles probably feel it is enough if they tell the truth approximately. . . . Yet it would be a bad thing if the readers of a Communist newspaper looked upon it as something which told only the approximate truth. . . . The editorial staff must purge such methods from the work of their associates. Party organizations, Party groups must not overlook such cases. . . . And this method must be followed by the rest of the papers because mistakes can be found not only in *Komaromi Dolgozok Lapja*, but in every other journal in the country. . . ."

The December 9, 1954 issue of *Szabad Nep* attacked the two most popular weeklies in Hungary, *Irodalmi Ujsag* (*The Literary Review*) and *Muvelt Nep* (*Educated People*), the former the publication of the Hungarian Writers' Union and the latter a cultural weekly for the intelligentsia. The *Szabad Nep* article was called "Political Blindness" and accused the editors of not paying sufficient at-

tention to the Moscow Convention of European Nations.

"... It is incredible that there should be anyone—and an editor at that—who could have overlooked this important international demonstration. And yet there were such people. This year's 38th issue of *Irodalmi Ujsag* came out on December 4, that is two days after completion of the Moscow Convention of European Nations. The 39th issue of *Muvelt Nep* appeared on December 5. . . . And yet in neither paper do we find even a trace of this historic event. . . . Even literature, art or culture could not have had a more important event than this. What's more, neither could the editors of the literary and cultural magazines."

It was not only the above "political blindness" that *Szabad Nep* was attacking but a series of articles published from October to December 1954 in *Muvelt Nep* in which the New Course was carried beyond the regime-dictated boundaries so that *Szabad Nep* could attack *Muvelt Nep* for "liberalization." Among these articles under attack were Lajos Mesterhazy's "Fighting People's Democracy and What Stands in Its Way," and "Forward and Not Backward Even a Step," (December 5), as well as Denes Polgar's "On the October Road," (November 7) and "A Young People of Age," (November 28). The Party press department sent a declaration to *Muvelt Nep* criticizing the paper, insisting that the editorial board had gone overboard on its "right to criticize," were actually guilty of anti-regime propaganda, and directing that the criticism be published. The editors of *Muvelt Nep* instead forwarded the criticism to the Information Bureau of the Council of Ministers which ruled that the paper did not have to publish the criticism because, although it had criticized public, scientific and artistic events, it had always done so "from a Marxist point of view and based on the government's program." Apparently the Information Bureau had decided that the time was not yet ripe for an open attack on the "liberal" line.

Purge and Rebuke

At the same time, an investigation against "right-wing deviationists" on the editorial staff of *Szabad Nep* took place directed against those who had in recent months gone further than the government program permitted. This disciplinary action took place during the first part of January and as a result the chairman of the board of editors, Marton Horvath, appointed shortly after the announcement of the New Course, was reprimanded, newsman Tibor Meray was sent to East Germany, and Peter Kende was suspended from his job.

This failure of even *Szabad Nep* to keep perfect step to the Party tune was openly criticized by *For a Lasting Peace, For a People's Democracy!* (February 25, 1955) which charged that during last November and December *Szabad Nep* had not properly stressed the development of heavy industry.

"... articles on this topic in the paper [*Szabad Nep*] have been very one-sided for a long time. The paper has given detailed information on the work of light industrial plants; but it did not inform [people] sufficiently on the activities of factories producing the means of production. It failed

to explain to readers what the Party's main task was in the past, and will continue to be in the future: the development of heavy industry. . . . The paper has only recently taken a more energetic stand against the mistaken interpretation of the Party's policy and called the necessity of the development of heavy industry to the attention of the people. . . ."

In February of this year, *Szabad Nep*, its editorial staff already reorganized, attacked the cultural magazine *Csillag* in an article called "The Weapon of Poetry."

"What does the big monthly of the Writers' Guild show?

In July the progressive world celebrated a victory; in Vietnam the guns were silenced and Soviet peace diplomacy was victorious. Yet in the August and September issues of *Csillag* we search in vain for lyrical expressions of joy and relief. . . . In September storm clouds were gathering; at the London meeting, the imperialists agreed on new methods of reviving militarism. In October the notorious Paris Agreement was signed. The Hungarian people concentrated their attention on these events and expressions of indignation became increasingly loud. In November there were practically daily protests in the press: workers, peasants, factories and whole villages protested. And one after the other distinguished intellectuals spoke. But not the poets of *Csillag*. . . . The poems of *Csillag* reflect only the changes in the weather, descriptions of the fall are replaced by descriptions of winter. But the great historic changes of our times are not mirrored in its pages."

Szabad Nep and Magyar Nemzet

The chief difference in Hungarian publications is best exemplified in the differences between *Magyar Nemzet* and *Szabad Nep*. *Szabad Nep* and *Tarsadalmi Szemle* have always been Party-line papers, but *Magyar Nemzet* seemed to become the New Course mouthpiece of the regime. It is the only "bourgeois" newspaper which has been kept alive, chiefly for the deliberate purpose of winning over large segments of the former middle class. Even before the New Course, *Magyar Nemzet* differed significantly from other Communist papers. Staff members of *Szabad Nep*, *Szabad Ifjusag*, and *Esti Budapest* generally are not professional newsmen, while the editors and staff members of *Magyar Nemzet* are journalists and writers of established reputation. For this reason, if no other, the style and general standards of the paper have differed materially from the other papers, even if the contents are not very different.

Often traces of protest appear in *Magyar Nemzet* from the professional journalists, projected between the lines and at other times expressed by absurd exaggeration, as if what is said can be understood in a different and opposite way.

Magyar Nemzet has also maintained certain "bourgeois vestiges." It is the only Communist paper which has carried advertisements, classified ads, obituaries and other personal news all along. It has generally not dealt with the dogmatic and doctrinal issues of Marxian dialectics. It has been less sparing of news from the West than the other papers in Hungary, although that news has been just as liberally spiced with negatives.

Almost from the inception of the New Course, *Magyar Nemzet* has considered it its own, and this proprietary attitude caused the ensuing tension between *Magyar Nemzet* and *Szabad Nep*. *Magyar Nemzet* drew a sharp line between the period before the New Course and after, indicating that in the earlier period grave mistakes were committed which the New Course was designed to correct and which were actually being corrected. *Szabad Nep*, on the other hand, continued to emphasize that there was no basic difference between the two periods. *Magyar Nemzet* has spoken of basic and prevalent errors in the past while *Szabad Nep* has taken the point of view that there were no basic mistakes and only temporary difficulties. If and when such difficulties arose, they were always due to the excesses of local petty tyrants, bureaucratic mismanagement on the lower levels and "counterrevolutionary enemies."

Magyar Nemzet displays a certain understanding of and protection for the intelligentsia, which of course is in keeping with the regime's aim for the paper: trying to win over the middle class and intellectuals and break down their resistance. *Magyar Nemzet* still recognizes the existence of a "private life" as separate from a "public life." *Szabad Nep* continues to ignore all human problems—love, friendship, nature, etc.—while focussing on Party problems, "Socialist competitions," and Plan fulfillments. *Magyar Nemzet*, on the other hand, has since the introduction of the New Course published a long serial novel, keeps dealing with the relationship between public and private life, has launched a long debate prompted by a housewife's letter complaining that housework was insufficiently appreciated in which *Magyar Nemzet* took the housewife's side.

Magyar Nemzet often praises cultural events outside of the Party line. For example, it carried a long article about the German conductor Furtwaengler (December 3, 1954) at the time of his death, and then another on the day of his funeral (December 7, 1954). It often brings news about cultural events, particularly French cultural events, not directly connected with Party-minded cultural affairs. For example, it dealt with the granting of French literary awards (December 3, 1954), had an article speaking appreciatively of American dance music (December 9, 1954), and even mentioned the discovery of a Botticelli painting in the United States (December 2, 1954). On several occasions, it has given space to former middle-class writers who had been silent for a long time, like the sentimental writer Imre Farkas.

Under these circumstances there is little wonder that sharp differences have arisen between *Szabad Nep* and *Magyar Nemzet* on more than one occasion. Generally these contentions arise when *Magyar Nemzet* attacks one of the institutions of Hungarian Communist life, or one of the more important sectors of the "People's Democracy." *Szabad Nep* immediately hastens to emphasize that the trouble is merely local, temporary, and definitely due to the negligence or inefficiency of individuals. On November 7, 1954, for instance, *Magyar Nemzet* launched a campaign against the police, saying that the police were unpopular in the country in every way. *Szabad Nep* promptly went to the defense of the police, but did not mention *Magyar Nemzet*.



Above: Sign on bottle reads "Acids," writing on paper "Criticism of Subordinates."

Below: Signs on bottle and jar read "Milk," "Honey"; writing on paper "Criticism of the boss."

Urzica (Bucharest), November 15, 1954

On several occasions, *Magyar Nemzet* has stated that housing construction has been criminally neglected in Hungary (for example in the November 12, 1954 issue). On November 24, and December 5, *Szabad Nep* came out with great praise for housing construction. *Magyar Nemzet* started another argument on October 31, 1954, by criticizing the low fees paid to authors. *Szabad Nep* then contradicted the statement, whereupon Gyula Hay, a prominent dramatist, confirmed the contention of *Magyar Nemzet*.

Other Papers and Publications

Since the introduction of the New Course, changes have been noted in some of the other papers as well. They report more non-political events; articles on the Soviet Union are considerably less in number; more anecdotes and humorous sketches can be found (before the New Course, *Nepszava* and *Esti Budapest* used to lash out at such things as American methods of keeping the masses in ignorance); and criticism is more frequent, but with the exception of *Magyar Nemzet*, is almost always directed against individuals.

During the early New Course, an important role was assigned to *Szabad Fold*, the agrarian paper which, in the first year of the New Course, had tone and color similar to *Magyar Nemzet's* but has since that time lost its difference and importance.

Two popular magazines, *Nok Lapja* (*The Woman's Magazine*) and *Beke es Szabadsag* (*Peace and Freedom*) have also shown considerable change. *Nok Lapja*, the official organ of the Hungarian Women's Democratic League (560,000 members), carries fewer articles glorifying the physical accomplishments of women and strictly "Party-line" articles. The number of articles on love and

the private life of women has increased greatly. Most striking, however, is the change in the illustrations. Formerly, the illustration cliché was the tractor girl, or the girl next to some machine. Now the pictures usually show couples in a sentimental surrounding.

Of all the Hungarian papers, *Beke es Szabadsag* is closest to the views of *Magyar Nemzet*. It has published a series of illustrated reports by Peter Ruffy portraying the failure of the kolkhoz system and collectivized production, and has also carried several illustrated articles describing the plight of the middle class.

Another striking change can be observed in the style and content of the only cartoon and comic paper, *Ludas Matyi*. The iron rule of not daring to make even the most flattering joke of any of the Communist leadership is still followed, but the tone used in criticizing less important personalities, like agronomists, technicians, bureaucrats, etc., has become increasingly biting. There is more sex in the stories and pictures and definitely more naughty stories. The latter have, in fact, almost reached the prewar level. So-called hearthside or family humor has become much stronger, but the two most important subjects remain work contests and anti-American propaganda. The brutal and coarse attacks on the Vatican and the Papacy have almost disappeared and their place has been taken by satirical attacks on the rearmament of West Germany.

Literary Magazine

The situation of the literary magazines, the bi-weekly *Irodalmi Ujsag* and the monthly *Csillag* (*The Star*), has been interesting. Their attitudes reflect most strikingly the present confusion caused by the tensions between the Old Course and the New. They carry articles enthusiastically advocating freedom for writers and, acting in this spirit, publish ruthless descriptions of the situation in the country. Then, on the heels of these, they publish refutations and denials. It was on July 18, 1954, in *Irodalmi Ujsag*, that Pal Szabo, Chairman of the Patriotic People's Front and well-known popular writer, hailed the "literary freedom" introduced by the New Course and said that "all doors opened up before literary works." On August 1, 1954, *Irodalmi Ujsag* demanded "more attractive and interesting literature" because Communist literature in Hungary was "characterized by uneventful dullness." In the August 15, 1954, issue of *Irodalmi Ujsag*, the young author Istvan Orkeny, who had often been attacked by doctrinaires, wistfully exclaimed: "How long it has been since beauty has been mentioned in aesthetics."

The same trend was manifest even more forcefully in *Csillag*. Lajos Konya, a young opportunist author and originally a doctrinaire Communist who attacked any freedom in literature, wrote a poem against the expression "our happy life," so constantly used by Communist writers (including himself). The poem was published by *Csillag* in October, 1953, and on October 24, 1953, *Irodalmi Ujsag* published an article of self-criticism by Konya accusing himself of having been an exponent of the Old Course. In the November 7, 1954, *Irodalmi Ujsag*, the young Communist poet Peter Kuczka joined the fate of the national economy to the fate of the national poetry, both failures:



The Bureaucrat
Szpilki (Warsaw), January 23, 1955

"We erred together, Comrade. You
As the country's farmer, I as the voice of the people.
And now you are failing with the fall sowing,
And today I can hardly write a poem."

Perhaps the most daring of the literary magazines has been *Uj Hang* (*New Voice*), organ of the young writers.

The magazine was severely reprimanded in 1952 and its whole editorial staff replaced. The November 1953 issue carried a Pal Szabo article which described the resistance against the regime in his own village. An article by Mihaly Gergely, very similar in tone, appeared in the October issue, showing the dissolution of rural life in very realistic colors. The reaction came in an article by the prominent Communist writer Ferenc Karinthy, published in the December 1953 issue of *Csillag*, in which he strenuously objected to this "atmosphere of death"—"there are some who are actually sounding the death knell for the People's Democracy"—and he described the gloomy descriptions sent by *Csillag* reporters from the various counties of Hungary. He criticized the fact that none of these reporters had a word of praise or reported a single achievement in the countryside, nor did any of them mention the activities of the "enemy" in the rural sector.

Karinthy's article was then followed by a long series of articles condemning the excesses of the writers celebrating the new "liberalization." Since then, both *Csillag* and *Irodalmi Ujsag* show a strange contradiction: on the one hand, they publish articles in which the authors make ample use of the new "liberalization"; and on the other, they carry the statements of the Party theoreticians emphasizing that the writers must not deviate from the path of "Socialist realism."

Scientific Magazines

There are a great many scientific magazines published in Hungary, most of them in Hungarian, but there are magazines which carry only foreign-language articles in English, French, German, Russian, etc. Such magazines are *Acta Historica*, *Acta Linguistica*, *Acta Ethnographica*, *Acta Archaeologica*, etc. Before 1953 they were almost completely limited to Russian-language articles. At present only some 25 percent of the articles is in Russian and the rest in various other languages. Formerly every article began with a dialectic Marxist introduction which generally did not relate directly to the subject in hand, and which was subsequently ignored by the author. At the same time, it was absolutely essential to refer to "superior Russian science" at least once in every article, and to quote Stalin at least once as the outstanding member of the field, irrespective of the field.

Recently these rules have been relaxed considerably. In contrast to former complete and unrestrained condemnation of Western scientists, recent articles are more positive. The old tone of scorn for any British or American publication has been replaced by a more objective tone. Of course some basic Communist terminology remains entrenched and recurs continually; one of these is "colonial exploitation."

One of the most striking features of the New Course in the Hungarian publications has been the complete disappearance of the open letters allegedly written by individuals from offices, factories or kolkhozes exposing their colleagues or relatives in a most ruthless manner. These letters were usually written by regime agents and in 1952 and early 1953 *Szabad Nep*, *Szabad Fold* and *Nepszava* carried five to ten such letters per issue. *Magyar Nemzet*, however, never had such letter writers. In the fall of 1952, there was even a regime-sponsored National Conference of Letter Writers, but after the introduction of the New Course, nothing was heard about the organization. There are letters still written and published, either genuine or fictitious, but they are no longer signed "The letter writer of *Szabad Nep*" or "The letter writer of *Szabad Fold*."


Essentially, this difference in newspaper treatment, tone and point of view is part of the regime program. On the "Day of the Hungarian Press," celebrated February 1, *Magyar Nemzet's* editorial gave some idea of the regime's purpose in permitting these divergences.

"The readers' faith in the newspapers has grown and continues to grow because they realize that the papers criticize bravely and frankly the shortcomings of our daily life. The subversive efforts of the enemy have been unmasked and the indifference demonstrated in the past towards the daily troubles of the people have been eliminated, as well as the soulless bureaucratic measures, the dangerous charlatans of our cultural life, and the rest of the troublemakers. . . . We must be ruthlessly severe towards any obstacle which hinders our Socialist development."

Not only do the Communists wish to restore the people's faith in regime publications, but all of the above reveals that the Communists seek to speak to the people, and do so, in many voices. They wish to appeal to as many segments of the population as they can. They are willing to veer and tuck somewhat in their journalistic methods to get their program across as best they can to the audience they wish to reach. Further, they deliberately permit some public and genuine criticism as a form of safety valve for popular discontent provided it does not "go too far" and criticize basic Communist institutions, basic Party policy, or higher Party leadership. Some of the criticisms which appear are undoubtedly a form of resistance by the journalists and editors, but in the main this is subtle, abstruse or implied, and is so dangerous that few deliberately cultivate it. In addition, the regime's "liberalization" policies are intended to give the appearance of differences, without their genuine substance; in short, to provide an illusion of journalistic variety within the reality of Communist publishing uniformity.

Exchange Policy

A Romanian joke says that, according to the clauses of the trade agreement between the Romanian People's Republic and the USSR, the two parties have agreed to the following: ". . . we shall give them our wheat and they, in return, will take our oil."



Tonight, in the countries behind the Iron Curtain, men, women and children will gather around radios tuned to the voices of their countrymen in the West, bringing them the news of the free world, the knowledge that they are not forgotten, and the hope of their future liberation. Radio Free Europe, operating as a home service from abroad, broadcasts over a network of 29 transmitters to Czechoslovakia, Poland, Hungary, Bulgaria, and Romania, competing directly with all Satellite Communist stations.

The Voice of Free Czechoslovakia . . .

The Historic Task


Sometimes, amid the petty worries of everyday life, it is rather difficult to see the true and whole picture of things as they are. Yes, petty worries do exist and nobody who wants to live can afford to scorn them. You, back home, and we, in exile, have to fight for a decent living, sometimes for the small needs and, if not for a place in the sun, then for a little speck of the sun. All this exists but there is also something else, one other fact that I venture to term a higher fact. With all our worries, with our personal lives, with darkness or light in our hearts, we all jointly represent one of the many Czech and Slovak generations; we are the hands into which the accomplishments of our forefathers were given for further development; we are the men who must answer just now for the life of the nation, the ones who can either disappoint or acquit themselves well. Looking at it from one angle we are individuals, looking at it from another we are a link in a chain. We often think of the great men who helped make our nation what it was. . . . But Havlicek, Bozena, Nemcova and Neruda are dead, we are alive and are responsible at present. Masaryk laid his work into our hands—are we capable of continuing it? Many of our people died for freedom. What about us? Do we just turn pale? Do we just wave a hand?

Even though life seems crumbled into details we shall enter the New Year—provided we are what we ought to be—in the realization that it is up to us. It is a realization inspiring to some and intimidating to others. But certain things must be done for our nation that none but us can do. We may be fearful, but even though we are fearful,

the task never ceases to confront us. I should not wish to speak light-heartedly of fear. We know you to be in an evil situation, since the dictator never hesitates to resort to violence. Recently I read a poem by Henrik Ibsen which mournfully extols a man thrust in shackles, whose life work has suddenly been destroyed. What kind of shackles were they at the beginning of our century? Possibly the papers spoke harshly of the man, possibly the emperor had chastized him, and that was all. Fifty years

ago, not even a monarch had the right to put a man who opposed him into shackles. Ibsen used a poetic metaphor. But at present many of us know what it means when real shackles bite into real wrists.

At one time I saw an exhibition of keepsakes of Karel Havlicek who, for a century now, lives in the memory of the nation as a martyr. His was an easy martyrdom—compared to that of today. Havlicek was banished, but



the Austrian government first had him examined by a doctor and when it was found that his lungs were weak, the inimical government sent him, its foe, to a resort in southern Tyrol, placed a house at his disposal, and the police agent who took him there drank wine with Havlicek at every stop—meticulously noting it in the expense account. But in the twentieth century political prisoners in transit sometimes drank nothing but water from lavatories for weeks on end. The wine and that water—this shows the difference between the tyrant of the 19th and 20th century. Never has political persecution been more cruel, and we carefully abstain from calling upon you to do anything that would make you a victim of this ever-ready brutality. We strive for and seek a tactic permitting you to conquer the regime in good health, lest ruins be left of you once victory is

won, ruins incapable of enjoying anything.

While all this is the truth, it is also true that the task persists and with it the need to find ways to pursue it. In this respect, you, more familiar with the present situation in the country, are probably wiser and more inventive than we are. But bear the task in mind. At this time and in the name of the task that faces you as it faces us, we do not ask much more of you than to be aware of the government ruling you in its own fashion, in order not to be deceived by its propaganda. Then, one of these days, this government will easily fall apart, undermined by disapproval of long standing. . . . The government recognizes the great impact of public opinion; this is why it strives so persistently to destroy this opinion and to reverse the notions of good and evil. So far, public opinion in a dictatorship hid in families, sought sanctuary among reliable friends, and erupted in shops and in plants. Now, at this stage, it is your assignment to channel public opinion, to erect—through spiritual bonds for the time being—a people's opposition. . . .

Masaryk spoke of a revolution of heads and hearts. What we need most is precisely such a revolution; nor do we boast of having invented anything new. We believe this revolution to be in progress in Bohemia and Slovakia.

The government offers concessions and will go on offering them. Of course you are to accept every one of the government's concessions. We are not of the philosophical school that says, the worse it goes, the better it is [for our cause]. We are happy about every single concession which makes your life easier and better. . . . The government errs when it says that we are angry. We know the meaning of every single concession: it means that the government had to yield, that the dictatorship was pierced, the despotism weakened, or, in other words, that we are one step nearer our goal. Therefore, instead of being angry, we say: hail to the concessions! It is the kitchen in which the last, great, most important concession is being concocted—the exit of the dictatorial government. The Czech nation elaborated in its history its own, sober revolutionary method. We adhere to this historic method.

This is the Voice of Free Romania . . .

Ghost Congress

(On October 28, the Second Congress of the Romanian Workers' [Communist] Party, scheduled for October 30, was postponed. No future date for the Congress was announced.)

As far as the Second Congress is concerned, Gheorghe Apostol and the other Party leaders seem to be playing the "shell game": now you see it, now you don't. . . .

Let us leave aside for the moment the fact that the [1948 Party] Statutes, which stipulate that the Congress is to be called every fourth year, have been infringed; that no Congress was held in 1952, that the one fixed for March 1954 was postponed until April and then, in April, postponed until October. Let us deal now exclusively with the famous October 30th Congress.

Two months before October 30th, both government and Party became intensely active; everyone wanted to justify his existence by issuing a new important edict. So,

Gheorghiu-Dej hastened to publish the directives of the Second Congress concerning the development of agriculture for the coming two to three years and Apostol published a new revised Statute of the Party, trying to prop up the old husk with several hundred words full of contradictions. The press, of course, became very active too. Entire pages were filled with correspondence and with "material"—as they call it—for the Second Congress. But all this furor—which almost completely overshadowed Vasile Luca's condemnation to life imprisonment—miraculously ceased on October 28th.

On that day, at 6.30 a.m.—an hour when people usually have something better to do than listen to Radio Bucharest—the announcer on Radio Bucharest virtually whispered the following information:

"Taking into account the tasks which have to be carried out by Party organizations for the mobilization of all State and public organs in order to fulfill successfully the autumn sowing and ploughing, collections and delivery of agricultural products, the Plenary of the Central Committee of the Romanian Workers' Party [has] decided . . . to hold the Congress only after the completion of these tasks."

So, two days before October 30th—date of the opening—the Party suddenly realized that the end of October is a period of intense agricultural activity. The Party didn't think of this in April. It seems that foresight is not one of the aptitudes of the Communist Party—as you may have noticed last winter when you were shivering in your homes because there was no firewood to heat them.

Finally a few naive people accepted this pretext for the annulment of the Congress. . . . And the days passed. . . . November passed, and the first snow fell. . . . On November 15th, when the temperature fell below zero and when Transylvania's and Moldavia's hills were covered with several feet of snow, an expert in meteorological forecasts explained over Radio Bucharest to the citizens who began wondering about the Congress, that the first snow doesn't always correspond to the beginning of winter; that this year winter began somewhat early, that it is not considered to be winter until November 22nd, or even later. . . . Don't worry, friends, the meteorologist seemed to be saying, if you haven't gotten firewood, don't worry if the Congress has not yet been held. . . . But November 22nd passed, and snow started to fall even along the Danube valley and reached 30 centimeters in depth in Iassy . . . and still nothing was heard about the Congress.

It looks as if there won't be a Congress for the time being, although the "agricultural tasks" are now completed. Indeed, the following announcement was made over Radio Bucharest:

"The advent of winter has changed the farmers' activities. When snow comes, they move on to the organization of the repair of their machines and tools. In Gilau village [Cluj region], people are no longer so busy with agricultural tasks, and therefore the activity of the House of Culture has increased. Choir rehearsals are held and plays are being prepared."

Radio Bucharest neglected to say whether the shows being prepared by the Gilau farmers include the Second Congress of the Romanian Workers' Party. . . .

This is the Voice of Free Poland . . .

The Case of the Lisowski Family

Citizen Lisowski lives in Dobre Miaste, in the Olsztyn district. Dobre Miasto means Good Town. But it is not so very good, as citizen Lisowski was to find out.

Who is citizen Lisowski? He is a worker, and a "leading" one at that. He works in the Warminska Agricultural Machinery Factory. What did he do, whom did he offend, that the clouds of the so-called People's rule of law descended on him? He wanted a roof to cover his own head and those of his large family. But a roof over one's head in People's Poland is like the Stalinist "superstructure": it must grow from the base. And worker Lisowski did not have a suitable base—he was neither a Party nor a Bezpieka [political police] dignitary. He did not work in the Citizens' Militia, or even in the Municipal National Council. Moreover he did not have the money to offer suitable bribes to the appropriate members of the [Housing] Allocation Department. He was an ordinary worker, though a leading one. Life on such a base can be rich in surprises and disappointments. But let us begin at the beginning. This is how it was.

Citizen Lisowski changed apartments. He moved in with some relatives. At the same time, in conformity with the law in a People's Democracy, Lisowski sent an application to the Municipal National Council, asking to be formally allocated a new apartment. He met all the requirements concerning living space and other regulations placed by the People's State upon living accommodations. He sent one application, another, and still another—he substantiated his claims, he emphasized that he had a large family, that one of his children was ill. Finally, to the fourth application the Municipal National Council replied that he must vacate his present apartment within 24 hours. "Vacate" meant to be thrown out into the street, for the billeting authority had not allocated him a new apartment.

From that moment, events followed each other at lightning speed. Representatives of the so-called People came on stage in all their majesty. The first activity of the so-called People's authority was the arrest of Lisowski by the

Citizens' Militia for not being able to vacate his apartment within 24 hours. Then came the eviction, with the observance of all the rules of the so-called People's legality and concern for the working man. The employees of the Municipal National Council threw his furniture out into the yard. When they had dealt with the furniture, they pulled Mrs. Lisowska—who was pregnant—down the stairs and into the yard. During these manifestations of People's law and order, the Citizen's Militia was in attendance. And when this exhibition of civic responsibility was over, only then did the vice-chairman of the Municipal National Council show the Lisowski family a new apartment. But it was too small, damp and unsuitable for a family of their size.

The correspondents of the newspaper *Sztandar Mlodych* in Dobre Miaste wrote an open letter to the Prosecutor of the People's Republic in Warsaw, describing the whole incident, and demanding justice for the evicted man. O innocence! As a result of this intervention, not only the General Prosecutor but also the Military Prosecutor interested themselves in the case. The case took on quite a different aspect from the one expected by the naive defenders of the man. The lightning struck not at the thugs from the Municipal National Council, but at the journalists from *Sztandar Mlodych*. One was dismissed, the others severely reprimanded. *Sztandar Mlodych* recanted. It apologized to its readers for having been misled by a false version of the incident, and for having wrongly interpreted the entire affair. For it seemed that the greatest crime in this case consisted in giving it publicity. The newspaper offered the following explanation: "The employees of the Municipal National Council . . . who took part in the eviction, performed their duties in conformity with the law."

Does anyone question this? Most certainly everyone concerned performed his duties in accordance with the law of the so-called People's Poland. The Bolshevik law, as Vishinsky once said, does not serve to protect the individual from the State, but to protect the State from the individual. . . . The case of the Lisowski family in Dobre Miaste not only illustrates the "concern" of the People's Government for the working man, but also the "activities" of certain National Councils.

Superfluous Step

Two friends who have not seen each other for a long time meet on a Warsaw street.

"Franek, old boy, what are you doing these days?"

"Oh, there is not much to tell. I'm working in the Ministry of Trade. But what are you doing?"

"I'm a translator."

"What do you translate?"

"Oh, our laws and government decrees."

"How do you translate them?"

"From Polish into Russian."

"Are you crazy? Back into Russian? ! !"

Hungarian Party Resolution

The following are excerpts from a resolution passed at the March 2-4 session of the Hungarian Workers' (Communist) Party dealing with the political situation in the country and the tasks facing the Party. It is the first comprehensive reappraisal of the New Course by a Satellite regime and indicates how the new Moscow line is presently being interpreted with reference to specific conditions in Hungary.

June Road

"... In the struggle for Socialism our Party has ... made mistakes. From 1951 on, Socialist industry aimed at a pace of development in excess of our capacity and economic conditions. In the development of agricultural co-operatives, it failed to pay sufficient attention in certain cases to the principle of voluntary adherence. It also did not give the necessary attention to the mobilization of the latent productive capacity of individual farmers.

"In June 1953, the Central Committee of the Party examined the country's position. With courageous criticism and self-criticism, it exposed the mistakes committed in the course of building Socialism and worked out the measures necessary for the elimination of these shortcomings. The June decisions of the Central Committee proved to be entirely correct.

"However, together with the successful struggle for the implementation of these correct decisions, there were also mistakes and shortcomings in carrying them out. Certain people have distorted these decisions in an opportunist and anti-Marxist manner, a fact which has led to harmful right-wing mistakes and rightist deviation. Consequently, some disquieting symptoms have appeared in the economic and political situation of our People's Democracy.

"In 1954, apart from results achieved in certain fields, industrial production as a whole marked time. The production of industry controlled by the ministries increased 0.3 percent in 1954, whereas the production of heavy industry fell 3.1 percent. Productivity fell in most sections of industry, production costs increased, and work discipline became lax. The development of agricultural production in 1954 was unfavorable ... the quantity of grains was less than in 1953. Also, there was no increase in cattle. Agriculture failed to fulfill its delivery obligations in decisive articles, although every realistic opportunity had prevailed and still prevails. All of this influenced ... the national income, which fell from what it was in 1953.

"The Central Committee of the Hungarian Workers' Party states that under such trends ... the increased standard of living of the workers ... rests mainly on the inroad made in State reserves and the reduction of investments. The raising of the standard of living does not rest on lasting and firm foundations, because the country's economic resources have lately failed to develop satisfactorily.

"The reasons behind the serious difficulties in our national economy should primarily be sought in the rightist, anti-Marxist, anti-Party, and opportunist views which of late—since June 1953—have spread in the Party, the State apparatus, and other spheres. The result has been that in-

dustrial development halted, Socialist accumulation decreased, and State and civic discipline deteriorated.

"The Central Committee notes that the decisions made at the June 1953 Central Committee meeting were correct and continue to remain so even today. Together with the decisions of the Third Party Congress, they form the basis of the Party's policy even today. The Party, as before, in the spirit of these decisions, considers the systematic raising of the working people's well-being and the increased meeting of their social and cultural needs to be its principal objective—on the basis of greater, renewed Socialist production and of higher productivity.

"Our Party considers that this main objective can be assured above all by the development of heavy industry, the entire Socialist industry, and agriculture. Our Party continues the policy of the Socialist transformation of agriculture, of the development of the collective farms on the basis of voluntary affiliation, of supporting the individual farmers, and of asserting the principle of financial interest in increased production on the part of growers so that they can produce more.

"The decisions concerning the establishing of collective leadership, Communist criticism and self-criticism, and the securing of State legality remain valid without any change.

Industry and Rightist Deviation

"... The Central Committee ... states that in the present phase the increased right-wing danger is the main obstacle in the way of a successful carrying out of the Party's correct policy. Therefore the Party's main task lies in the



Caption: Why don't the comrades speak up?

Irodalmi Ujsag (Budapest), November 20, 1954

total isolation and ideological destruction of the harmful rightist views, because only in so doing can the Party's correct policy fully assert itself in every sphere of political, economic, cultural, and social life. . . . These harmful right-wing views manifest themselves in the following manner: first of all, in the distortion of the correct policy of Socialist industrialization. . . .

"Before June 1953 [exaggerated industrialization] and the backlog in agriculture hampered the sound development of our national economy. Today, however, the healthy progress of our entire national economy, the successful building of Socialism, and the steady raising of the people's standard of living on a firm and lasting basis are threatened by the stagnation of our industrial production and by the decline in the output of our heavy industry. If the opportunist, right-wing policy opposing the main line of policy of the Party were to triumph, Hungary would ultimately be dragged down to the level of a backward country.

"The withering away of heavy industry would make impossible the development of agriculture and light industry. . . . In order to enable agriculture to develop, machines and increasingly modern techniques are necessary; mechanization alone can assure the Socialist transformation of agriculture and an increase in yields. . . . Also, the consumer goods industry constantly needs modern machines, which can only be supplied by the heavy and machine industries. The right-wing attitude of opposing the development of heavy industry and of belittling its importance is contrary to the fundamental interests of the working class, the working peasantry, and the intellectuals. . . . All those who relinquish the Leninist-Stalinist principle of priority for heavy industrial development and deny its correctness are really denying the leading role of the working class. It is common knowledge that the political leading role of the working class grows and gains strength parallel with the development of industry and heavy industry. . . .

"In view of the growing tension in the international situation, it is necessary for our Party and government to pay increased attention to the defense of the country. This would be inconceivable without the constant development of heavy industry. . . .

"Lenin pointed out that productivity is ultimately the most important prerequisite for the triumph of the new social order. Losing sight of this fundamental tenet of Lenin, Comrade Imre Nagy often committed the mistake of forgetting this most important and supreme prerequisite for the triumph of Socialism—the necessity of steadily increasing productivity. . . .

Agrarian Policy

"Particularly great harm has been done by those right-wing views, alien to Marxism-Leninism, which have appeared concerning the main issues of the Party's agrarian policy. . . . The Central Committee of the Party affirms that the further consolidation of the worker-peasant alliance is one of its most important tasks. This task, and with it the winning over of the medium peasants, can only be solved by relying on the poor peasantry and by fighting against the kulaks, under the leadership of the working class. . . .



Painter—"What? Don't you like this abstract painting? Doesn't the new government program mean anything to you?" The "abstract" painting still contains the same message: factories, shockworkers and the hand pointing that means, "You."

Ludas Matyi (Budapest), August 15, 1954

Certain petty-bourgeois theories, crushed by Marxism long ago, have been revived and even published in some periodicals concerned with theory . . . some people began to deny the imperative necessity of the Socialist transformation of agriculture, and under this pretext, started to wreck the kolkhoz movement.

"Such views are largely responsible for the fact that there was no numerical increase in our kolkhozes last year. On the contrary, they somewhat decreased, although in a substantial number of kolkhozes the standard of living of the members is better than that of the individual medium farmers. . . .

"The Central Committee . . . clearly sees the opportunities inherent in the development of the production of individual peasant farms. Therefore, it considers the promotion of their utilization to be an important task. However, being aware of the limits to which small-scale peasant farming can be developed, the Central Committee deems it necessary that, by observing the voluntary principle laid down by Lenin, the Party and State authorities should do widespread political, economic, and organizational work in the interests of the consolidation and enlargement of the kolkhoz movement. . . .

"Some Party members have adopted an incorrect attitude on the question of produce collection. It is due to this right-wing attitude and to the undermining work of the kulaks that in 1954 even the correctly-reduced surrender [delivery] plan was not fulfilled. The importance of produce collection was not sufficiently stressed, and the slackening of discipline in produce collection was idly watched. . . .

Nagy and the Party's Role

"The strengthened opportunist deviation has manifested itself also in the depreciation of the Party's leading role. Some people have denied the Party's leading role in the Patriotic People's Front. The creation of the PPF, on the initiative of the Party, was accompanied by right-wing tendencies aimed at reducing the leading role and importance of the Party in order to make the PPF the authority for controlling the State organizations and councils. To enable the PPF to fulfill this role of control and direction, some people tried to make it the most all-round organization of the People's Democracy. In this way they wanted, in fact, to give a greater role to the PPF than to the local councils, which are after all the widest mass organizations. . . .

"The Party is the supreme organizational form of the working class. Consequently, it is the Party which is entitled to direct all mass organizations and to control their activity. . . .

"A considerable part of the erroneous views which have gained ground on the ideological and economic issues is the reflection of the class enemy's influence in the Party and in other fields of the People's Democracy. These rightist views were able to become so dangerous in our Party and in our State because Comrade Imre Nagy supported these anti-Marxist views in his speeches and articles; he advocated them in the first place. One of the fundamental traits of the right-wing line of Comrade Imre Nagy manifested itself in the fact that he denied and belittled the magnificent victories achieved by the Party and that he regularly kept silent about the results achieved. . . .

"... Comrade Nagy and some other comrades in the ministries and in the press—above all in *Szabad Nep*—deceived the working class with cheap demagogic promises. They spread among the working class an atmosphere of complacency, of waiting for the plums to drop into their mouths; they adjusted themselves to the backward sections of the workers; and they thus introduced certain elements of disruption into the working class. Therein lies the principal cause of the insufficiency of industrial work in 1954. In the work of several ministries and of the Council of Ministers, the wrong, harmful, and opportunist attitudes gained ground according to which, if enterprises failed to fulfill the plan, it was reduced repeatedly in the course of the year—instead of doing everything to bring the lagging factories into line with the others, and instead of mobilizing the workers in the struggle to raise productivity in order to fulfill the plans without fail.

Party Tasks Defined

"The Central Committee, taking into consideration the fact that in the present situation it is the right-wing danger which has gathered strength and which constitutes the principal obstacle to our progress in every field, has laid down the main tasks of the Party as follows:

"A—The fundamental task of our Party, in accordance with the decisions of the Third Party Congress, is to lay the foundations for the building of Socialism in Hungary. To attain this goal, the main policy line of our Party . . .

must systematically be asserted by assuring priority to the development of heavy industry in the national economy. . . .

"B—The struggle for laying the foundations of Socialism and the results in Socialist construction guarantee the steady raising of the working people's standard of living—the constant improvement of the material, cultural, and social conditions of the working people—which has always been, and shall always remain, the main aim of our Party's policy. . . .

"... The steady raising of the working people's living standards demands a ceaseless increase in industrial and agricultural production, an increase in productivity, and a fall in production costs. A determined struggle should be waged for enforcing strictest economy in materials and finances, for restoring and strengthening work discipline and for conscientious meeting of civic duties such as tax paying, compulsory produce delivery, and so forth. . . .

"C—Within the 1955 plan, a 5.7 percent increase over 1954 in the production of Socialist industry and a 7.3 percent increase in agricultural production must be assured. Coal production must go up by 4 percent, metallurgical production by 4 percent, and electric power generation by 10 percent as compared with 1954. A considerable increase must be insured in the production of consumer goods. Per capita output in industry must be raised by 3.9 percent as compared with last year, and production costs on the whole must be reduced by 3 percent. Generally speaking, a 2.3 percent economy in raw materials must be attained. In 1955 about 9 million *forints* must be used for investments, and 4.8 billion *forints* for replacement of equipment. National income must increase by 8.4 percent as compared with 1954. . . .

"D—The Central Committee authorizes the Political Committee to work out in detail the guiding principles of the Second Five Year Plan in the spirit of the decisions of the Third Party Congress. It should take into consideration the priority of heavy industry, and within it, that of manufacturing of the means of production, the further development and modernization of agriculture, the laying of the foundations of Socialism in agriculture, and the further increase in the production of consumer goods. . . .

"E—It is necessary fully to safeguard by all means at our disposal the unwavering ideological, political, and organizational unity of our Party. . . .

"F—An uncompromising ideological struggle must be waged against every deviation from the Party's policy—in the present case, primarily against right-wing deviation. . . ."

"The leading and directing role of the Party must be insured in every sphere of social and state life—in the state organs, in the mass organizations, and movements, in the press, radio, and literature, and so forth. . . .

"The Central Committee makes it obligatory of Party organizations to widen the scope of the Party's relations, with all means at their disposal, with the broad masses of workers, peasants and intellectuals. . . ."

Signed: Central Committee of the Hungarian Workers' Party.

Current Developments

Area

Collectivization

Although the Communists have not been pressing collectivization of the countryside for the past 20 months, they have not forgotten their doctrinal commitments to it. Present insistence that the process be carried out by "persuasion" and the "principles of voluntariness" are reiterated almost daily in editorials, radio broadcasts and instructions to rural Party agitators. Nevertheless, the Communists have continued to make efforts to bring peasants into the collective sector. Statistics on the Communist program in the countryside are confused by the usual secrecy, deliberate falsification, and "errors of omission," but the following is the most recent information on the progress of that program.

Albania

131 kolkhozes as of January 1955 (Radio Tirana, Sept. 15, 1954 and Jan. 17, 1955).

21 sovkhoses as of September 1954 (Radio Tirana, Sept. 15, 1954).


Bulgaria

2,747 kolkhozes as of December 1953. These contained 568,989 household units, 53 percent of all household units. They comprised 2,548,182 hectares of arable land, officially claimed to be 60.5 percent of all arable land, more probably 51.7 percent of the total (*Otechestven Front* [Sofia], Feb. 27, 1954). The number of kolkhozes is now approximately the same; there has been a slight increase in the number of members.

Czechoslovakia

6,502 kolkhozes as of January 1955 (*Rude Pravo* [Prague], Feb. 19, 1955). This was stated to be an 11 percent increase over 1953, for the beginning of which year a figure of 5,848 was given. However, a number of previous official, and conflicting, figures for the middle and end of 1953 are all higher than the 1955 figure given: 6,782 at the end of 1953 (*Rude Pravo*, Jan. 31, 1954); 6,679 at the end of 1953 (*Rude Pravo*, April 15, 1954); 7,038 as of June 30, 1953 (*Rude Pravo*, Dec. 19, 1953).

The last available figure on percentage of land in kolkhozes is 33 percent of the total arable land at the end of 1953 (*Rude Pravo*, June 12, 1954). This figure was 40.6 percent at the end of 1952.



Caption: "... and thus, according to Party directives, you should act independently, develop the initiative of the masses and cement ties with them ..."

"Yes, Comrade, but with respect to this independence of action, when will we receive directives on the topic from the Central Committee?"

Szpilki (Warsaw), February 20, 1955

Hungary

4,500 kolkhozes at the end of 1954 (*Kozgazdasagi Szemle* [Budapest], Dec. 1954). This is a decrease of 177 from the end of 1953, of 815 from the end of 1952. Kolkhozes at the end of 1954 comprised 1,140,000 hectares of land, 20.8 percent of the total arable land. At the end of 1953 kolkhozes comprised approximately 1,117,000 hectares, 20.2 percent of the arable land (*Szabad Nep* [Budapest], Dec. 30, 1953); in April 1953 they comprised 1,494,000 hectares, 27.2 percent of the arable land (*Szabad Nep*, May 11, 1953).

The number of members in kolkhozes has dropped much more sharply. There were about 300,000 at the end of 1954; 238,000 at the end of 1953; 500,000 in April 1953.

Poland

9,712 kolkhozes at the end of 1954 (*Trybuna Ludu* [Warsaw], Jan. 30, 1955). These comprised 1,800,000 hectares, 8.5 percent of the total arable land (*Zielony Sztander* [Warsaw], Jan. 1, 1955). There were "more than" 200,000 members. At the end of 1953 there were "more than" 8,000 kolkhozes, comprising 1,500,000 hectares, 7.2 percent of the arable land, with 200,000 members (*Gospodarka Planowa* [Warsaw], March 1954). From the middle of 1953 to the end of 1953 there was apparently no growth in kolkhozes.

Romania

Approximately 2,300 kolkhozes at the end of 1954. There were 2,048 in the middle of 1954 (Radio Bucharest, August 22), around 2,000 at the end of 1953 (Radio Bucharest, Feb. 11).

There were approximately 2,700 simple associations at the end of 1954, 2,384 in the middle of 1954, 2,087 at the end of 1953.

Kolkhozes and simple associations together comprised approximately 1,100,000 hectares at the end of 1954, 11.6 percent of the arable land. In the middle of 1954 they comprised 977,000 hectares, 10.3 percent of the arable land (742,000 hectares in kolkhozes, 235,000 hectares in simple associations).

There were 318,000 families in kolkhozes and simple associations at the end of 1954 (Radio Bucharest, Feb. 1, 1955); 300,000 in the middle of 1954 (182,000 in kolkhozes, 118,000 in simple associations); 280,000 at the end of 1953 (178,000 in kolkhozes, 102,000 in simple associations).

"Crimes Against 'Socialist' Property"

In the past year there has been a great increase in the number of press reports of crimes throughout the area. These crimes are almost all of the same character: against State property. Thefts of goods from factories and collective farms (particularly by employees), embezzlement, falsification of records to obtain unearned premiums or other benefits—such crimes have been more and more frequently reported and those guilty of them are receiving increasingly severe sentences. Essentially, these crimes are of two types: one the normal quota of criminal activity any society has; the other a special variety of active and passive resistance by the captive peoples to the Communist regime's oppressions and deprivations.

On February 22, Radio Budapest reported the arrest of a group of workers of a factory who, led by the factory's chief mechanic, had stolen engines, spare parts and other equipment from the plant to the value of 204,000 *forints* between January 1953 and September 1954. On February 16 six court proceedings were reported, including the sentencing of a woman to a year's imprisonment for the illegal slaughtering of a calf, the trial of 29 functionaries of a Budapest catering establishment for extorting money from

workers under the threat of having them fired, and the sentencing to six years imprisonment of a railway employee for "pilfering social property . . . 7,000 *forints* worth of goods at the Oroshaza railway station." On February 27 Radio Prague reported the trial for embezzlement of three functionaries of a collective farm and an official of the national committee of the district. The three farmers were the chairman, treasurer and bookkeeper of the kolkhoz; the defendants received sentences ranging from two to six years imprisonment. On February 19, *Rominia Libera* (Bucharest) reported five trials, including the sentencing of a kolkhoz fund manager to nine years imprisonment for embezzlement, and the sentencing of the head of the stockroom of a factory to three years imprisonment for selling parts and tools on the black market. On February 15 *Zycie Warszawy* (Warsaw) reported the trial of an employee of the State Timber Office and three associates for accepting bribes in the matter of timber allocation to handicraft cooperatives; sentences of one and a half to three and a half years were handed out.

These are merely random examples of the very large number of such reports. It is apparent from editorials, cartoons and official comments that throughout the area the regimes are seriously troubled by this increase in crimes.

It is not surprising that there has been an increase of crimes of this sort under the New Course. The relaxation of the most extreme measures of police-state harshness made the risks seem less, and regime propaganda about the need for higher living standards provided added incentive to take personal initiative in the matter. Hungary, where the New Course went furthest, has apparently suffered most from the increase in crime, and has reacted by making more stringent laws. *Szabad Nep* (Budapest), January 23, reported that the death sentence could henceforth be passed for theft of State property. In less serious cases punishments up to ten years imprisonment are provided. It was stated that during the "present temporary shortage of raw materials much damage was done to the State by the theft of material from State factories."

Hungary

The Central Committee resolution (pp. 46-48), reported by Radio Budapest on March 9, is a culmination of recent criticism of certain New Course trends. It denounced the under-emphasis on heavy industry that led to a 3.1 percent decrease in production in 1954, and that necessitated the use of State reserves. It castigated the tendency to make of the Patriotic People's Front an organization independent of the Party and of major influence in the government. Premier Imre Nagy was accused of being the fountainhead of these "right-wing" and "anti-Marxist views."

The resolution was shortly followed by a number of speeches to the same point, by Politburo member Mihaly Farkas, First Party Secretary Matyas Rakosi, and First Secretary of the Budapest Party Committee Istvan Kovacs, all delivered on March 11.

The new line seems to be an attempt to correct excesses



Title: Because of a lack of control, a group of cashiers has embezzled a large amount of money.

Caption: Financial Inspector—"It appears that nothing is missing from the safe."

Sturshel (Sofia), December 24, 1954

Two Aspects of Slipshod Production



Caption: "... seems I've whittled it down a little too much—well, never mind ..."



"Outrageous, the meat is burnt to cinders ..."

Uj Vilag (Budapest), December 30, 1954

in the New Course program, much as the New Course itself was an attempt to correct previous excesses in economic and political planning. Under New Course emphasis on consumer goods industry, heavy industry was allowed to fall into a dangerous state of stagnation. The New Course political "liberalizations," designed to elicit from the workers higher productivity and greater cooperation, have not only completely failed in that aim but were threatening to weaken Party control of the country.

The resolution does not call for a return to pre-New Course economic, social or political policy. Economically, the planned industrial growth for 1955 is far below that of the years of intense industrialization. An attempt is being made, however, to pull heavy industry out of the decline it has suffered in the last year and a half, and certain heavy industry installations, like the Stalinvaros complex, upon which work was halted under the New Course, are to be finished.

Politically, the authority and scope of the PPF will be curtailed. The resolution was careful to reaffirm, however, that the New Course principles of "collective leadership, Communist criticism and self-criticism, and the securing of State legality, remain valid without any change." Nevertheless, it seems probable that there will be some diminution in the range of criticism permitted.

In agriculture, the resolution reaffirms the necessity for eventual full collectivization, but also states that this must be attained "voluntarily" and without pre-New Course coercions. Probably the major increase of pressure for collectivization will fall upon kolkhoz and Party functionaries, from whom improvement of kolkhoz performance and conditions will be demanded in order to make collectives more attractive to the peasants.

Indeed, Rakosi's speech, reported on Radio Budapest, March 13, particularly stressed that the single regard in which the resolution represents a return to pre-New Course principles is that it demands greater sacrifice and discipline from Party members:

"I am afraid that some comrades will believe that we are not returning to the conditions prior to 1953 in any respect at all. I must say frankly, however, that in certain respects we will return. Prior to 1953 the entire Hungarian working population, headed by the working class, achieved miracles of rebuilding and offering sacrifices. We want to revive these traditions! We want particularly to revive the Communist setting of examples, the Communist will to shoulder sacrifices and to take a courageous stand for the cause of Communist building."

In general, the new resolution represented a calculated attempt by the Party leadership to maintain control and direction of the New Course policies, and to prevent deviations either to the "right" or "left."

Curb on Meat Speculation

A new decree prohibits independent farmers from selling slaughtered hogs, pork or lard bacon, and permits them to sell processed hog meat only if they have fulfilled all compulsory deliveries and have enough fattened hogs on hand to "assure the fulfillment of this year's obligations," according to *Szabad Nep* (Budapest), February 17. Kolkhozes may sell pork from hogs fattened in the kolkhoz, but may not purchase hogs for the purpose of selling their meat. Live hogs and cattle may be sold by independent farmers only if they can prove that the hogs have been in their possession for at least 60 days, the cattle for at least 90 days. Farmers who have outstanding compulsory deliveries may sell no cattle at all, and only those hogs weighing less than 60 kilos.

The purpose of this decree is to reduce speculation in meat on the free market which, according to *Szabad Nep*, has "assumed enormous proportions." The newspaper stated that:

"A large number of people try to use our policy to develop the free market for profiteering, black marketing and boosting prices ... the difference between the price of live

hogs and pork has increased tremendously. Many farmers marketed the meat not of hogs they had fattened but of pigs they had bought just for that purpose, and thus engaged in a profiteering business. This phenomenon could be observed in kolkhozes too."

Many farmers have taken advantage of the high free market prices, and failed to deliver their compulsory quotas. *Szabad Nep*, February 19, stated that "Frequently the delivery collectors themselves are the middlemen, who sell the delivered pork at high profit on the black market." There have been frequent press reports of legal action taken against farmers who have failed to fulfill deliveries and slaughtered hogs without permission. They are generally sentenced to one or two years in jail. *Szabad Nep*, February 27, called for an increased campaign against offending independent farmers who have been "sabotaging the country's economy." The editorial demanded that future offenders be "punished in an exemplary manner."

Other Decrees

There have been other recent agricultural decrees, several of them favoring kolkhozes. Farmers who join kolkhozes before April 30 will be exempted from paying the 1955 income tax on their private land, according to *Magyar Nemzet* (Budapest), March 6. Since kolkhoz farmers do not pay this tax, the exemption will actually apply only to the first four months of the year.

Fees for certain kinds of work done by MTS have been reduced 10 to 25 percent, according to *Szabad Nep*, February 23. These reductions apply only to kolkhozes.

As in previous years, special encouragement is being given to farmers to conclude contracts for certain crops with the State or with enterprises at prices higher than those for quota deliveries. A decree published in *Szabad Nep*, February 12, provides that if such contracts are concluded for certain vegetables, the area sown with such vegetables is exempt from delivery quotas, and the farmer may sell surplus production on the free market.

Fruit growing is being particularly encouraged, presumably with an eye to the export market. *Szabad Nep*, February 6, reports that farmers who take up fruit growing are exempted from compulsory deliveries and eight years of taxes on the land so cultivated.

Czechoslovakia

Delivery Price Increases

Continuing the emphasis on increased agricultural production, the regime has announced a series of price increases for compulsory deliveries and above-quota bulk purchases, according to Radio Prague, March 3. The increased prices will be paid to independent and collectivized farmers alike.

The price of cattle for slaughter was raised 1.40 *koruny* per kilo of live weight for compulsory delivery and above-quota purchases. The compulsory delivery price of hops was increased 65 to 265 *koruny* per quintal, depending on quality; in addition, the bonus payment for deliveries in

excess of contract was raised to 45 percent from the previous 40 percent. The compulsory delivery price of sugar beet was raised to 13 *koruny* per 100 kilos, an increase of one *koruna*. The price of hog hides was increased an average of four *koruny*. Prices were also raised for poppy seed, chicory, hemp seed and various kinds of vegetables. It is claimed that the new prices will increase farmers' incomes by 372 million *koruny* this year.

"... [The price increases] will provide an incentive to kolkhoz farmers, as well as independent farmers, in their effort to increase further agricultural production, particularly to develop animal breeding, the rapid increase of which is of exceptional importance for the rise of all agriculture and for the increase of meat and fat supplies for the population. It will lead to an effort to develop sugar beet growing and the cultivation of hops and other technical products for food supplies, for industry and for foreign trade."

Increasing foreign trade has particular relevance to cultivation of hops, a very large percentage of which was in the past used for export (in addition to those exported in the form of the famous Czechoslovak beers). In 1948 the new Communist regime greatly curtailed the cultivation of hops in favor of grain; in 1953, with the New Course, hop-growing was revived.

Aid to Independent Farmers

It appears that there is now a campaign under way to increase very sharply MTS aid to independent farmers. A February 24 Radio Prague report stated that "MTS have concluded contracts with 45,000 independent farmers in the Czech regions, and will perform tasks equal to the 'medium tilling' of 338,000 hectares of land." No comparable figure has been released for the Slovak regions, but an indication that this startling concession is also to be granted in that area was given by a February 19 Radio Prague announcement that members of the Youth League employed at certain MTS have formed a special section which will devote 70 percent of its time to independent farmers.

This aid seems to represent more than mere passive toleration of independent farmers, and indicates that at present the regime is prepared to go further in New Course agricultural concessions. The necessity for increasing agricultural production has become more pressing, and the failure of kolkhozes to produce or to increase as planned necessitates further regime dependence on independent farmers.

Kolkhoz Congress

The Second Congress of Collectives was held on February 18-20. In the major speech of the Congress, Minister of Agriculture Marek Smida "emphasized the importance of the meeting at a time when the Party and government have ordered the increase of agricultural production, which has lagged behind industry; the low level of agriculture is slowing down the growth of the standard of living" (Radio Prague, February 19).

After giving some unconvincing figures on the growth

of kolkhozes (see p. 49), and statistics on the increased production and income of kolkhoz members, Smida went on to state that:

"... we cannot be absolutely satisfied with results achieved so far. . . . The real reason for these transitional difficulties in the development of some of our collectives is primarily that the principle of voluntary membership has not always been rigidly applied, that the economic prerequisites for an even growth of kolkhoz production have not always been secured, and that at many places the destructive activity of the class enemy, the village rich, has been underestimated."

Smida referred only briefly to the major problem of kolkhozes, the recruitment of manpower. This topic, however, was stressed by other speakers who called for "a considerable improvement in this sector."

Manpower

The regime press and radio have been continuing the drive for agricultural workers, particularly in the border areas depopulated by the expulsion of the Sudeten Germans. A March 6 Radio Prague broadcast reviewed the advantages and inducements offered to new farmers in these areas. Among them are housing at very nominal cost, 13 hectares of free land and a cow for those who enter kolkhozes, 50 *ares* (one *are* equals 100 square meters) of land for a private garden plot not subject to compulsory deliveries for those who enter State Farms and MTS, a kitchen and a bedroom free for newly wedded couples, free land for independent farmers and rural craftsmen.

Romania

Gheorghiu-Dej on Agriculture

In a speech delivered at a conference of leading agricultural workers, February 27-March 3, Premier Gheorghiu-Dej gave a comprehensive summary of Communist achievements and failures in agriculture, and detailed future plans. Agriculture, he stated, is to receive greatly increased attention in the coming year:

"To realize the decisions of August 1953, the enlarged Plenum of the Central Committee, the Party, and the . . . government took a series of economic, technical and organizational measures bound to bring about an increase in agricultural production. . . . Investments in agriculture were increased as far back as the autumn of 1953, and in 1954 their volume reached over 1.8 billion *lei*. In the 1953 to 1954 period, agriculture received 5,820 tractors, 1,750 threshing machines, 2,777 reaper-binders and 615 self-propelled combines. In 1955, investments in agriculture will reach approximately 2.8 billion *lei*, and agriculture will be supplied with another 2,540 tractors, 4,370 tractor plows, 1,585 grain seeders, 1,600 reaping and binding machines, 1,200 threshing machines and other agricultural machinery and implements." (Radio Bucharest, March 3)

This tractor delivery rate is well below that of 1952.

In addition to this firm espousal of agriculture and the indication of the remarkable degree to which it is to be pushed in 1955 (investments to increase over 55 percent

over 1954), Gheorghiu-Dej emphasized the assistance to be given to independent farmers as well as kolkhozes:

"The working peasantry received State credits under advantageous conditions. The volume of credits . . . will be increased 300 percent in 1955 over what it was in 1954. In order to permit the collective farms, peasant associations and independent peasants to obtain credits, an agricultural bank was set up at the beginning of this year, and has already begun its activity."

Gheorghiu-Dej followed present Satellite practice of making an obeisance to current Soviet emphasis on heavy industry, but carefully linked heavy industry with the production of agricultural machinery: "The equipping of our agriculture with up-to-date tractors and machines was made possible because the State paid great attention to heavy industry and primarily to the machine industry, which has been set up in the years of the people's power."

Corn

In discussing productivity of corn per hectare, Gheorghiu-Dej revealed that the regime hopes to attain, although it has not yet done so, productivity as high as was obtained forty years ago:

"If forty years ago, on areas of hundreds of thousands of hectares, production of over 2,000 kilos per hectare was achieved, then production exceeding 2,000 kilos of corn per hectare can be achieved today when the land belongs to those who till it, and when the State-led working class, in alliance with the working peasantry, supplies agriculture with perfected tractors and machines and when agricultural sciences have made important progress. . . . In 1954 an overall production of six million tons of corn was obtained, that is, an average production of almost 2,000 kilos per hectare. Many regions and districts obtained a much larger average production per hectare."

It was stated that "between 1948 and 1953 the area under corn diminished by approximately 800,000 hectares." This land was sown with technical crops and vegetables. This reduction adversely affected cattle breeding, and was the reason why "the population during those years received not only smaller quantities of grain, but also smaller quantities of meat, milk, cheese, eggs, fowl and other animal produce."

With the New Course, the area sown to corn was increased, and in 1954 reached about 3.4 million hectares. This is still almost 300,000 hectares less than the area sown to corn in 1948. Gheorghiu-Dej stressed the importance of grain for the whole economy: "Boosting grain production is the most important target in the development of agriculture and the solution of the grain problem is the main prerequisite for the development of all other branches of agriculture and for permanent improvement of supplies to the population." He called upon the country to "rally all our forces to produce in 1955 a crop of 10 million tons of wheat and corn and a country wide average yield of at least 2,000 kilos of corn per hectare."

As for other types of produce, Gheorghiu-Dej stated that "In order to increase the supply of nutritious farm produce . . . and in order to insure that the light and food industries have the necessary agricultural raw materials, it

is necessary, in addition to increasing grain production, . . . to give special attention to increasing the production of potatoes, sugar beet, sunflower, and other crops."

It was another speaker at the conference, Petru Groza, Chairman of the Presidium of the National Assembly, who produced the statement in most pointed contrast to the current emphasis elsewhere in the area on heavy industry as the foundation of the economy:

"The aim of this conference is clear—the undertaking of a great battle to gain more and better bread for all the workers, bread without which we cannot live. The same old peasant I mentioned above said wisely, 'Without the bread we are winning, neither I, the peasant, nor the workers in factories and plants, nor the employees in offices, can live; neither can airplanes fly nor submarines cross the sea.'"

Concessions to Farmers

A government decision, announced by *Scinteia* (Bucharest), February 3, provides for considerably higher prices to be paid to farmers for industrial crops and medicinal and aromatic plants. In addition to the price increases, a number of other advantages (also given last year) are offered to increase incentive for production.

Hemp and flax prices were increased by over 50 percent. Cotton prices were raised for the higher grades. Farmers growing produce covered by the decision will be exempted from compulsory deliveries on the land so cultivated. They will receive free shoots, free use of sowing machines, free bacterial fertilizers and chemical fertilizers at "advantageous prices," among other aids. Although all the incentives and advantages are offered to both independent and collectivized farmers, kolkhozes and sovkhozes are to receive slightly more advantageous terms in some matters.

Another decision, to encourage vegetable and fruit growing, was announced by Radio Bucharest, March 1. Kolkhozes, peasant associations and independent peasants who conclude contracts for delivery of vegetables and fruit with State and cooperative enterprises will be granted a number of advantages, including the right to buy tools and fertilizers at lower prices, 75 percent discount on seed prices, long-term credits, and sizeable tax reductions on the areas so planted.

Aid to Independent Farmers

Commenting on the National Agricultural Conference held from February 27 to March 3, *Scinteia*, March 5, stressed the aid to be given independent farmers:

"MTS, which have an important role to play in agriculture, must do much more; they must conclude as many contracts as possible with both 'Socialist' and independent farms. Party agencies and people's council executive committees must carry out widespread political work to convince independent farmers to help each other with tools and livestock, to buy and use in common machines and tools sent by the State to villages. . . . Our industry must enlarge the variety, increase the number and improve the quality of farm machinery and tools for independent farm-

ers, deliver the necessary spare parts on time, produce ever more fertilizer, etc."

The wording of the article seems to indicate that such aid to independent farmers is tied to their willingness to "cooperate" with each other and with the regime, and this could mean that the regime is aiming not only at raising the level of agricultural production but also at inducing private farmers to join agricultural associations.

Bulgaria

Kolkhoz Congress and Agricultural Failure

The Fourth Conference of Agricultural Collectives was held on February 15-17. The major speech was made by Premier Vulko Chervenkov and consisted largely of a thoroughgoing admission of failure in agriculture.

According to *Zemедельско Зname* (Sofia), February 17, Chervenkov stated that during 1954:

"We did not attain success in our work for higher average yields, and we were not able to fulfill the decisions of the Sixth Party Congress on the development of agriculture. The plans for 1954 with reference to wheat, rye, oats, fodder, etc. were not fulfilled, and production was poor. Such average productivity as 120-130 kilos of wheat or 50-60 kilos of tobacco per decare is very low, and is inexcusable. . . . We must clearly and sincerely say that the plan for the average production in agriculture during 1954 was not fulfilled. Also, the plan for compulsory deliveries was not fulfilled. The inevitable difficulties under these circumstances were avoided thanks only to the existing State reserves."

Among the causes for this failure were, according to Chervenkov, "natural calamities"—unusually bad weather. He went on to say, however, that "The main reason, in the end, lies in our work and ourselves."

In greater detail, he stated:

"From our visits to the kolkhozes in the Vratza and Pleven districts we learned the reasons for the poor results—bad labor organization, poor management! Robberies occur, and everybody points to thieves but nobody arrests them. People work the fields intensively, but for months none of the administrators goes there. The President of the kolkhoz Gradishte, the Party Secretary, the President of the Control Council, the former President and many members—relatives of the executives—have withdrawn huge sums in advance, and much produce. . . . Members of the Control council . . . take for personal use more land than is permissible, and arbitrarily award themselves a great number of 'work days' for 'control work.' In too many kolkhozes the responsible administrators use their positions for personal benefits. . . . I must state, Comrades, that such occurrences are too frequent, that they are of the most dangerous kind, and we must turn against them cruelly, without mercy. . . . The abuse of position, the thefts, the corruption must not be tolerated, they must be fought."

In addition to attacking corruption, Chervenkov also blamed incompetence of planners and administrators for the agricultural failure. Fodder was not grown in sufficient quantity, crops were sown where they could not grow,

bureaucratic rules were applied "mechanically," without regard to local conditions. MTS failed to provide sufficient aid to kolkhozes. Among the results of poor management, according to a speech at the Congress by the Minister of Supply and State Reserves, Roussi Hristozov, was the loss of over 3 million kilos of rice through spoilage which resulted from the failure of kolkhozes to harvest and thresh on time.

The speakers at the Congress called for greater effort and greater cooperation among all sectors of the people: "The strengthening of the kolkhozes can be attained only on the basis of close collaboration between Communists, farmers and honest non-Party people."

Party Meeting

In a speech to the Pleven District Party organization broadcast over Radio Sofia, March 13, Chervenkov repeated his strictures on the failure of agriculture, particularly in regard to average yield. He stressed the important role of the Party in improving the organization of agriculture: "It is imperative that the Party and State authorities improve the management of the rural economy, rise to the need of the impending tasks, and secure their execution."

Chervenkov also emphasized the inter-dependence of agriculture and heavy industry, repeating the general Party line that "agricultural development is possible only on the basis of . . . priority in development of heavy industry," but adding that ". . . the upsurge of agriculture itself is a very important pre-condition for the successful industrialization of the country."

In speaking of the methods by which the Party must improve agricultural work, Chervenkov emphasized the position that the Party must obtain the willing support of the masses: "To guide does not mean to command; your decisions should be obligatory only for Party members." He also stressed the need to obtain the widest support possible: "The district Party committee should be everywhere, trying to win support from everybody." Corruption and nepotism were castigated:

"The Party member does not possess and is not entitled to possess any privileges and favors not shared with other citizens. . . . The Party cannot tolerate members who are covetous for more important and easier jobs, or who show willingness to benefit themselves or their relatives."

Errata

The figures on agricultural expenditures given last month, p. 55, were misleading, later reports have indicated. Total State expenditures for agriculture in 1955 will be 1,772.5 million *leva* (the figure previously given was for State plus people's councils and kolkhoz expenditures). 1954 expenditures were 1,670.5 million *leva*.

Capital investments in agriculture will be increased from 458 million *leva* in 1954 to approximately 700 million *leva* in 1955.

In addition, later reports reveal that in the February 3 decree on agriculture (NBIC, March 1955, p. 60), the increased prices for farmers do not apply to compulsory de-



Caption: "Watch it, we'd better scam, there's somebody coming!"
"Relax, it's only an ordinary cop."

Szpilki (Warsaw), January 2, 1955

liveries, but to surplus deliveries of over-quota production. These prices, although higher than the compulsory delivery prices, are in many cases lower than free market prices.

Show Trials

In addition to the call to all elements to aid the agricultural program, the regime staged several trials against "thieves and wasters of cooperative property," timed to coincide with the Congress. In one of these, four Communist functionaries of a kolkhoz were convicted of embezzlement and misappropriation amounting to hundreds of thousands of *leva* and tons of grain, according to *Otechestven Front* (Sofia), February 22. They received sentences ranging from ten to fifteen years imprisonment.

In another trial, reported in *Otechestven Front*, February 20, 39 persons were convicted on 240 counts of stealing grain from State and cooperative warehouses. Two of the defendants received death sentences, five received sentences of twenty years imprisonment, the remainder sentences up to fifteen years.

Poland

Economic Policy Clarified

There has been further clarification of the regime's attitude toward the relative emphasis to be placed on heavy and consumer goods industry. A Radio Warsaw broadcast, February 26, began with claims of the great advance in industrialization achieved in the last few years. Twenty-five types of Polish machine tools, it was stated, had recently been exported to Argentina, which would have been impossible in 1949, when Poland could not meet its own

urgent requirements. By 1954, however, "Poland had moved to fifth place in industrial output in Europe; today we are exporting not only lathes but complete equipment for industrial plants." The broadcast continued:

"Industrialization means primarily the expansion of heavy industry. In accordance with our 1955 Plan the output of heavy industry ought to increase by over six percent. At the same time the production of consumer goods is to go up by some 11 percent. The fixing of this sort of proportion for the current year is warranted by the need to remove the disproportion created in the past between the production of heavy industry and the consumer goods industry. The inference, however, that this state of affairs can be perpetuated would be completely false. This should be mentioned because some people are not quite clear about this issue.

"It should be stressed most clearly that conditions under which the output of heavy industry goes up at a slower rate than consumer goods production are exceptional. Such a ratio must be regarded as a departure from a binding principle. Why? Because heavy industry is the foundation of the entire economy. Only on the basis of its speedy expansion is the harmonious development of all branches of the national economy possible. Only then is a rise in living standards possible."

The broadcast went on to speak of the necessity for an "appreciable increase" in agricultural production, which is "possible only through the necessary supplies of agricultural machinery and artificial fertilizers." Similarly, it was stated, the increase in textile production and in new construction is possible only by increases in such sectors of heavy industry as coal and electricity.

The broadcast called for increases in productivity, possible only with the "introduction of modern machinery into agriculture, industry and transport—in other words . . . the rapid development of heavy industry."

The broadcast also referred to the need for heavy industry to bolster national defense. An article in *Zycie Warszawy* (Warsaw), February 16, was more explicit on the relation between that need and higher living standards. In reply to a question as to whether "the need which has arisen in connection with the sharpened international tensions did not make it impossible for us to fulfill the tasks of the Second Congress concerning the raising of the living standard," the editors replied:

"Doubtless, the need to strengthen our country's defence has a restricting effect on the possibility of raising the standard of living of the working masses. However, the tasks of the Second Congress, designed to raise real wages of workers . . . and real income of working peasants by 15 to 20 percent during the two years 1954-55, will be fulfilled . . . perhaps closer to the upper limits of the task. In what degree we will manage it depends . . . particularly on the reduction of production costs and the increase of productivity."

There will apparently be, in 1955, an increase in the amount of consumer goods produced by heavy industry. Radio Warsaw, February 28, stated that the production of

consumer goods by the machine industry will increase 70 percent over 1954, including 460,000 radio sets, 250,000 bicycles, and washing and sewing machines. "This year," the broadcast stated, "directors of machine industry factories will be made personally responsible for the production of consumer goods."

Trade Union Meeting

The Fourth Plenum of the Central Council of Trade Unions was held on February 14-15. The two major topics discussed were the extensive development of "Socialist competition" and the transfer of management of the social insurance program from the State to the unions.

The major speech was delivered by Wiktor Klosiewicz, chairman of the Central Council. He stressed the importance of improved "Socialist competition" as the chief means for attaining the planned 5 percent increase in industrial productivity and 7.5 billion *zlotys* decrease in production costs. He praised the work done by the movement in 1954, but added that "a turning point has not been reached by the trade unions in directing the labor competition movement; in particular the turning point has not been reached in the wide development of the competition movement for the lowering of production costs." (Radio Warsaw, February 14)

The necessity for obtaining popular support in the competition movement, rather than relying on the artificial enthusiasm and political pressures of a few activists and functionaries, was emphasized: ". . . we must ruthlessly put a decisive end to administrative methods in organizing the labor competition movement, so as to support it more fully through the initiative of leading workers and give it the character of a mass movement from below."

Klosiewicz was careful to speak of combining "the fulfillment of production plans and the development of labor competition with the deepest solicitude for satisfying more fully the material, cultural and social needs of the working man." Solicitude is also to be shown toward "health and welfare problems . . . hygiene regulations . . . the entertainment and leisure hours of the working people." Such solicitude, he said, is "the unbreakable foundation on which the mutual confidence and connection between trade unions and the masses will be developed."

The transfer of the management of the social insurance system, announced as impending at the Third Trade Union Congress in May 1954, was finally implemented by a decree of February 2, 1955. Responsibility for sickness, family, maternity and unemployment benefits will be the unions'; pensions will still be controlled by a State ministry. In addition to management of funds, unions will have legislative initiative in the field of social insurance and the right to make pertinent ordinances and regulations.

It was revealed that over 6.5 million workers are covered by social insurance. Including dependents, the number covered by the program is 14 million, well over 50 percent of the population.

Recent and Related

Close Contact, by C. H. Dewhurst (*Houghton Mifflin: \$4.00*). General Dewhurst was Chief of the British Mission in Eastern Germany from March, 1951 until March, 1953, and prior to that, Military Attaché in Yugoslavia. In this book he gives an informal and humorous account of his experiences with individual Russians of all classes and ranks, including their reactions to Stalin's death. There are many quoted conversations. He says, "I was . . . in closer contact with the Russians over the last two important years than anyone even in Moscow, and I write here what I thought of the experience and of the people I met, without going into . . . details of my actual mission work."

Labor Productivity in Soviet and American Industry, by Walter Galenson (*Columbia: \$5.50*). In this study the author, professor of industrial relations at the University of California, has three purposes: "to trace the development of labor productivity in a number of Soviet industries since 1928; to compare productivity in these industries with that in their U.S. counterparts; and to arrive at some general conclusions on comparative labor productivity in Soviet and American industry." The book is divided into three sections in which Mr. Galenson discusses "the productivity concepts employed and . . . the problems involved in . . . statistical comparisons," details studies of separate industries with "U.S.—U.S.S.R. productivity comparisons" and evaluates and speculates on his results. Tables and bibliography.

Ritual of Liquidation, by Nathan Leites and Elsa Bernaut (*Free Press: \$6.50*). In this detailed study of the Moscow trials of August 1936, January 1937 and March 1938, the authors systematically analyze "a major part of the background of the trials and the records of the proceedings" in an attempt to answer the question, ". . . why and how did the defendants confess—and resist?" Acknowledging the difficulties inherent in such research and that "speculation" cannot be avoided, the authors quote extensively the actual testimony and, in an epilogue and a postscript, relate this testimony and their conclusions to the Rajk, Kostov and Slansky trials, the Beria episode and the conflict between Soviet and Yugoslav Party leadership. The study is divided

into three sections, "Capitulation," "Confessions" and "Resistance," with a section entitled "Veiled Language" which illustrates various methods employed by defendants to indicate covertly the falsity of their confessions. Extensive notes, bibliography, index of names and index of quotations.

The Red Carpet, by Marshall MacDuffie (*Norton: \$4.50*). Mr. MacDuffie has been in Russia twice since the war; once in the first half of 1946 as chief of an UNNRA mission, and then in the fall of 1953 for sixty-five days on a visa from M. S. Khrushchev, whom he had known during his first visit. This well-illustrated book contains the author's impressions of Russia and its people, based on his personal experiences and observations. Although he is not inclined to draw general conclusions, Mr. MacDuffie found two major—and contradictory—currents running through Russian life today. One is the everywhere-expressed and undoubtedly sincere desire for peace among the people, and the other, heavy militarization and a virulent anti-American campaign. He says, "I came out as before—impressed by Soviet ability and drive, troubled by Soviet methods and aims, abhorring Communism more than ever, and quite fond of the Russian people."


The Prospects for Communist China, by W. W. Rostow (*Wiley: \$5.00*). Written in collaboration with others by the director of the China Project at the Center for International Studies at M.I.T., this book "aims to pull together in the compass of a short volume what we know about Communist China; and it aims to assist in the making of a forward-looking American policy by offering a unified interpretation of Peking's intentions and its ability to achieve them." After reviewing China's modern history, its economic stability and its relationship with Moscow, Mr. Rostow concludes that "the present position of the Chinese Communist regime on mainland China is internally secure," and that it will fight to maintain its domestic hold, but will attempt neither major war nor further Asiatic expansion at the expense of its internal security. Chronology, appendices, selected bibliography and index.

School of Darkness, by Bella Dodd (*Kenedy: \$4.00*). A member of the American Communist Party's National

Committee until her expulsion in 1949, Mrs. Dodd, in her autobiography, recounts her emotional and intellectual development from the days of her arrival in the United States from Italy at the age of five through her days as an educator with a growing involvement in the Communist Party to her return to the Catholic Church. Index.

The Pleasure Is Mine, by Mircea Vasiliu (*Harper: \$3.50*). The light-hearted autobiography of a young Romanian diplomat's discovery of America. He describes the complex and amusing process by which he moved from the life of a professional diplomat in Romania to that of an American artist and illustrator. Illustrations by the author.

Two Studies in Soviet Controls: Communism and the Russian Peasant, and Moscow in Crisis, by Herbert S. Dinerstein and Leon Goure (*Free Press: \$4.50*). Believing that "control, both of its apparatus of rule and of the masses ruled, is the central problem of the Soviet system," the authors examine, in these two complementary studies, the "problem of control" in two specific situations. The first is the general area of "conflict between the interests of the regime and those of the peasantry," where Mr. Dinerstein discusses structure, function and hierarchy in the rural sector and the "behavior and attitudes of peasants and officials." He concludes that after twenty-five years of collectivization, resistance and mismanagement exist in much the same forms, primarily because "for the Bolsheviks the future is still more important than the present, humanity in the abstract more important than human beings." The second study investigates the problem of control, and the people's reaction to it, in a time of crisis—the advance of the Nazi armies on Moscow. The situation is examined, with the assistance of testimony by eyewitnesses, because "many lessons can be learned about the nature and durability of any system of social control if it is possible to observe it at a time of severe stress." The authors find that "at the height of the crisis the majority of the population of Moscow did not rebel against their rulers. And, on the basis of available evidence, they had no intention of doing so." Notes and bibliography.



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